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Foreword
The materials gathered for this publication are part of a larger initiative of the Center 
for Policy Studies at CEU and tiri–making integrity work, a London-based NGO. 
In order to address broader issues of governance reform, public policy dilemmas, and 
democracy building challenges, the Public Integrity Education Network (PIEN) was 
launched jointly by tiri and CPS in 2004 and has been lead by tiri since 2006. The 
network was established with the following key objectives: to facilitate the develop-
ment of eﬀective, policy-oriented training and teaching programs on corruption 
control and organizational integrity; to bring together established, leading universities 
primarily from major regions of the world so that new training practices can enter into 
the mainstream and rapidly gain local legitimacy; and to build regional networks for 
joint research projects and the development of a pool of critical and independent case 
studies of reforms. 
One of the key activities of PIEN in the last three years has been the development of 
a ﬂagship advanced summer course on Integrity Reform, within the Central European 
University’s Summer University setting in Budapest. Drawing on interdisciplinary 
academic perspectives and lessons learned from practice, this course represents one of 
the few targeted, applied, and yet conceptually grounded eﬀorts currently available 
internationally for the analysis of corruption and anti-corruption. The 2007 summer 
university succeeded in bringing together a critical mass of individuals involved in this 
topic of high policy and social relevance. A novelty in 2007 was the division of the 
course into four Policy Labs devoted to the in-depth analysis of (a) Applied Legal Skills 
for Integrity Reform and Anti-Corruption; (b) Fiscal Transparency and Corruption Risks; 
(c) Governance of Natural Resource Revenues; and (d) Integrity in Reconstruction Aid and 
Programming.
The overarching aim of the policy labs was to bring together international experts in 
a given ﬁeld and experienced stakeholder representatives to identify and address the key 
policy challenges faced in a particular domain. By providing suﬃcient coverage of the 
analytical, methodological, and strategic issues faced in a number of diﬀerent contexts, 
credible strategic policy reviews were developed.  Lab participants revealed a coherent 
structure and set of learning outcomes that can be used as the basis of teaching in main-
stream education. The policy labs were devised as a problem-centered collaborative eﬀort 
that called for innovation, experimentation, and testing based on empirical evidence.
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The development of the Policy Lab on Fiscal Transparency and Corruption Risks was 
a joint endeavor between OSI’s Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative 
(LGI), the Center for Policy Studies at CEU, and tiri–making integrity work. The 
objective of this lab was to combine a civil society agenda, focusing on transparency and 
accountability, with a governmental perspective in terms of corruption risks in public 
ﬁnances, budgeting, and ﬁnancial management. The multidisciplinary approach involved 
insights from public ﬁnance, public policymaking, and various ﬁelds of public service 
management. The lab was grounded in two distinct but complementary perspectives 
on public ﬁnance: one arising from the ﬁduciary duties of governmental agencies, the 
other from demands of opening up budgeting and ﬁnancial management to wider social 
control—both of which imply increased attention to minimizing the loss of public 
money to corruption and incompetence.
The contributions to this resource book by the invited experts, of whom many served 
as resource persons to the course in 2007, will demonstrate our strong conviction in 
an approach that tackles technical governance and broader accountability problems in 
their interrelations. We hope that this volume will provide a useful tool to those who 
are committed to working towards making government institutions more open and 
decision-making more inclusive. We are conﬁdent that there are many such committed 
practitioners, advisers, and civil society activists working with governments both on the 
national and sub-national levels for the beneﬁt of the broader public. 
Violetta Zentai 
Director
Center for Policy Studies (CPS)
Central European University
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1. Corruption Is Systemic
Corruption—the use of public power for personal gain—has been studied from many 
diﬀerent angles. The chapters collected in this publication mostly focus on one aspect 
of corruption, when decisions are directly linked to public ﬁnances. So regardless of the 
fact whether corruption provides personal or institutional gains, whether it is considered 
grand or petty, these reports examine diﬀerent stages of public ﬁnance management. 
They analyze the budget cycle starting from the allocation of public funds (budgeting), 
through revenue policies (tax collection and the sharing or transferring of national 
budget funds to lower levels of government) and spending (procurement, contracting, 
asset utilization) till audit and its information base. 
The most eﬀective anti-corruption policies can be designed by understanding govern-
ments’ incentives and their behavior in those areas where the money is. Our assumption 
is that the risk of corruption is the highest in those ﬁelds and transactions where money 
directly ﬂows between diﬀerent actors. Mismanagement of public funds does not always 
mean that personal beneﬁt and misuse of public resources is always intentional on every 
occasion. These are just the areas that are most frequently exposed to corruption and 
ineﬃciency, and a better understanding of the rules of the game will lead to greater 
integrity and better service provision in the public sector. 
This approach, focusing on malfunctioning government is based on the assumption 
that corruption has systemic causes. Consequently, the problems of low-scale bribes or 
grand corruption should be understood within the broader framework of public sector 
rules and procedures. Unprofessional government decisions and ineﬃcient management 
of services will lead to accidental losses in the public sector. So behind corrupt govern-
ment practices one could often ﬁnd a lack of knowledge, missing competencies, and a 
low level of technical capacities. 
The basic requirements of ﬁscal transparency—set by the International Monetary 
Fund—also identify four major systemic areas of good government. They are the clarity 
of roles and responsibilities; the availability of public information; open budgeting and 
reporting; and the assurance of integrity through consistent, relevant, and audited data.1 
So governance matters a lot in the ﬁght against corruption.
 
2. Governance Matters
The term governance in this context is used in a broad sense. Firstly, governance aims 
to ensure legitimacy through better accountability. It is achieved through representa-
tion and due processes, but legitimacy is also based on trust. The political practices 
and administrative institutions have to be adjusted to the given social environment 
and they should be commonly accepted. Secondly, governance is about the capacity of 
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professional decision-making, which is supposed to be transparent and inclusive as well. 
Thirdly, good governance means also the policy implementation capacity. This aspect of 
governance is highly relevant in the period of expanding markets and when government 
functions are changing under New Public Management schemes.
These three dimensions of governance show that corruption is aﬀected by several 
factors. Consequently, anti-corruption policies might have diﬀerent forms, ranging 
from legal and administrative measures to the opening of decision-making procedures 
and increased professionalism in public service management. Proportions and timing 
of these techniques will inﬂuence the success of anti-corruption measures. 
2.1 Decentralization and Corruption 
The form and scale of decentralization are critical elements of government moderniza-
tion eﬀorts. With expanding municipal functions and competencies, the lower govern-
ment levels have high responsibilities in managing public functions.2 So in countries 
with multi-level governments—being federal states or unitary countries with diverse 
municipal structures—various issues of corruption come up. The basic questions are 
whether corruption is higher in more decentralized states and are speciﬁc accountability 
schemes and integrity mechanisms needed at diﬀerent levels of government. 
Despite the skepticism of general public opinion towards the impact of decentral-
ization on corruption (“like the sea, the deeper we go the darker it is”), the literature 
does not prove that corruption risks become higher with decentralization.3 The primary 
lesson from these studies is that the level of corruption depends on how decentraliza-
tion was implemented, and consequently on the interacting social, administrative, and 
ﬁnancial factors. So integrity mechanisms will be diﬀerent in developing, transition, 
and developed countries. 
In a decentralized setting great eﬀorts have been made to understand the role of 
local governments in public sector integrity. And the increased number of corruption 
cases may be explained by the new ease with which they can become public. In devel-
oping countries decentralization did not necessarily bring the intended results of greater 
accountability and transparency, as family-based social networks captured local leadership 
and created uncontrolled lines of reciprocity. But the experiences of successful transition 
countries have proved that ﬁscal (revenue) decentralization increased local accountability 
and created incentives for innovations and increased transparency. 
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3. The Accountability Framework 
The methods and techniques of accountability are critical conditions of successful 
anti-corruption policies. Within public service provision, where ﬁscal transparency 
issues most often come up, accountability schemes are built around three actors and 
in several directions.4  The World Development Report in 2004 has widely publicized 
this model by specifying the linkages between the main actors in service provision: 
(i) citizens/clients, (ii) government (state), and (iii) the service producer. Based on 
this approach, the long and the short routes of accountability have been identiﬁed by 
separating vertical (citizen-government; state-contractor) and horizontal (client-service 
producer) connections (Figure 1).
This categorization of instruments of public sector accountability has not only 
helped to develop new tools, but it also has supported their eﬀective use for diﬀerent 
types of public services. So the “voice” mechanisms of public participation, better access 
to information, and open budgeting put a greater pressure on governments in the case 
of services with larger economies of scale (e.g., water supply) or low-income barriers 
(e.g., urban transport). 
Figure 1. 
Improving Social Accountability in Public Service Delivery
Government (state)
integrity of the civil service
decentralization
transparency
  
election audit/supervision
public participation grant allocation
access to public information contracting out /PPP
budgeting public procurement
corporate sector (publish what you pay)
international organizations
Citizen/client Service producer
pricing
complaint mechanisms
customer council, board 
citizen charter
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The horizontal linkage between the user of public services and the service organiza-
tion is based on various instruments of control. This short route of accountability is 
primarily based on “exit” mechanisms oﬀered by the marketization of public services. 
In this case user charges and fees provide direct connections between the customer and 
service producer. Pricing is supplemented by other forms of inﬂuence through complaint 
mechanisms, general contracts in the form of citizen charters, and control over manage-
ment decision in consumers’ councils. 
The long route of accountability—the linkage between the citizen and service 
producers through the state—is completed by the “compact” mechanisms introduced by 
the government. They are various forms of technical supervision, the audit system, and 
ﬁnancial transfer schemes. In a market environment rules and procedures of cooperation 
between the public and private sector supplement these traditional forms of control. 
Public procurement and contracting out regulations, and legal and ﬁnancial conditions 
of public-private partnership schemes determine the balance of power between govern-
ment, citizens, and contractors.
Chapters in this book discuss some of these techniques of accountability and their 
impact on public sector integrity. However, all these methods are developed in a speciﬁc 
social and economic environment, so the country context of corruption has to be taken 
into consideration. 
4. Context in the Corruption Formula
The classic formula on corruption incorporates three factors that determine the level 
of corruption: monopoly power, discretionary authority, and level of accountability. 
Obviously, the lack of competitors will increase the risk of corruption, as there are no 
alternatives. Within this monopolistic environment (in the arms business, oil industry, 
public works, etc.), where decisions are usually not controlled by any balancing market 
powers and there is a wide discretion over any kind of resources, the chances of corrup-
tion are higher. Unless some forms of accountability limit the discretionary powers.
However, this model with the three factors is always inﬂuenced by the social environ-
ment. Corruption means diﬀerent things in diﬀerent societies and the level of tolerance 
greatly varies by cultures. This is why the ethical system is built into the original model 
by “putting into brackets” monopoly, discretion, and accountability: C={m+d-a}/e. 
Due to diﬀerences in values and social norms, acceptance of corruption greatly varies 
in diﬀerent cultures. These country-speciﬁc factors are expressed by tolerance of society 
towards corruption and they are also reﬂected by the administrative culture or civil 
service ethics as well. 
Researches based on world values surveys have proved that cultural factors explain 
75 percent of the variation in the perceived corruption index.5 Along the economic 
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dimension of values, the “survival” orientation deﬁnes higher levels of corruption, 
while on the social axis it is “traditional” values. This is known from everyday practice: 
the transparency of public decisions is limited when a shortage of goods and services 
increases the risk of corruption or when family lines determine social interaction. 
Strong local networks, often closed societies with tribal or family-based cultures, 
might create an environment where corruption is tolerated. This social capital can 
be utilized successfully by some individuals; however, the larger community suﬀers 
signiﬁcant losses. But these values are going through a change over time, when new 
generations become better educated and wealthier.6 This will result in more rational 
argumentation-based decision-making in the public sphere and the gradual dominance 
of self-expression values will promote the opening up of the public sector. 
5. What to Do?
The great variety of relationships between the critical actors in diﬀerent cultures will 
make the choice of eﬀective anti-corruption methods more complicated. There is a wide 
range of potential actions: economic measures, legal and administrative methods, rules 
and procedures, and the involvement of other social actors.7 This complexity explains 
why the exchange of experiences in the ﬁght against corruption is managed at two 
diﬀerent levels: on the one hand, there are general international codes and conventions 
and, on the other hand, toolkits and case studies are compiled on speciﬁc subject areas. 
Their objective is similar, as both of them intend to provide assistance to governments, 
civil society organizations, or businesses to develop their own methods for coping with 
corruption. 
This book intends to combine the lessons from the general recommendations and the 
instruments used for speciﬁc areas in the public sector. There are three basic messages, 
which are put into the overall framework of good governance. 
5.1 Risk Assessment Approach
As there are several factors inﬂuencing the quality of governance, the scope of actions 
in ﬁscal transparency has to be limited. In order to narrow down this broad topic, the 
risk assessment approach was followed in the selection of the key issues of corruption 
in public ﬁnances and public service management. We tried to identify those topics and 
sub-areas of governance that are the most exposed to corruption. This risk assessment 
method—often used in auditing—might be helpful in developing anti-corruption 
policies in speciﬁc areas as well. 
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5.2 Cut the Web
In more complicated cases, like public procurement or contracting with private service 
providers when social traditions also inﬂuence these transactions, anti-corruption policies 
have to take into account the complexity of these interactions. The simple two-level, 
principal-agent model with a vertical relationship has to be further reﬁned. Corruption 
exists within the public sector between various public agencies and actors who issue 
licenses, deal with environmental problems, etc. Under this scheme, a principal itself 
becomes a client, who might reach another principal through an agent. So this relation-
ship could be characterized more as a web of informal connections within the public 
sector, having contacts at certain points with private entities. 
International organizations, as ﬁnancial institutions or through their technical assis-
tance programs, are also involved in these public service actions. In this sense account-
ability became global, so actors can move out from the domestic arena and inﬂuence 
local actors through international organizations. This has modiﬁed the accountability 
scene and opened new possibilities for cutting the informal network of interconnected 
actors in the domestic scene.
5.3 Transparency Does Not Solve Everything
An important lesson from using the governance approach was that corruption in public 
ﬁnances can be decreased principally in two ways. Firstly, by making government 
institutions more open and decision-making more inclusive. This is true in the case of 
budgeting, contracting out, and management of public assets. But there are areas of 
government operation that cannot be made entirely opened. Either because the tech-
nical complexity of the issues (e.g., details of public procurement, monetary policy) or 
because of the conﬁdential nature of the government action (e.g., protection of personal 
information by the tax administration). So the lesson is that in these cases when deci-
sions cannot be made entirely transparent, then internal mechanisms and procedures 
of the public institutions should be improved. Here administrative accountability, rules 
and regulations of public sector management, and the enforcement of ethical standards 
might be the solution. 
6. Chapters in This Book
The topics of this book are connected to each other under the good governance and 
accountability framework. After presenting this new accountability agenda, the speciﬁc 
anti-corruption approaches and measures are discussed in the following chapters of two 
types. The ﬁrst ones focus on the integrity mechanisms of the public (civil) service, 
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intergovernmental ﬁscal relations, tax administration, and audit and supporting ﬁscal 
information systems. These are the topics where public institutions and decision-making 
procedures can be controlled by the general public indirectly. So here transparency 
should be combined with administrative accountability mechanisms. 
The second group of topics on the rules and techniques of budgeting, forms of 
public-private partnerships, and public asset management is more about those issues, 
where transparency and direct involvement of the public is feasible and desirable. They 
are the tangible issues where public actions are exposed to corruption, because this is 
“where the money is.” 
These two types of topics are put into the cycle of public fund management. But we 
could not cover all the issues of ﬁscal transparency and corruption control in the good 
governance framework. The most important subject areas left out from this book are 
planning rules, administrative regulations on issuing permits and licensing, procedures 
of urban planning, preparation of government decisions, and public policymaking. 
As the summer university course in 2007 also focused on other critical areas of public 
integrity (postwar reconstruction, management of natural resources), the linkages to 
these speciﬁc topics have to be further explored as well. In transition countries a similar 
cross-cutting theme left for future analysis is corruption in multiethnic countries and 
communities.  
These papers targeted towards two groups of potential readers. Firstly, they were 
aimed for  the participants of “Integrity Reform and Strategic Corruption Control” at 
the Summer University Course at Central European University in 2007. Hopefully the 
participants of future SUN courses will ﬁnd them useful. Secondly, the publication is 
intended to help the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative of Open 
Society Institute–Budapest in designing their programs and also in assisting its partners.
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A b s t r a c t
This chapter discusses the evolution of the elusive concept of accountability. It first tries to 
elaborate on the kinds of relations that constitute accountability. It also presents the compo-
nents, directions, and dimensions of accountability to better discern the different meanings 
of the concept often used confusingly in the literature. The chapter then discusses different 
approaches that are used to strengthen accountability relationships both within the public 
sector and between the public sector and citizens. In order to do so, the chapter groups 
these different approaches under two main categories: supply- and demand-side account-
ability approaches. The goal is to present these often loosely connected approaches in a 
coherent framework that recognizes the interactions among them which target improving 
the accountability of both central and local governments towards citizens. The chapter 
builds on the interrelationships between the concepts of the discretion and accountability 
and it argues that accountability follows discretion granted to public officials. The argu-
ment is such that elected and appointed officials in central and local governments should 
be provided with an appropriate discretionary space, the use of which would be the source 
of their accountability. The accountable use of their discretion could be facilitated both by 
public sector and social accountability approaches that aim to strengthen citizen oversight 
and vigilance over the political, administrative, and fiscal spheres of such discretion. 
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1. Accountability: An Elusive Concept
Over the last decade, accountability has come to be recognized as the cornerstone of 
good governance in development discourse. However, the scope and meaning of account-
ability has been extended in various directions so much so that it became an elusive 
concept—it means diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people (Mulgan 2000). In a variety of 
political and academic dialogues, it is used as an umbrella concept, synonymous with 
transparency, accessibility, responsiveness, answerability, control, responsibility, and 
integrity. These terms are very important components of accountability; however, they 
themselves do not constitute a genuine form of accountability (see the section below 
on components of accountability). 
In discussions on good governance, it is also very important to cover the issues of 
the direction and dimensions of accountability. There seems to be a plethora of terms 
used in the literature. Each implies a diﬀerent direction and dimension of an account-
ability relationship. 
1.1 What Exactly Is Meant by Accountability?
In political discourse accountability often is used interchangeably with good govern-
ance, which stretches its meaning further, contributing to its elusiveness. Accountability 
actually speciﬁcally refers to the practice of account giving. The most concise descrip-
tion of accountability is the obligation to explain and justify conduct (Bovens 2006). It 
therefore is also a social relationship between an actor, the accountor, and a forum, the 
account-holder or accountee (Politt 2003). According to Bovens (2006), the account-
ability relationship between the actor and the forum consists of three elements: (i) the 
obligation of the actor to inform the forum about his conduct; (ii) the forum’s power 
to interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of the information or the legiti-
macy of the conduct; (iii) the forum’s power to pass judgment on the conduct of the 
actor—it may approve of an annual account, denounce a policy, or publicly condemn 
the behavior of the actor.
1.2 What Are the Diﬀerent Components of Accountability?
An accountability relationship as such between an actor and a forum is composed of 
various constitutive elements. It is important to note here that these elements individu-
ally are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for a relationship to be an accountability 
relationship. Presenting them individually as if they constitute accountability relation-
17
G o o d  G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  t h e  E m e r g e n c e  o f  a  N e w  A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  A g e n d a
ships is a major source of confusion in the accountability literature. The constitutive 
elements of accountability include:
  transparency, being exposed to public scrutiny; 
  accessibility, to anyone, anytime, anywhere; 
  responsiveness, to people’s needs and preferences;
  control, for the abuse and misuse of public authority;
  responsibility, of public servants to their professional standards and ethic values;
  integrity, that describes high standards for the conduct of work.
Transparency
Transparency is about establishing open processes and providing systematic reports on 
government operations. Access to information is a precondition for public scrutiny. It 
is a basic building block for open government and is enshrined in the constitutions of 
many Western countries. 
The publication of annual reports, performance data, and public accounts are impor-
tant tools for ensuring public scrutiny of past government actions. The publication of 
policy documents, strategic plans, and legislative timetables are all important features 
of public sector openness. They should all be done in a way that enables non-public 
stakeholders to monitor government actions and be able to contribute to policymaking 
processes and plans for the future.
Yet, it is important to note that while transparency is an important source of account-
ability, it does not guarantee accountability (which is essentially built on answerability 
and sanctions based on certain standards). 
Accessibility
Building an open government that is accessible to anyone requires, at a minimum, 
provisions to ensure equal treatment. A freedom of information law is one of the recent 
public sector tools used in establishing an open government as such. However, as these 
laws are very recent in historical terms, their impact on accountability has yet to be seen 
in many developing countries. Administrative laws also can help build more open and 
accessible governments by deﬁning the basic conditions for citizens’ access and estab-
lishing mechanisms for holding public institutions accountable for their performance 
and decisions. They provide guarantees for citizens in their interactions with government, 
uphold the rule of law, and give substance to constitutional rights. They often include 
provisions to ensure that citizens who are potentially aﬀected by administrative actions 
and decisions have the possibility to receive prior notice of, and defend their interest 
in, a given decision-making process. They oﬀer choice and provide means for seeking 
redress. Many countries have introduced citizens’ charters with the aim of providing 
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high-quality public services. By introducing these charters, governments have provided 
citizens with a means of assessing their own experience as users of public services against 
declared standards of service.
Responsiveness
Responsiveness is the capacity (and willingness) to identify and respond to the needs 
and preferences of citizens. A recent discussion note prepared for U.K.’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) addresses the distinguishing aspects of accountability 
and responsiveness1 (Moore and Teskey 2006). According to the note, accountability 
can be a very powerful source of responsiveness but it is not the only source. There can 
be many other sources of responsiveness, including (a) war or confrontation with radical 
internal oppositions (the need to keep people loyal and supportive), (b) a strong sense 
of nationalism, including pride that one’s people are doing well compared to others (c) 
fear that, if the masses are not educated or healthy, the whole nation, including the elite, 
might suﬀer, and (d) the desire to help taxpayers prosper so that the government might 
get its revenue easily (Moore and Teskey 2006). To say that a government is responsive 
implies nothing about why that is the case. The interesting case the note presents is the 
governments of the Confucian world (Taiwan, Japan, Korea, China, and Singapore) who 
could be identiﬁed as responsive to mass welfare despite the absence of strong account-
ability mechanisms (Ibid 2006). The point here is that presence of high level of respon-
siveness does not guarantee high levels of accountability, and vice versa. In that sense, 
accountability may or may not bring responsiveness. Similarly, responsiveness, being a 
kind of behavior, may or may not constitute to form an institutionalized form of account 
giving against preset standards (accountability). This is why it is important to distinguish 
between the two and not to fall into the confusion often seen in the literature. 
Control
The control component of accountability seeks to ensure that the authoritative and 
coercive powers of state are not abused or misused. In diﬀerent systems, an array of 
accountability processes and mechanisms help to control the exercise of power.
Responsibility
Public servants are accountable to their professional organizations as well as their ethical 
beliefs for responsible behavior. 
Integrity
Public sector activities that have a demonstrable ethical base are an important part 
of building and maintaining public trust and enabling employees to better serve the 
public interest. Many governments have agency codes of conduct and ethics as well as 
principles of conduct in place.
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These terms—transparency, accessibility, responsiveness, answerability, control, 
responsibility, and integrity—are often used as a synonym for accountability. Yet, as 
mentioned before, although they are very important prerequisites for accountability, 
they themselves do not constitute a genuine form of accountability. 
An accountability relationship is characterized by three building blocks: standards, 
rules, and norms (against which the accountee is measured); answerability (the obliga-
tion to inform and to explain the conduct against the standards); and enforcement (the 
capacity to impose sanctions on power holders if those standards are not met) (Goetz 
and Jenkins 2001). 
Answerability here refers to the obligation of public oﬃce holders to explain and 
justify their conduct to others. It is about having the obligation to answer questions 
regarding decisions and actions. Answerability is an important component of account-
ability, uncovering unauthorized actions by oﬃce holders, and allowing for the next 
step to build an accountability relationship: enforcement. 
In the public sector literature on accountability, the aspect of enforcement is 
very often not an explicit feature of the accountability deﬁnition. It is assumed that 
enforcement forms a natural part of the bureaucratic sanction and reward scheme and 
accountability is often used as a synonym to responsiveness. With the recognition that 
good governance cannot be achieved by governments alone but is the process of collec-
tive problem solving, the accountability relationships become more complex. Within 
a broader governance concept the power relationships with actors outside the govern-
ment are not automatically deﬁned by clear administrative or political rules. It is in this 
context that enforcement becomes a critical and distinguishing aspect of accountability. 
This does not necessarily mean that the actor who seeks information and explanation 
(answerability) is the same as the one that can enforce actions. Frequently those two 
functions are separated but linked within a governance framework. 
1.3 Directions of Accountability
Over time and in diﬀerent contexts both the questions to which a government is answer-
able (standards) as well as to whom it might be accountable has changed and diﬀerent 
forms and approaches to accountability have evolved. As a consequence diﬀerent terms 
have been coined to describe and distinguish this growing accountability agenda. 
The agenda has also been expanded to deﬁne diﬀerent directions that accountability 
relationships may take. The most frequently used terms to describe the directional aspects 
of accountability are horizontal and vertical, as well as downward and upward account-
ability. Although they have slightly diﬀerent meanings, these terms are frequently used 
interchangeably. In this section, we will present the distinguishing aspects as well as 
interrelated meanings of these terms. 
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Horizontal accountability describes a relationship between state agencies in the same 
hierarchical level (e.g., between diﬀerent line departments), whereas vertical and upward 
accountability refers to a given hierarchical structure within government. The term down-
ward and vertical accountability is the ability and mechanism of the state to be accountable 
towards its constituency. On the other hand, upward accountability is usually referred to 
the accountability of a lower echelon government entity towards its overseeing government 
agencies. Upward and downward accountability are commonly used in the context of 
decentralization to characterize the accountability relationships between the decentralized 
government and the central government (upward accountability) and the between the 
decentralized government and the constituency (downward accountability).
In the social development literature the term horizontal and vertical accountability is 
often used in a diﬀerent sense.2 Horizontal accountability is referred to as the capacity 
of state institutions to check on the performance of other public agencies and branches 
of the government. Horizontal accountability mechanisms are mechanisms inside 
the state, no matter if they relate to subordinate agencies or decentralized agencies. 
Vertical accountability, on the other hand, refers to means whereby outside actors seek 
to enforce standards of good behavior and performance of public oﬃcials and service 
providers. The accountability seekers in vertical accountability arrangements are typi-
cally ordinary citizens, mass media, and civil society. Elections are a typical form of 
vertical accountability.
1.4 What Are the Diﬀerent Dimensions of Accountability?
Accountability can take many diﬀerent forms and actors can give an account to various 
forms in a variety of ways. There are four important questions to be asked to understand 
various dimensions of an accountability relationship. 
A. To Whom Is Account to Be Rendered?
As mentioned earlier, accountability is the relationship between the actor and the forum 
(Boven 2006). According to this deﬁnition, the actors render account to at least four 
types of forums. Each of these forums holds a diﬀerent kind of power over the actor and 
demands diﬀerent kind of information from the actor. They are also therefore likely to 
apply diﬀerent set of criteria in judging the actor (Boven 2006). 
  To voters and elected representatives
  This is the most important type of accountability in a democracy. Voters elect 
their representatives at the local and central level to run their government, both 
at the central and local levels. Therefore, elected oﬃcials render account to the 
voters during elections. 
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  To auditors, inspectors, and controllers
  Administrative accountability can be both vertical and horizontal (see the 
previous section on directions of accountability). Vertical administrative account-
ability relationship is based on hierarchical relationship between local govern-
ment and higher levels of government, such as laws giving power to a central 
government ministry (i.e., the Ministry of Local Government or Ministry of 
Interior) to audit local governments administrative and ﬁnancial transactions. 
Horizontal administrative accountability relations happen at the local govern-
ment level when, for example, their internal control inspectors audit local 
government units. 
  To the judiciary 
  Legal accountability is an important component of broader accountability 
framework.3 Especially in the developed world, public sector institutions give 
account to the judiciary for their conduct. Legal accountability is usually based 
on speciﬁc responsibilities legally conferred upon public sector agencies. In many 
countries, such as France, there are specialized administrative courts that play 
an important role as a forum. 
  To the society 
  Eﬀorts to overcome the shortcomings of electoral and administrative account-
ability systems have produced new forms of societal accountability that enable 
civil society groups to engage the government more directly. Social accountability 
is a stronger version of vertical accountability. It refers to the broad range of 
actions and mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use to hold the state 
and providers of public services to account (Ackerman 2003). 
B. Who Should Render Account?
Public policies go through multiple processes where diverse institutional and individual 
actors are involved in their formation and implementation. This complexity makes it 
quite diﬃcult to untangle who contributed in what way. The question in front of the 
forum is who should be called to account, interrogation, and judgment? Typically, two 
types of actors render the account:
  Public institutions: corporate accountability 
  All public sector institutions are corporate bodies with a political and admin-
istrative leadership. They operate within a certain political, administrative, and 
legal framework that circumscribes their accountability sphere. Local govern-
ments as a whole, as well as individual departments within them can be held 
accountable to the relevant forum—typically, general citizenry, local councils, 
judiciary, auditor’s oﬃce, and so forth. 
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  Public servants: individual accountability
  Individuals in public sector institutions are liable to various forums for their 
conduct. Individual accountability makes it impossible for public servants to hide 
behind their organizations. Depending on the conduct, public servants might 
be called to account by a disciplinary tribunal, external auditor, parliamentary 
commission, courts, etc.
C. About What Is Account to Be Rendered?
Accountability relationships can also be categorized in terms of whether accountability 
is rendered about the process or outcome. In fact, depending on the focus on process 
versus outcome, accountability systems could be structured in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent 
ways. Accountability for process refers to “whether or not governments are acting 
in accord with rules that prescribe how they should or should not behave” (Schroeder 
2006: 2). Accountability for outcomes, on the other hand, focuses whether the decisions 
of governments are in the best interest of their citizens (Schroeder 2006: 2). 
The accountability for outcomes emerged as part of the “New Public Management” 
paradigm in response to the concerns about government performance in terms of 
providing high-quality services that citizens value. It is an attempt to “shift account-
ability from complying with rules and regulations to achieving results” (Behn 2001: 27). 
In this line, public oﬃcials are expected to respond to individual citizens through inno-
vative and ﬂexible approaches. 
Ideally, accountability is expected to be rendered through both process and perfor-
mance. Accountability systems focusing too much on the process will more likely be 
inﬂexible, so much so that everything would be prescribed as to how things should be 
done. On the other hand, focusing too much on outcome and results and ignoring how 
things are done will more likely leave room for corruption or unfairness in the process of 
getting the results. Behn (2001: 29), in the American context, argues that “in an envi-
ronment with excessive oversight and regulatory requirements,” most public managers 
choose to satisfy the test for accountability for ﬁnances and fairness. According to him, 
most public managers make sure that no one can hold them accountable (that is, punish 
them) for not handling the ﬁnances properly; then, if they still have time, resources, 
organizational capacity, or ﬂexibility left over, they will try to improve performance 
(Ibid: 30). Other risk-taking and result-seeking executives, on the other hand, may seek 
“innovative ways to circumvent the formal rules.” The challenge here is whether we can 
encourage public managers to be “entrepreneurial” while making sure that we can get 
enough information about their conduct. 
The question of “about what the accountability is rendered” could also be answered 
in terms of the political, administrative, and ﬁscal dimensions of government decision-
making. Political accountability refers to the account giving to the electorate about the 
way government business is conducted (this form of accountability usually refers to 
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political leaders being held accountable through local elections but it also refers to other 
political aspects such as campaign ﬁnances, legislative performance, etc.). Administrative 
accountability covers administrative decisions (i.e., decisions about recruitment, procure-
ment, land use, planning, etc.) of local oﬃcials. Fiscal accountability refers to the ﬁnancial 
planning and decision-making process and its outcomes. This includes accountability for 
sound and transparent public expenditure and ﬁnancial management systems, overall 
ﬁscal discipline, allocation of resources to priority needs, and the eﬃcient and eﬀective 
allocation of public services in an eﬀective, eﬃcient, transparent, and rules-based public 
ﬁnancial management (PFM) system. 
The discussion about process versus outcomes is still relevant in each dimension. 
For example, in the context of administrative accountability, citizens may be highly 
satisﬁed about the quality of a particular service they receive (outcome) but whether or 
not the contract to the service provider was awarded in a fair and competitive process 
is still an important process question that needs to be addressed through accountability 
mechanisms.
D. Why Render Account?
  Involuntary: the actor is forced 
  Involuntary account giving occurs in situations where the forum formally wields 
powers over the actor. The forum has the formal and legal power to compel the 
actor to give account and be judged. Invariably, these are supported by formal 
sanction mechanisms if the accountholder is found delinquent or deﬁcient.
  Voluntary: the actor voluntarily gives an account
  In voluntary forms of account giving, the actor voluntarily renders account with 
no legal obligation. Social norms and behaviors can dictate the actor to provide 
account to the forum. Despite the non-formal nature of the account there can 
be sanctions. 
2. Supply- and Demand-Side: Public and Social Accountability
Skeptics of public sector reforms that promote the idea of extending the discretionary 
powers of lower levels bureaucrats or elected oﬃcials often point out the risk that discre-
tionary powers as such are prone to abuse. They therefore argue that discretion should 
be limited so that public oﬃcials could be kept under check. Yet, the real question is 
not about whether to give more or less discretion, but how to control it. The major 
objective of this section is to explore and analyze the linkages between building state 
capacity and increasing social accountability and assess how the level of discretion relates 
to building eﬀective and democratic state and society relations. The eﬀort is to bridge 
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approaches that have traditionally ignored each other—supply and demand-side. Public 
sector specialists advocate for strengthening supply-side institutions of control. On the 
other hand, social development approaches directly stress the importance of demand-
side initiatives that focus on citizen involvement and participation/civic engagement, 
while putting less emphasis on state capacity building and the need to work with the 
state sector. Many advocates of these approaches tend to discount any role for the state 
in terms of building capacity and increasing accountability and transparency. 
2.1 Public Sector Accountability 
Public accountability refers to institutionalized practice of account giving by civil serv-
ants and public sector institutions. Although the literature on public accountability is 
devoted to the accountability of central governments, the issue is equally important for 
local governments, especially in the era of decentralization. Public accountability as a 
supply-side approach is critical in establishing aggregate controls, prioritization, and 
eﬃciency in local government operations.
Public accountability is the hallmark of and a sine qua non for good governance 
(Bovens 2005). It is the obligation of public authorities (governments, elected represen-
tatives, corporate, and other governing bodies) to explain publicly, fully, and fairly how 
they are carrying out responsibilities that aﬀect the public in important ways. Public 
accountability focuses on public sector managers who spend public money, exercise 
public authority, and manage a corporate body under public law. Public account giving 
provides political representatives4 and voters with the necessary inputs for judging the 
fairness, eﬀectiveness, and eﬃciency of their governance system (Manin, Przeworski, 
and Stokes 1999).
Historically, the concept of public accountability is derived from accounting and 
bookkeeping (Bovens 2005). Today, it has moved far beyond bookkeeping and is at 
the center of good governance. Public sector governance encompasses the policies and 
processes to provide reasonable level of assurances to the public that objectives are met 
and that operations are carried out in an ethical and accountable manner. Public sector 
governance includes the means by which goals are established and accomplished, as 
well as activities that ensure appropriate behavior of civil servants—thereby reducing 
the risk of corruption (Institute of Auditors 2006).
The recent developments on public sector reforms—what has been called New 
Public Management—are actually about the evolution of public accountability. In the 
traditional Weberian model of government, accountability involves the adherence to 
a set of process requirements and rules for conducting people’s business. According to 
this model, governments are accountable if they adhere to established processes when 
governing. This model is more process oriented and promotes following the rules and 
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regulations in handling people’s money (public ﬁnancial management) rather than the 
identiﬁcation of people’s needs and preferences and providing services eﬃciently and 
eﬀectively.
In the last two decades, the Weberian “monolithic systems of hierarchical political 
and organizational accountability relations has been under serious pressure and is slowly 
giving way to a more diversiﬁed and pluralistic set of accountability relationships” 
(Bovens 2005: 196). In the new public management model, accountability has a diﬀerent 
meaning, focused more directly on how government interacts with citizens. In this model, 
governments are accountable if they engage with citizens in a transparent way and are 
responsible to citizens’ needs. The promotion of the establishment of ombudsmen, 
auditors, and independent inspectors in the New Public Management model puts 
the emphasis on administrative accountability, which forces us to rethink the classical 
top-down, principal agent model. These new accountability institutions inﬂuence the 
accountability relationship in the principal agent framework.5 Even though most of 
these accountability institutions report either to the elected leaders—Parliament—or 
the executive branch, “they are not part of the direct chain of principal-agent relations 
(Bovens 2005: 196). They establish diagonal accountability relationship to mediate the 
accountability between an agent and a principal. 
In the public sector application of the principal agent framework, public account-
ability is important in providing a democratic means to monitor and control government 
conduct, in helping to prevent public servants’ abuses of their power, and in enhancing 
the learning capacity and eﬀectiveness of the public servants (Aucoin and Heintzman 
2000). The citizens, who are the ultimate principals, have empowered their popular 
representatives to draft and enforce laws and policies. These representatives in turn have 
transferred the power to run the public sector machine to the executive branch of the 
government. Ministers subsequently entrust the daily running of the public sector to 
their staﬀ. In this chain relationship, accountability actors frequently change their roles 
as principals and agents. Therefore, public sector accountability is an essential precon-
dition for the democratic process to work as it provides citizens with the information 
needed for judging the propriety and eﬀectiveness of public sector (Manin, Przeworski, 
and Stokes 1999).
In this framework, public sector accountability institutions and tools are designed 
to further the objectives of the citizens in ensuring eﬃcient and eﬀective use of their tax 
money. They do so by constraining discretion of public sector actors in use of public 
resources. These supply-side tools are meant to address information asymmetry issues 
present in the principal agent framework. Bureaucrats, as agents, have considerably more 
information than that available to the citizen, the principals. This information asym-
metry allows agents to indulge in opportunistic behavior. Public sector accountability 
institutions and tools, such as ombudsmen, auditors, and independent inspectors, are 
intended to be countervailing institutions to enforce accountable governance. However, 
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in many countries, weak judicial systems and an inadequate provision of information 
make it diﬃcult to promote public accountability.
Public sector accountability is comprised of three main dimensions: political, 
administrative, and ﬁnancial.6 The political dimension is about setting the rules for 
citizens to elect and interact with their elected leaders and they deﬁne degree of oversight 
that those elected leaders have over the executive arm of government and bureaucracy. 
Administrative arrangements establish the civil service rules that determine the autonomy 
and incentive structure for enabling accountable and well-functioning central and local 
bureaucracies. Fiscal arrangements determine the role of central and local governments 
in service delivery by assigning service delivery responsibilities. Furthermore, they deﬁne 
the funding level for governments to deliver these services. 
Political accountability is a process “whereby citizens hold their governors to account 
for their behavior and performance directly through elections” (Aucoin and Heintzman 
2000). However, in modern democracies it is exercised indirectly, i.e., it is the elected 
leaders, not citizens, who hold service civil servants accountable through hierarchical 
structures (see Figure 1). For example, in parliamentary systems, political accountability 
is with the cabinet ministers who are responsible for the functioning of their ministries 
and civil servants.7 In presidential systems senior level public sector managers are directly 
accountable to the legislatures.
Delegation of public authority from elected oﬃcials to unelected bureaucrats is a 
fact of contemporary democracies. Discretion is given to public sector oﬃcials so that 
they are able to use their best judgment to meet the public interest.8
Figure 1. 
Vertical Accountability
Source: Bovens 2005: 199.
ParliamentMedia Voters
Minister
Ministry
Agency
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Administrative accountability refers to local civil servants being accountable to their top 
administrative oﬃcers and to outside bodies such as public audit oﬃcers, ombudsmen, and 
regulators, or a particular administrative agency, or a board/committee about the use of their 
administrative discretion. Administrative accountability mechanisms include oﬃces within 
agencies or ministries and practices within administrative processes designed to ensure 
that the decisions and actions of public oﬃcials account for the interest of citizens (see 
Table 1). Other mechanisms for administrative accountability include independent audi-
tors who scrutinize the use of public funds for signs of misuse, administrative courts that 
hear citizens’ complaints about agency decisions, and ethics rules protecting so-called 
whistleblowers—those within government who speak out about corruption or abuse 
of oﬃcial authority—from reprisals.
Administrative accountability aims at monitoring and regulating processes of public 
administration to ensure the quality, transparency, and eﬃciency and implementation 
of administrative processes in line with administrative decision-making. This involves 
collecting information, evaluating the possible alternative solutions, determining the best 
options available, assessing diﬀerent ways of implementation of decisions, and appraising 
of the possible eﬀects on public interests or relevant parties and individuals. 
On the supply-side, measures to improve downward administrative accountability 
include independent judicial/quasi-judicial agencies that investigate cases of government 
corruption and misconduct; regular administrative audits (external audits) of govern-
ment transactions through permanent or ad hoc independent entities; administrative 
courts that deal with compliance on regulatory decision-making and actions; a national 
procurement strategy for local governments; well-deﬁned procurement rules and 
processes; independent procurement audits; standards for service delivery and reward 
performance; strong information systems to monitor service quality; clear rules regarding 
civil service practices (payrolls, staﬀ levels, recruitment practices, staﬀ performance); 
systems for periodic monitoring and timely revisions (often through local government 
commissions) of civil service rules; and a ﬂexible career and performance management 
supported by a civil service system with merit-based recruitment. 
Administrative decision-making is a complex procedure that takes into account 
the objectives set by political leadership, statutory provisions, and other governmental 
regulations. Consequently, administrative accountability is achieved through the use 
of a variety of mechanisms—information provision, consultation/oversight, active 
participation (see Table 1)—designed to prevent corruption and ensure that public 
oﬃcials are answerable and accessible to the people they serve. There is a hierarchical 
accountability relationship within the public sector. Civil servants are responsible to 
the top administrative oﬃcers and ministers. They are also responsible to parliamentary 
commissioners, public audit oﬃcers, ombudsmen, and regulators as well as a particular 
administrative agency or board.9
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Table 1.
Administrative Mechanisms for Advancing Public Sector Accountability
Accountability 
Mechanism
Task Method
Information Provision Provision of
information
Mandatory provision of information by the 
government through annual reports, brochures, 
newsletters, and the publication of normative acts 
in newspapers.
Consultation/Oversight Notice and comment 
on rule making
Requirement that draft normative laws be published 
prior to their enactment.
Public hearing Public hearings to be held prior to rule making and 
the enactment of a law.
Administrative 
procedures
Administrative actions requiring informing citizen 
prior to any legislation or other action.
Advisory committee Permanent or ad hoc bodies that provide input to 
government in various policy areas.
Active Participation Right to petition The public has the right to propose the adoption, 
amendment, or repeal of a normative act.
Consensus/negotiated 
rule making
Councils that engage groups to reach consensus 
with respect to policy initiatives.
Financial accountability is about promoting and reporting publicly on performance. 
Public ﬁnancial accountability requires that governments manage ﬁnances prudently; 
“that they integrate their ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial reporting, control, budgeting, and 
performance; that they report comprehensively on what they have achieved with their 
expenditure of funds…” (Sahgal and Chakrapani 2000). 
Public expenditure management (PEM) and public ﬁnancial management (PFM) 
systems are essential components of public ﬁnancial accountability.10 Sound, transparent, 
and rules-based public expenditure and ﬁnancial management systems are fundamental 
building blocks for good public sector governance. Public expenditure and ﬁnancial 
management arrangements should promote transparency and accountability in the use 
of public resources, ensuring allocation of public resources in accordance with citizens’ 
priorities and supporting aggregate ﬁscal discipline, in line with core dimensions deﬁned 
by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) initiative (see Box 1).
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Box 1. 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) initiative deﬁnes these core 
dimensions of eﬀective PEM and PFM systems:
1. Credibility of the budget: The budget is realistic and is implemented as intended.
2. Comprehensiveness and transparency: The budget and the ﬁscal risk oversight are comprehensive 
and ﬁscal and budget information is accessible to public.
3. Policy-based budgeting: The budget is prepared with due regard to government policy.
4. Predictability and control in budget execution: The budget is implemented in an orderly and 
predictable manner and there are arrangements for the exercise of control and stewardship 
in the use of public funds. 
5. Accounting, recording and reporting: Adequate records and information are produced, main-
tained, and disseminated to meet decision-making control, management, and reporting 
purposes. 
6. External scrutiny and audit: Arrangements for scrutiny of public ﬁnances and follow up by 
executive are operating.
Source: PEFA 2005.
2.2 Social Accountability
 —The Emergence of a New Accountability Agenda
In a democracy, citizens delegate power to elected representatives and bureaucrats on one 
condition: that they will be able to hold them accountable for their performance—either 
directly, by voting them out of oﬃce, or indirectly, through the government system of 
checks and balances. Both accountability mechanisms, however, have been plagued 
by structural and contextual problems that limit their eﬀectiveness. In response, citi-
zens and civil society organizations have unleashed a broad range of experiments and 
innovations aimed at enhancing government accountability. The global trends towards 
democratization and decentralization have opened up the potential that the local space 
oﬀers for social accountability initiatives.11
Elections have proven to be a very weak and blunt instrument for citizens to hold the 
state to account, for several reasons: (a) elections only hold elected oﬃcials accountable, 
and not appointed bureaucrats, (b) elections cannot give clear accountability signals to 
individual oﬃce holders because voters have only one shot at punishing or rewarding 
numerous governmental decisions and because we can never know whether they are 
enforcing prospective or retrospective controls; (c) voting is a decentralized strategic 
action—since it is hard for citizens to coordinate the orientation of their votes, the 
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power of voting as a control mechanism is weakened; and (d) shortages of information 
prevent voters from having an adequate standard for evaluating government performance 
and decisions.12
Public accountability mechanisms, such as the ombudsmen, anti-corruption agencies, 
audit oﬃces, or legislative investigative commissions, have to face the structural impos-
sibility of monitoring the almost inﬁnite number of government actions (and inactions) 
as well as the contextual diﬃculty of the lack of adequate funding, limited enforcement 
capacity, or the absence of second order accountability (i.e., holding accounting agen-
cies accountable).13
The limitations of both electoral and public accountability mechanisms have encour-
aged an expansion in the repertoire of instruments through which citizens can hold the 
state to account. These instruments include traditional practices such as public demon-
strations, protests, and investigative journalism, as well as more innovative ones such as 
participatory budgeting, social audits, or citizen report cards. What they have in common 
is to try to build accountability through civic engagement—social accountability. 
Social accountability refers to an approach toward building accountability that 
relies on civic engagement—in which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organiza-
tion demand accountability.14 Other terms used to refer to the same phenomenon 
include “citizen or civic oversight/monitoring,” “citizen demands for accountability,” 
or “accountability demands.” Strictly speaking, social accountability is not a new type 
of accountability but it denotes an expansion in the mechanisms and methods for 
downward accountability (from elected representatives to citizens).
The diﬀusion of social accountability initiatives can be seen as part of the emergence 
of a broader “new accountability agenda.”15 This new agenda responds to the systemic 
failures of conventional institutions of democratic accountability to overcome the 
entrenched processes of elite capture and elite bias, and deliver accountable governance 
to poor and marginalized groups in society. The new agenda also challenges the conven-
tional perspective on the role of civil society in accountability. Traditionally, the emphasis 
has been on a clear separation, an arms-length relation, between state and society.16 In 
contrast, the new agenda shows how citizen oversight can ﬂourish precisely in institu-
tional forms where the boundaries between state and society are blurred or confused. 
These institutional forms, which have been termed “co-governance for accountability,” 
violate explicitly the separation between state and society, inviting civil society to the 
inner chambers of the state to “participate directly in the core functions of government 
itself.”17 Those functions could be the elaboration and control of local budgets through 
participatory budgeting, or the hiring and ﬁring of principals through local school 
councils, or the auditing of local government managed public works programs through 
social audits and freedom of access to information laws.18
The role of citizen oversight is not to replace but to complement and enhance 
public accountability mechanisms. The concepts of “police patrol” and “ﬁre alarm” 
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oversight mechanisms illustrate well this complementary role. “Police patrol” oversight 
is the traditional modality in which supervisory agencies operate, trying to keep a 
constant eye on those they are supposed to monitor. In contrast, “ﬁre alarm” oversight 
happens when an agency relies on external actors to detect when there are problems 
(to “sound the alarm”) and then focuses its attention particularly carefully on those 
areas.19
Citizens demands for accountability can contribute to (i) improved governance by 
monitoring that authority is exercised in a transparent, responsive, and fair way; (ii) 
improved service delivery by providing feedback to service providers on areas that need 
improvement and helping to discipline them; and (iii) deepening democracy by allowing 
citizens to exercise their right to expect and ensure that government acts in the best 
interests of people.
Responsiveness and (social) accountability are related but distinct concepts that 
often get conﬂated when discussing social accountability. Eﬀorts to build government 
responsiveness by increasing citizen voice in decisions can create the enabling condi-
tions for citizen oversight. However, voice eﬀorts alone do not constitute instances of 
social accountability. For social accountability to happen, citizens and/or civil society 
organizations need to play an active role in demanding explanations (answerability) 
and/or in imposing sanctions/rewards (enforcement) about government performance. 
For instance, a participatory municipal plan that actively involves citizens in deﬁning 
local investment priorities can increase government responsiveness. It becomes a social 
accountability initiative only if it facilitates a dialogue/debate between citizens and local 
governments about the previous year/s plan and budget execution.20
3. Accountability as a Function of Discretion
The basic assumption of this chapter is that accountability is a function of discretion. 
Without discretion, there is no accountability. This means that public sector oﬃcials 
should ﬁrst be provided with a meaningful level of discretion and then they should be 
held accountable about how they use this discretion. In making governments account-
able, upward and downward accountability structures should reinforce one another 
and downward accountability should be strengthened through both public and social 
accountability approaches.21
Discretion is given to public sector oﬃcials so that they are able to use their best 
judgment to meet the public interest. The broad deﬁnition of discretion focuses on the 
public sector in application of rules and policies on a day-to-day basis.22 It is deﬁned 
as an exercise of judgment and choice by public oﬃcials to apply rules and implement 
policies at the ﬁeld level. The basic premise is that public sector oﬃcials are knowledge-
able and experienced to apply rules to particular situations and contexts, which increases 
32
F I N D I N G  T H E  M O N E Y
the eﬀectiveness of rules and policies, improves performance, and is inherently ﬂexible 
and responsive to public needs and demands. 
The establishment of discretionary space calls for the establishment of safeguards 
against its abuse as well. Despite the beneﬁts and practicality of discretion, there are 
tendencies for misuse and abuse of discretionary power, to use discretion for private 
gain, and public oﬃcials being unduly inﬂuenced and captured by elite groups due to 
lack of checks and balances to discretionary power. Although discretion follows from 
formal rules and norms, law and rules are generally vague and often incomplete to 
deal with every situation and circumstance. Legal and judicial reforms do not address 
implementation and enforcement of policies and rules. Additionally, there are numerous 
informal rules and norms that are required for the eﬀective operation of public sector 
mechanisms. Implementation and enforcement of laws relies heavily on informal norms 
of all types, including professional, legal, community, and moral. However, there is 
insuﬃcient attention given to strengthening accountability and providing checks and 
balances to discretion, especially informal mechanisms. 
The issue of discretion and the potential for abuse of power is critical to strong state-
society relations. In many developing countries, the capacity of enforcement institutions 
for rules and laws is weak. Therefore, there is a potential for the abuse of power. In these 
countries, monitoring and controlling discretion constitutes a major challenge to their 
public sector reform eﬀorts. 
4. Linking Discretion and Accountability: 
 Establishing Trajectories of Reform 
Based on the theoretical elements presented in the earlier sections, good governance 
presumes an integrated accountability framework that balances a high degree of local 
discretion with a high degree of accountability. 
Yet, this is the ideal scenario, assuming that public sector reforms at all dimensions 
(political, administrative, and ﬁscal) are fully implemented and they successfully integrate 
both public and social accountability approaches. In reality, countries are at diﬀerent 
stages of public sector reforms, with varying degrees of focus on the linkages between 
discretion and accountability. Figure 2 shows three possible trajectories for good gover-
nance turnarounds and the related scenarios for the sequencing of governance reforms.23 
The starting point for all trajectories is quadrant II where both discretion and account-
ability are very low—highly centralized countries with no government accountability. 
The end point is quadrant III where public oﬃcials have a high degree of discretionary 
power accompanied with a high degree of accountability towards citizens. Countries that 
are at the high end of discretion but lacking focus on accountability fall under quadrant I 
in Figure 2. This kind of “high discretion-low accountability” combination may actually 
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create perverse incentives for governments, making them vulnerable to elite capture or 
prone to reckless decision-making. Quadrant IV, on the other hand, signiﬁes countries 
that are more focused on accountability structures governing governance systems. Yet, 
in the absence of high discretion for decision-making, governments in these countries 
are more likely to be overloaded by accountability requirements. Absence of discretion 
also implies that governments have skewed incentives to be heavily process oriented.
Figure 2.
Governance Turnarounds: Trajectories
Source: Adopted from Levy 2006. 
The ﬁrst trajectory in Figure 2 signiﬁes a country context where the focus is on 
discretion in the short-run. Decentralization reforms are good examples of such a 
strategy (e.g., big-bang decentralization in Indonesia). In this group of countries, 
decentralization reforms placed an emphasis on increasing political, administrative, and 
ﬁscal discretionary power of local governments initially. Several well-known examples 
of decentralization reforms—most notably, in recent times, Indonesia—exemplify this 
trajectory. In Indonesia, for example, the “big bang” decentralization devolved functions 
and resources through two national laws (Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999, respectively). 
Supporting laws and regulations, as well as other institutional measures, to strengthen 
control and improve accountability of local governments were introduced much later. 
In fact, the process of bringing greater accountability in local governance has been an 
ongoing process in Indonesia’s decentralization.
The next step in their reform eﬀorts is to strengthen accountability of local govern-
ments towards citizens. The second trajectory denotes a scenario where the national 
Trajectory I Trajectory IIITrajectory II
Discretion
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I III
II IV
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Accountability
Discretion
Accountability
Initial turnaround Desirable follow-through
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decision-makers put a higher priority on promoting political pluralism, administra-
tive accountability, and ﬁnancial safeguards in the short-run, as was the case with 
ex-Communist transition countries in Eastern Europe. 
The third trajectory represents a balanced situation where both discretion and 
accountability are strengthened simultaneously. Arguably, in the real world, there are 
few instances of a perfect diagonal trajectory.
5. The Way Forward: 
 Towards a Comprehensive Accountability Framework
Until recently, eﬀorts to foster good governance focused on strengthening the supply-side 
of accountability in state institutions. Accordingly, donor initiatives supported institution 
building in developing countries to increase the supply of governance processes through 
reforming public institutions. More recently, the development community has come to 
realize that domestic demand for accountability, originating in civil society entities and the 
public at large, is at least as important for development as supply-side mechanisms. Also 
referred to as social accountability, demand-side refers to an approach toward building 
accountability that relies on civic engagement—in which ordinary citizens and/or civil 
society organizations demand accountability. Accordingly, this chapter argues that down-
ward accountability of governments follows the discretions provided to governments 
and it should be strengthened by integrated approaches marrying supply-side public 
sector accountability with demand-side social accountability instruments.
We have described in the previous sections how public and social accountability 
approaches could help reinforce downward accountability and discussed the possible 
trajectories to reach a state of high discretion with strong accountability (quadrant III) 
supported by these approaches. 
Whatever the eventual trajectory may be, reaching quadrant III requires taking 
certain actions on the part of policymakers. In order to guide this process, Table 2 
provides a set of recommendations. These recommendations are divided into two 
groups of action—supply- and demand-sides—denoting the twin focus we have been 
emphasizing throughout this chapter: improving public sector capacity while concur-
rently developing institutions of demand-side of good governance. They aim to inform 
various parties involved about the issues in designing a public sector reform strategy. 
It should be stressed that Table 2 does not pretend to be a prescriptive “cookbook” 
that is a recipe for all countries and contexts—rather, it aims to provide a concise list 
of issues that may be relevant to a larger set of countries and needs to be prioritized 
and sequenced. 
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Table 2.
Policy Recommendations to Strengthen Accountability
POLITICAL SETTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Supply-side Demand-side
 Review and revise, as needed, the role of 
campaign financing rules that may favor large, 
centralized parties and make it more difficult 
for local candidates or new parties to compete 
 Establish transparent rules for financing 
of elections, and monitor and enforce these
 Improve the quality of the electoral system’s 
recall, write-in, and independent candidate 
options 
 Ensure representation of marginalized/
vulnerable groups (reserved seats, quota 
systems)
 Institute consultation mechanisms such as 
public hearings and integrate these into 
formal decision-making processes
 Secure and strengthen the role of elected 
body/ies in overseeing government operations 
 Strengthen electoral system 
 – Ensure free and fair elections 
 – Clearly define rules regarding electoral
  system and broader guidelines for political
  competition 
 Allow for competitive multi-party systems; 
remove restrictions before party competition
 Provide legal safeguards against dismissal 
of elected officials on frivolous grounds
 Ensure a legally mandated length of term 
for elected public officials (which is not 
too short or too long to serve citizens)
 Establish clear separation of power between 
the executive and legislative bodies 
 Assign necessary functions and mechanisms, 
and strengthen resources to elected 
representatives for exercising their oversight 
functions
 Allow, within prescribed rules, for voting 
measures beyond elections, i.e., authority 
for governments to initiate referendum
 Allow for citizen initiated legislation 
(i.e., petition) and referendum
 Establish procedures for public petitions to 
adopt, amend, or repeal an act, legislation, 
or executive order
 Allow for citizens to initiate recall of elected 
public officials
 Allow for citizens to demand public hearings 
on policy decisions and actions
 Establish citizen ombudsman offices 
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Table 2. (continued)
Policy Recommendations to Strengthen Accountability
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Supply-side Demand-side
 Regularly conduct administrative audits 
(external audit) on government transactions 
through permanent or ad hoc independent 
entities
 Establish independent judicial/quasi-judicial 
agencies to investigate cases of government 
corruption and misconduct 
 Establish specialized administrative courts 
to deal with compliance on regulatory 
decision-making and actions 
 Develop national procurement strategy to 
strengthen procurement rules and processes; 
institutionalize independent procurement 
audits
 Develop ethics rules, codes of conduct, and 
professional practice guidelines for government 
employees
 Introduce a flexible career and performance 
management supported by a civil service 
system with merit-based recruitment
 Establish clear rules regarding civil service 
practices (payrolls, staff levels, recruitment 
practices, staff performance) and develop 
systems for periodic monitoring and timely 
revisions 
 Institute a grievance/complaint system 
as well as a whistleblower protection system
 Set standards for service delivery and reward 
performance. Strengthen information systems 
to monitor service quality 
 Secure citizen participation in decision-
making processes regarding administrative 
affairs through neighborhood councils, 
community councils
 Allow citizens to challenge administrative 
decisions made by government departments 
 Support public involvement in contracting 
and implementation of public works projects 
through social audit committees
 Develop citizens charters for empowering 
them in their interactions with local service 
providers
 Support public oversight mechanisms to 
provide citizens a channel to oversee local 
service delivery and introduce measures for 
assessing citizen satisfaction with service 
delivery (scorecards, service delivery surveys) 
 Integrate service delivery performance into 
formal intergovernmental processes and 
provide incentives for good performance
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Table 2. (continued) 
Policy Recommendations to Strengthen Accountability
FINANCIAL/FISCAL DISCRETION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Supply-side Demand-side
 Strengthen local capacity for budgeting and 
public financial management
 Create a modern chart of accounts system 
for reporting revenues and expenses 
 Establish criteria for revenue mobilization, 
expenditure efficiency, and financial 
management discipline and link performance 
to rewards 
 Publicize approved budgets; provide open and 
timely access to budget execution information; 
publicize end of fiscal year budget 
 Develop a system of performance monitoring 
and evaluation for tracking budget and public 
expenditure outcomes, and make info publicly 
available
 Strengthen public audit systems and make 
audit findings publicly available
 Make government financial information 
(including budgets and end-of-year financial 
statements) easily accessible to public
 Strengthen public involvement in budgetary 
process through participatory budgeting 
practices
 Introduce gender-sensitive planning, 
budgeting, and resource allocation
—reinforced by gender audits
 Make budget information available to the 
public and influence budget allocation 
through independent budget analysis 
 Monitor budget execution and leakage 
of funds through participatory public 
expenditure tracking
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Notes
1 The note explains the CAR (Capability, Accountability, and Responsiveness Framework) 
used by the U.K. government’s governance and conﬂict advisers. 
2 Malena, Carmen, Forster Reiner, and Janmejay Singh. 2004. “Social Accountability, An 
Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Practice.” Social Development Paper No. 76. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
3 Although legal accountability via judicial systems is an important component of account-
ability framework, it does not come under the purview of this chapter.
4 The formal doctrine of elected representatives’ responsibility rests upon the notion of 
representative democracy and parliamentary sovereignty. The elected representatives of 
people—parliament—bring the government—the executive—to account. Parliament enacts 
administrative laws to enforce accountability. On the other hand, poor governance and a lack 
of public sector accountability may result from a number of factors including civil service 
incompetence, lack of eﬃcient institutions, and pervasive corruption (Schaeﬀer 2005).
5 The Principal-Agent (PA) theory provides for a conceptual framework for the understanding 
of public accountability processes. Its basic insight is that the principal, P, hires the agent, 
A, to undertake a particular task, but P suﬀers from an information asymmetry problem in 
motivating and controlling A. In both economics literature (e.g., Arrow 1985; Rees 1985; 
Laﬀont 1989) and its public management extensions (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
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Andrews and Shah 2005) the solution to a PA problem involves the development of an 
optimal incentive package that furthers the objectives of the principal and constrains the 
actions of the agent.
6 Legal accountability is an important component of public sector accountability; however, 
legal issues are beyond the scope of this paper. 
7 In many parliamentary systems, civil servants also appear in front of political forums, such 
as parliamentary committees and give account to parliamentary inquiries. 
8 The broad deﬁnition of discretion focuses on the public sector in application of rules and 
policies on a day-to-day basis. See Handler (1986) for a general discussion on discretion. 
9 These agencies have been set up by the legislature to make inquiries and obtain informa-
tion and ﬁnally to make regulations or judgments. Although their judgments may lack 
suﬃcient legal sanctions, they cause departmental embarrassment and, to a limited extent, 
governmental changes in policy and decisions (Zarei 2000).
10 The terms public expenditure and public ﬁnancial management are often used interchange-
ably to refer to all components of budgeting process. Public expenditure management is 
a broad term referring to both “upstream” and “downstream” phases of budgeting and 
budget execution processes. Public expenditure management includes all phases of the 
budget cycle, including the preparation of the budget, internal control and audit, procure-
ment, monitoring and reporting arrangements, and external audit. On the other hand, 
public ﬁnancial management has a narrower deﬁnition; it entails to downstream phase of 
budgeting—namely budget execution, accounting, control, reporting, monitoring, and 
evaluation (Allen, Schiavo-Campo, and Garrity 2004).
11 Initially, the agenda for social accountability was mostly driven by social movements. 
Increasingly, however, reformist politicians and government oﬃcials are actively supporting 
these initiatives. These politicians understand that sharing their power increases their legiti-
macy, which in turn is translated into political gains and less transactional cost in enforcing 
decisions. Greater trust and legitimacy is particularly eﬀective when reformist politicians 
and technocrats face entrenched resistance from within the bureaucracy and political system. 
The donor community has also given greater attention to social accountability instruments, 
acknowledging that traditional public reforms are necessary but not suﬃcient for good 
governance.
12 Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999); Ackerman (2003). 
13 Ackerman (2003).
14 The concept of social accountability underlines both the right and the correspondent 
responsibility of citizens to expect and ensure that government acts in the best interests of 
the people. Consequently, social accountability initiatives help citizens to understand their 
civic rights and play a proactive and responsive role in exercising those rights.
15 Goetz and Jenkins (2005).
16 The position that state-society collaboration hinders society’s capacity to control the state has 
been entrenched in the literature, particularly in the social movement literature. It can be 
traced to the classic text by Piven and Cloward (1979) for whom “poor people’s movements” 
41
G o o d  G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  t h e  E m e r g e n c e  o f  a  N e w  A c c o u n t a b i l i t y  A g e n d a
could be eﬀective only if they totally rejected cooperation of any kind with state agencies, 
and pursued the strategy of making a nuisance of themselves to the state apparatus. Much 
of the social movement literature has focused on the need to avoid co-optation and losing 
autonomy.
17 Ackerman (2005) has summarized this literature (see citations). While there is a previous 
literature that showed how mixing state and society could lead to positive, synergistic, 
development outcomes (see articles by Evans, Ostrom, Lam, and Tendler in the 1996 issue 
of World Development 24 [6]), it is more recently that this argument has been articulated 
for social accountability.
18 See Baiocchi (2001) and Abers (2000) for participatory budgeting, Fung (2003) for the case 
of Chicago schools, and Jenkins and Goetz (1999a) for social audits.
19 McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). A similar emphasis on the complementary role of citizen 
oversight appears throughout the literature. See Paul (1992) on the relationship between 
“exit”/“voice” and control. 
20 Citizens can only demand explanations or impose sanctions/rewards with respect to actions 
or decisions that government has taken in the past (i.e., the budget execution of the previous 
year). In that sense, (social) accountability is always an ex-post relationship. However, in 
some cases the demand for explanations can refer to formal government proposals for future 
action (i.e., a draft budget that local executive sends to the legislative), in which cases it is 
possible to talk of ex-ante accountability. 
21 We use the term downward accountability to describe the ability of the government to be 
accountable towards its constituency (supply-side of governance). On the other hand, social 
accountability is about aﬃrming and operationalizing voice in accountability relationship 
between citizens, power holders, and service providers. It relies on civic engagement—civil 
society led accountability activities (demand-side of governance).
22 See Handler (1986) for a general discussion on discretion. 
23 Admittedly, neither one of these trajectories is superior to others.
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A b s t r a c t
Integrity in public decision-making is vital for maintaining trust in government and the public 
service. Experience shows that building a culture of integrity requires the development and 
upgrade of mechanisms for ensuring that public office is used for the public interest. 
 This chapter focuses on the following key aspects of enhancing integrity and resistance 
to corruption in public organizations, namely:
 1. What are the key components of building a sound integrity framework?
 2. How to address emerging risks to integrity and resistance to corruption?
 3. How to measure corruption and integrity?
 4. What role international organizations play in the anti-corruption movement?
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1. Elements of Ethics Infrastructure
Today it is widely recognized that the corruption of public oﬃcials is more than a ques-
tion of individual criminal behavior; it is also the result of systemic failure of governance 
and public management mechanisms. This ﬁrst section highlights the lessons learned 
in building a strong framework for integrity and corruption resistance in developed 
democracies (OECD 2000 and OECD 1996).
Figure 1.
Elements and Functions of Ethics Infrastructure
Source: OECD. 1996. Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues and Practices. Public Management 
Occasional Papers No. 14, p. 26. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/24/1898992.
pdf.
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Control, guidance, and management have been identiﬁed over a decade ago as critical 
functions for a sound “Ethics Infrastructure.” They support in a mutually reinforcing 
way the combination of relevant laws, institutions, and mechanisms in place to prevent 
corruption and promote integrity in the public service.
1.1 Political Commitment and Ethical Leadership
In the absence of sustained political commitment to ethical behavior in public organi-
zations, eﬀorts to encourage such behavior will be in vain. Attempts to improve public 
sector ethics in OECD countries have been sponsored at the highest political levels, such 
as the approval of comprehensive anti-corruption strategies and programs requested by 
the President of Mexico and the Republic of Korea, or anti-corruption programs adopted 
by the government in Hungary in 2003 or Poland in 2006. Other actions, such as the 
integrity measures sponsored by the Minister of the Interior in the Netherlands in 1995 
or the eleven inquiries of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, set up in 1994 by 
the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, have demonstrated strong political support. 
Furthermore, political leaders and senior public servants also serve as important role 
models by setting example for public servants.
1.2 Workable Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct play a vital role in stating the expected standards of behavior, particu-
larly in OECD countries that have reduced the rules applying to public servants and 
have adopted more “managerial” styles of public management. New Zealand, in June 
2007, and the United Kingdom, in 2006, issued codes of conduct for the whole public 
service from which individual agencies may design tailored institutional codes to reﬂect 
their particular objectives and mission. In other countries (e.g., Netherlands), these codes 
are all agency-based. The ethical issues confronting an employee of a defense ministry 
might vary signiﬁcantly from those facing social security oﬃcials. Codes may be criti-
cized for being too speciﬁc or too general, unworkable, unused, unknown, or merely 
that simplistic statements of rules are not the ideal medium for answering complicated 
ethical dilemmas faced by public servants.
1.3 Professional Socialization Mechanisms
However, the content of the codes of conduct or even legal provisions remains simply 
words on paper, if it is not adequately communicated and inculcated. Socialization 
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mechanisms are the processes by which public servants learn and adopt ethical norms, 
standards of conduct, and public service values. Training—both induction and 
ongoing—is an essential element to raise ethics awareness and develop skills capable of 
solving ethical dilemmas. Ethics, for example, now constitutes an integral part of the 
initial training of future managers in Belgium, whereas all senior private sector entrants 
to the civil service in the United Kingdom focus on ethics issues in their mandatory 
induction training. In the same way, training on vulnerable areas can help public servants 
solve ethical dilemmas by deﬁning practices for managing organizational and strategic 
risks proactively.
1.4 Supportive Public Service Conditions
The high standards of ethical conduct expected of public oﬃcials are one side of the coin. 
The other side is a “package” which provides decent working and living conditions for 
the “servants of the public.” This “package” consists of such basic elements as suﬃcient 
job security, the prospect of possible promotion and a career, fair remuneration, and/or 
social appreciation. Fair and impartial human resources management policies could 
ensure that the selection and promotion processes in the public sector would be based 
on general professional requirements, and other factors such as direct political interven-
tion would be minimized. If public servants are feeling underpaid, overworked, and 
insecure, then they are less likely to embrace initiatives to improve their performance, 
including the ethical domain.
1.5 Coordinating Body
These take various forms—parliamentary committees, central government agencies, or 
specially created bodies—and assume various functions:
  “Watchdog” including investigation, such as France’s permanent anti-corruption 
investigation commission, Korea’s Independent Commission against Corruption, 
or the New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption in 
Australia; 
  “General promoter” of public sector ethics, a role performed by the Department 
of Employers Aﬀairs in Norway and the New Zealand State Services Com-
mission; 
  “Counselor and adviser,” such as the United States Oﬃce of Government Ethics 
and the Canadian Ethics Commissioner that also plays the role of “watchdog”; 
or
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  “Permanent ethics workshop” as the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 
the United Kingdom.
The existence of a coordinating body should not, however, be construed as absolving 
departments and managers of the responsibility for ensuring ethical conduct within 
their jurisdictions.
1.6 Eﬀective Legal Framework
The legal framework is the “teeth” of the overall ethics infrastructure. Laws and regula-
tions deﬁne the basic standards of behavior for public servants and enforce them through 
systems of investigation and prosecution. In reviewing its legal framework, a country 
must check that existing criminal codes and civil service laws, conﬂict-of-interest statutes, 
and other regulations that apply to public servants are clear and consistent. A prominent 
eﬀort is the implementation of the National Public Service Ethics Law in Japan, the 
country’s ﬁrst such legislation in August 1999. This law basically bans public servants 
from receiving gifts and/or entertainment from private companies under their jurisdic-
tion. Furthermore, senior oﬃcials in the central government are required to report gifts 
or entertainment worth more than 5,000 yen, with some in higher positions required to 
report their stock and income transactions as well. In Central Europe, Poland adopted 
a law requiring all public oﬃcials to declare their ﬁnancial assets, property, and busi-
ness capital, whereas Hungary introduced in 2001 a wide-ranging property declaration 
system for civil servants and adopted a speciﬁc act in 2003 on ensuring the transparency 
of public expenses.
1.7 Eﬃcient Accountability and Control Mechanisms
Accountability and control mechanisms encourage ethical behavior by making unethical 
actions hard to accomplish and easy to detect. Accountability mechanisms set guidelines 
for government activities, for checking that results have been achieved, and for checking 
that due process has been observed. They include internal administrative procedures 
(requirements that activities or requests be recorded in writing), comprehensive processes 
such as audits and evaluations of an agency’s performance, or new forms of procedures 
such as whistleblowing—which can encourage public servants to expose wrongdoing 
committed by others or to say no when asked to do something inappropriate. They 
might also be external to the public service: for example, oversight mechanisms in the 
form of legislative or parliamentary committees.
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1.8 Active Civil Society
Ethics and ﬁghting corruption is everybody’s responsibility, including that of an assertive 
media that through its investigative reporting helps to raise awareness among citizens 
and act as a watchdog over the actions of public oﬃcials. Freedom of information 
laws, now present in most developed democracies (most recently adopted in Mexico in 
2002 and Switzerland in 2004) can institutionalize and support public awareness and 
responsiveness.
2. An Updated Framework: A Proactive Approach
The elements of the Ethics Infrastructure outlined above must be adapted to encompass 
developments as the public sector environment has evolved considerably in the last 
decade, both at the organizational level and in the wider public management and govern-
ance environment. To increase responsiveness in public service, new public management 
reforms have led to the devolution of responsibilities and increased commercialization 
of public services. However, reforms to make governments more eﬃcient and eﬀective 
have often fallen short of enhancing public trust.
One particular concern is that public management reforms have opened grey zones 
and opportunities in the absence of adjustments to control discretionary power. With 
the breaking down of barriers between public and private sectors—e.g., through the 
privatization of services—governments recognized that conﬂict of interest has become 
a key concern in public debates worldwide. 
This proactive approach has progressively become a cornerstone for a modern 
government that looks ahead and addresses citizens’ growing expectations. In particular, 
an emerging concern is to map out risks to integrity in order to strengthen corruption 
resistance in the public service. Governments have started developing additional measures 
for categories of oﬃcials that are particularly vulnerable to corruption. These include 
oﬃcials working at interfaces:
  With the private sector, in particular public procurement and contract manage-
ment, sponsoring, public oﬃcials leaving the public sector to work for the private 
sector, etc.;
  With politicians, because of potential political interference; and
  With citizens, for example, law enforcement, tax administration, customs, 
etc.
Preventing corruption in the public service requires more than designing and 
implementing core integrity and anti-corruption standards. A culture of integrity in 
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the public service is the visible result of eﬀorts at organizational, public management, 
and governance levels.
As part of a “whole-of-government approach” to modernize governments, there is 
growing recognition that the success of anti-corruption strategies also depends on the 
creation of a supportive environment in the public administration in which transpar-
ency and accountability play an essential role. For instance, control in public ﬁnance, 
administrative simpliﬁcation, and e-government are essential components to a long-term 
strategy for enhancing resistance to corruption.
Furthermore, at the governance level the involvement of stakeholders such as elected 
oﬃcials, private sector actors, civil society, media, and the wider public is an essential 
condition for the successful development and implementation of pro-integrity and 
anti-corruption reforms.
3. Integrity Circles
An updated framework should take into consideration the lessons learned in reforming 
pro-integrity and anti-corruption measures in the past decade. Annex 1 at the end of 
this chapter outlines this shift by giving details on the elements of three interrelated 
Integrity Circles (see Figure 2).
Figure 2.
An Inside-out View of Government Pro-integrity and Anti-corruption Eﬀorts
Integrity Circles
Integrity infrastructure
in the public service
Corruption resistance for 
officials in situations and/or 
positions at risk
Supportive public management 
and governance conditions
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The core part of the ﬁrst circle is the integrity infrastructure that identiﬁes appro-
priate legal, institutional, and procedural frameworks for setting and implementing 
values, principles, and standards of conduct for the public service to embed a culture 
of integrity and corruption prevention. Within this infrastructure ﬁve strategic goals 
are identiﬁed, each supported by a set of complementary mechanisms:
  Setting standards—i.e., through an updated set of values, principles, and stan-
dards—is critical to make clear what is expected from public oﬃcials in daily 
conduct. This objective can be institutionally supported by mission statements, 
codes of conduct, and anti-corruption and conﬂict-of-interest legislation. A 
consultative process with stakeholders for deﬁning values and standards can result 
in higher awareness of standards and they more adequately reﬂect expectations 
of society and business. 
  Providing guidance through communication, training, role models, and 
counseling will further promote a lasting culture of integrity and corruption 
prevention. This includes leading by example on the part of senior oﬃcials, 
communicating expectations regarding ethical conduct, and capacity building 
and counseling for resolving integrity dilemmas in the work place. 
  Monitoring also plays an important role for verifying compliance with values 
and standards to identify deﬁciencies and improve management. This requires 
regular organization and follow up of controls (e.g., ﬁnancial management 
control, internal audit, etc). Facilitating the reporting of misconduct via acces-
sible procedures for reporting and adequate protection of whistleblowers also 
helps monitor misconduct and possibly corruption. Finally, scrutiny over public 
sector operations—by independent bodies such as courts of audit, ombudsmen, 
or parliamentary committees—contributes to integrity and accountability in 
the public service.
  Once standards are established, enforcement is key to ensuring they become 
part of the integrity culture. This requires, for instance, clear descriptions of 
disciplinary rules, guarantees for equal treatment, and appropriate legal and 
ﬁnancial means for investigation and prosecution.
  Finally, integrity in daily management must be fostered through adequate 
incentives, in particular merit-based selection, promotion, and remuneration. 
Performance targets can also be employed like integrity considerations can be 
integrated in recruitment and performance assessment.
Encompassing the integrity infrastructure, the second circle enhances corruption 
resistance, where risks to integrity are anticipated and corruption resistance eﬀorts 
should be developed to maintain public trust:
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  Assessing the main risks to integrity by mapping situations and positions of 
vulnerability—in particular at the public/private sector interface (e.g., public 
procurement, contract management, public-private partnerships [PPPs]); the 
political/administrative interface (e.g., political advisers); and the government/
citizen interface—is a primary instrument for building corruption resistance. 
  Applying speciﬁc measures that are adequately tailored to the type of risk (e.g., 
additional guidelines, restrictions, requirements, tightened control, background 
checks for certain positions, regularly rotating personnel, etc.) is also essential 
for building corruption resistance in public organizations.
Supportive public management and governance conditions are essential for 
implementing integrity and corruption resistance eﬀorts in a coherent manner. These 
conditions include:
  Overall coordination of pro-integrity and anti-corruption eﬀorts through 
articulated policy measures to ensure their consistency and integration in daily 
management in order to improve overall performance (e.g., by enhanced trans-
parency and accountability in accounting and public ﬁnance). 
  Ensuring that the wider public governance and management contexts—in particular 
enhanced transparency and accountability measures, political, economic, and 
social drivers of corruption—are properly identiﬁed to enhance corruption 
resistance and support integrity and overall performance. 
  Involving stakeholders like the private sector, the media, and the wider public 
who have a strong role to play as drivers for cultural change. This requires the 
education of stakeholders to raise awareness about integrity, as well as the involve-
ment of civil society and the public at large in public decision-making through 
information, consultation, and direct participation (e.g., monitoring). 
  Finally, the impact of reform implementation must be assessed in order to provide 
relevant and credible information for policymakers and the general public. 
Data collection methodologies and systems focused on measuring the impact of 
integrity programs, followed by establishing procedures that properly integrate 
the collected data into a policy cycle, are means to achieve this objective.
The updated framework for integrity and corruption prevention in the public service 
provides a practical instrument to verify whether vital building blocks are in place in 
public organizations to enhance integrity and corruption resistance and to assess whether 
these eﬀorts lead to expected results. It describes in particular:
  What speciﬁc objectives public oﬃcials may follow to enhance integrity and 
corruption prevention;
  What mechanisms/building blocks they have in hand; and
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  Examples of qualitative assessments that illustrate the dimensions that govern-
ments could integrate when measuring the achieved results.
These examples of qualitative assessment comprise the veriﬁcation of the existence of 
standards/mechanisms as well as their eﬀectiveness and impact on the culture of public 
organizations (e.g., whether public oﬃcials are aware of standards, understand them, 
and are committed to act accordingly; whether mechanisms to prevent corruption are 
available and are actually used, etc.). 
The approach taken by the framework is an inside-out vision of how to enhance 
integrity and corruption prevention from the perspective of public organizations. It 
starts with measures that speciﬁcally aim at promoting integrity in public organizations, 
and for which public oﬃcials have a direct capacity and responsibility to act. Public 
oﬃcials are considered as the primary actors for “sowing the seeds” of integrity in the 
public service and for partnering with other stakeholders.
4. Measuring Integrity: Indicators and Benchmarks
4.1 Challenges and Approaches to Provide Credible Data on 
 Implementation and Impact
Countries have in the last decade made substantial eﬀorts to develop institutions, 
systems, and mechanisms for promoting integrity and ﬁghting corruption in the public 
service. A growing demand for evidence of impact requires public institutions to shift 
their focus towards verifying the eﬀectiveness of these eﬀorts. 
Advocacy groups have used perception indices in order to raise awareness of the issue 
of corruption at the political level and in society at large. Indices such as the Corruption 
Perceptions Index and the Bribe Payers Index developed by Transparency International 
have been extensively cited in the media worldwide. Yet their methodology has been 
contested; these indices are often quoted as international benchmarks although they 
give little indication of where the risks for corruption lie or whether progress has been 
made in a number of key areas.
Good governance requires thorough assessment, and policies promoting integrity 
and preventing corruption are no exception. Assessment is a crucial way for governments 
to provide evidence-based information on the results of their eﬀorts to ﬁght corruption. 
Governments are increasingly expected to verify whether integrity policies are achieving 
their objectives in order to foster a favorable economic, political and social environment 
and strengthen public trust. However, assessment in this ﬁeld raises speciﬁc challenges, 
in particular the deﬁnition of an objective methodology.
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Figure 3.
Setting Criteria Assessing Integrity and Corruption Prevention Policy Measures
Specific objectives
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Source: OECD. 2005. Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment.
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resources, and conditions)?
EXISTENCE
Is the measure in place?
WHAT IS ASSESSED?
SETTING CRITERIA TO SELECT WHAT TO ASSESS
WHY ASSESS?
Purpose
Context (timing, political circumstances, media, coordination)
ASSESSING 
RESULTS 
AGAINST INITIAL 
OBJECTIVES
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4.2 Designing the Assessment Process: OECD Assessment Framework
4.2.1 Challenge One: What to Measure?
The OECD Assessment Framework (OECD 2005) provides a set of criteria to help 
decision-makers and managers design an assessment that captures relevant information 
for decision-making. Assessments may focus on:
  Formal existence of measures—are integrity policy instruments (e.g., legal 
provisions, codes of conduct, institutions, procedures) in place?
  Feasibility—are integrity policy instruments capable of functioning?
  Eﬀectiveness—did the integrity policy instrument achieve its speciﬁc initial 
objectives?
  Relevance—how signiﬁcantly have policy instruments contributed to meeting 
stakeholders’ overall expectations (e.g., overall impact on daily behavior)?
  Coherence—do the various elements of the procedure coherently interact and 
reinforce one another, and support the overall aims of integrity policy?
4.2.2 Challenge Two: How to Ensure Reliability?
The reliability and credibility of the assessment will depend on both the procedures for 
conducting an assessment and the methodology developed. Weighing the advantages 
of internal and external assessment will help determine who will actually conduct the 
assessment. In order to ensure the credibility and reliability of the ﬁndings, several factors 
need to be considered, in particular:
  Impartiality of the assessor and its competence;
  The need for directly using ﬁndings in the decision-making process; 
  Time, resources, and internal capacities available to conduct the assessment;
  Involving external stakeholders that could support wider acceptance of evalu-
ation outcomes;
  Identifying relevant observable measures that reﬂect not only the outputs—i.e., 
the immediate results of a policy—but also its outcomes—i.e., beneﬁts in 
participants’ knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors achieved by the policy.
It is much easier to measure the number of training sessions provided on a code 
of conduct than to assess whether public oﬃcials are aware of the standards and values 
outlined in the code, as well as being able to properly identify ethical dilemmas and 
being committed to solve them according to stated standards.
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4.2.3 Challenge Three: How to Ensure Impact?
If reaching credible and useful conclusions may seem like an end in itself, it is similarly 
important to ensure that:
  Assessment results are properly communicated to policymakers in charge of 
formulating and implementing a policy and actually used in the policy cycle.
  Active follow-up actions, such as mandatory responses from examined organiza-
tions or follow-up reviews and trainings using the results of assessment.
  Findings are also communicated to a wider audience such as stakeholders and 
society at large to foster accountability.
The following ﬁgure presents procedural steps and criteria for assessing integrity 
and corruption prevention measures.
Figure 4.
Procedural Steps and Criteria for Assessing Integrity and 
Corruption Prevention Measures
Policy 
measures
By whom
Source: OECD. 2005. Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment.
4.3 Data and Indicators—Measuring Processes, Outputs, and Outcomes
Most eﬀorts so far to measure corruption have relied on perception indicators1 whose 
validity and appropriateness for tracking change are open to considerable debate. As 
Michael Johnston highlights (2007), national-level corruption indices have become 
increasingly sophisticated but signiﬁcant problems remain:
Criteria
Existence Feasibility
Effectiveness
Relevance
Coherence
How to ensure impact
How to assess What to assess
Why assess
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  Starting with the basic issue of deﬁnitions: consensus on a nominal deﬁnition 
of corruption likely will never be reached.
  Most existing indices can do little to track trends over time because of irregular 
underlying data and contrasting methods. 
  “The single-number problem” which hides diﬀering types of corruption occur-
ring in diﬀerent segments of societies and governments.
  Knowing that corruption is extensive does not, by itself, tell us what to change 
and what to leave alone. Corruption, even where it is severe, does not explain 
all that goes wrong in a government or society (e.g., policies may be poorly 
conceived and under-funded).
Rather than attempting to measure corruption itself, an emerging approach is to use 
the indicators of government performance to track trends in the eﬀects of corruption, 
and in the incentives sustaining it. The notion of actionable indicators requires that as 
much data as possible must directly reﬂect aspects of governance over which we have 
signiﬁcant amounts control—speciﬁc processes, problems, and trends about which 
leaders and reform advocates can do something. It follows that the notion of indica-
tors must track changes in sensitive and accurate ways, not only giving reform leaders 
invaluable feedback on the eﬀects of their eﬀorts, but also enabling them to take credit 
for success or progress, or ﬁxing accountability for failure. 
An example of such indicator is bureaucratic burden: in City A getting a building 
permit involves 33 steps and takes seven weeks, while in City B the same process typically 
involves four steps and takes three days. Corruption cannot be measured in those two 
agencies directly; however, theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that the numerous steps 
and long delays in City A are both eﬀects of corruption (bureaucrats have found they 
can make money by contriving new requirements and delays) and incentives sustaining 
it (construction ﬁrms, knowing that time is money and facing numerous bureaucratic 
“toll gates” and long delays, ﬁnd it quicker and cheaper to pay up).
Similar indicators could be easily gathered, and clearly linked to the eﬀects of corrup-
tion and to its sustaining incentives, comparable from one place and time to another, and 
easily understood by citizens and non-specialists. Further examples might include:
  Time, expense, and the number of steps involved in establishing a small business 
or a corporation; similarly, the frequency and cost of hiring consultants.
  Speed and accuracy with which vendors’ invoices are paid.
  Time and charges involved in obtaining routine information, copies of documents, 
or more speciﬁc sorts of services such as passports, licenses, and permits.
  Time, number of steps, and frequency and range of variations involved in tax 
assessments and other revenue collections.
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  Citizen assessments of the quality and responsiveness of public services.
  Trends in the numbers of licenses, permits, and in subsidy or beneﬁt payments 
granted by a given agency.
  Number of inspections performed per member of ﬁeld staﬀ in regulatory 
agencies.
  Prices paid to suppliers and charged from the public for basic services (school 
meals, telephone equipment).
  Prices paid for fuel and basic clerical supplies.
  Prices paid for basic commodities involved in a public service (asphalt, concrete, 
vehicles, and tools).
Annex 2—based on (Johnston 2007) —provides more details on potential indica-
tors, including their eﬀects of past corruption and incentives to further corruption as 
well as possible benchmarks and actions indicated.
5. The Role of International Organizations
Sharing experiences of lessons learned in ﬁghting corruption is a critical role for inter-
national organizations. The OECD has been an international leader in forging alliances 
and building networks that encompass transition economies, developing countries, and 
emerging markets from all regions of the world:
  In Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, progress in 
ﬁghting corruption is being made in the framework of both the Anti-Corruption 
Network for Transition Economies (launched in 1998 in Istanbul) and a 
joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union named Support for 
Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA).
  In the Asia-Paciﬁc region eﬀorts to combat corruption are promoted and 
supported by the Asian Development Bank/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative 
for Asia-Paciﬁc that was launched in 1999 in Manila.
  More recently, the OECD launched a structured policy dialogue with Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) countries on issues related to corruption 
and public and private sector integrity. Within the framework of the MENA 
OECD Initiative on Governance and Investment for Development, MENA 
countries launched a Working Group on Civil Service and Integrity and a Task 
Force on Business Integrity and Bribery in 2005.
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  In Latin America the OECD cooperates with the Organization of American 
States to support eﬀorts of anti-corruption, state modernization, and good 
governance in Latin American countries.
International organizations also provide fora to develop and negotiate international 
standards. Anti-corruption conventions include: 
  The Inter-American Convention against Corruption that was concluded in 1996 
by the Organization of American States.
  The 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Oﬃcials 
in International Business Transactions. 
  The 1999 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe.
  2004 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) that entered into 
force a combination of binding rules and prevention mechanisms for addressing 
corruption.
In addition to binding convention, international organizations also develop good 
practices and work out standards for preventing corruption and promoting integrity in 
public service. In order to prevent corruption and strengthen public trust in govern-
ment, OECD countries are committed to review regularly and modernize their integrity 
policies and practices by:
  The 1998 Recommendation on Improving Ethical Conduct in the Public Service.
  The 2003 Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing Conﬂict of Interest in the 
Public Service.
Fighting corruption, promoting transparency, and improving integrity are also key 
objectives in the development of cooperation policies as corruption directly impedes 
progress towards the common poverty reduction and the Millennium Development 
Goals. OECD countries include the major donors that ﬁrst introduced anti-corruption 
provisions in their work in procurement agreements funded through bilateral devel-
opment aid, following the 1996 Recommendation on Anti-Corruption Proposals for 
Aid-Funded Procurement. In 2003, donors set out to work together closely to ensure 
that they collectively support country-led anti-corruption strategies and to ensure that 
aid programs themselves do not foster corruption, as detailed in the Development 
Assistance Committee’s Principles for Donor Action in Anti-Corruption.
However, international government organizations are not the only players in the 
international arena; civil society organizations and the private sector also signiﬁcantly 
contribute to the common aim of promoting integrity and ﬁghting corruption. All of 
these actors are important part of the broad policy dialogue that underlies their respective 
roles and joint responsibilities to eradicate corrupt practices in all parts of the world.
61
P u b l i c  S e c t o r  I n t e g r i t y
Sources Cited
Council of Europe. 2000. Model Code of Conduct. Council of Europe Recommendation, 
May 2000. Available online: http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/greco/documents/Rec(2000)10_
EN.pdf.
Johnston, Michael. 2007. Benchmarks for Integrity: Tracking Trends in Governance. Paris: 
OECD.
OECD. 1996. Ethics in the Public Service: Current Issues and Practices. Public Management 
Occasional Papers No. 14. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/24/1898992.
pdf.
OECD. 1998. Promoting Ethics in the Public Service. OECD 1998 Recommendation. Available 
online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/22/2957360.pdf. 
OECD. 2000. Building Public Trust: Ethics Measures in OECD Countries. OECD Policy Brief, 
September 2000. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/43/1899427.pdf. 
OECD. 2000. Trust in Government—Ethics Measures in OECD Countries. Available online: 
http://www.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/display.asp?sf1=identiﬁers&st1=422000061P1.
OECD. 2005. Managing Conﬂict of Interest in the Public Sector: A Toolkit. Available online: 
http://www.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/display.asp?K=5LH0997VJJJJ&tag=XXC678XX599
889X97DXWA3&lang=EN&sort=sort_date%2Fd&sf1=Title&st1=managing+conﬂict+i
nterest&sf3=SubjectCode&st4=not+E4+or+E5+or+P5&sf4=SubVersionCode&ds=mana
ging+conﬂict+interest%3B+All+Subjects%3B+&m=1&dc=4&plang=en and http://www.
oecd.org/gov/ethics.
OECD. 2005. OECD Guidelines for Managing Conﬂict of Interest in the Public Service. OECD 
Policy Brief, September 2005. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/44/
35365195.pdf http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/13/1899138.pdf.
OECD. 2005. Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment. Available online: http://caliban.
sourceoecd.org/vl=5760923/cl=21/nw=1/rpsv/~6677/v2005n31/s1/p1l.
OECD. 2005. Public Sector Modernisation: Open Government. OECD Policy Brief, February 
2005. Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/35/34455306.pdf.
OECD. 2007. Integrity in Public Procurement: Good Practice from A to Z. Available online: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34135_38561148_1_1_1_1,00.htm 
and lhttp://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/procurement.
Note
1  The most prominent indices include: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), Bribe Payers’ Index, and Global Corruption Barometer.
62
F I N D I N G  T H E  M O N E Y
Annex 1. 
Elements for an Updated Framework for Integrity and Corruption 
Prevention in the Public Service
CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
CIRCLE I. — INTEGRITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Embedding a culture of integrity in the public service and preventing corruption through a combination of legal, 
institutional, and procedural frameworks in the public service 
1.1 Setting 
 standards
 Setting core values, 
principles, and standards 
for integrity and corruption 
resistance in the public 
service to clarify what 
is expected from public 
officials
 Statement of core values, 
principles, and standards 
(e.g., in the form of 
mission statement, code of 
conduct, anti-corruption, 
and conflict-of-interest 
legislation)
 Involvement of stakeholders 
in the definition of core 
values, principles, and 
standards in the public 
service (e.g., through 
consultation)
 Whether core values, 
principles, and standards 
are up-to-date to reflect 
expectations and cover 
emerging issues 
1.2 Providing  
 guidance 
 Providing guidance 
through role model, 
communication, training, 
and counseling to embed a 
culture of integrity 
 Demonstration of 
personal example by senior 
officials (e.g., avoiding 
the exploitation of rules, 
taking proactive steps to 
avoid apparent conflict of 
interest)
 Communication 
of expectations of 
ethical conduct (e.g., 
communicating values, 
providing induction 
training and briefing, 
identifying vulnerable areas 
in organizations, punishing 
misconduct)
 Provision of counseling 
for resolving work-related 
integrity dilemmas (e.g., 
coaching and support, 
ensuring follow up 
on reports of integrity 
concerns)
 Whether the behavior of 
senior officials is consistent 
with integrity policies 
and reflects stakeholders’ 
expectations
 Whether officials are aware 
of integrity standards, 
understand them, and are 
committed to follow them
 Whether public officials 
know where to seek advice, 
actually seek advice when 
needed, and follow it
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
1.2 Providing  
  guidance 
  (continued)
 Capacity building for 
resolving work-related 
integrity dilemmas (e.g., 
organizing ongoing training 
on integrity on a regular 
basis, promoting open 
discussions on integrity 
issues)
1.3 Monitoring  Monitoring compliance 
through control 
mechanisms to detect 
deficiencies and improve 
overall management 
 Facilitating the reporting 
of misconduct while 
protecting against 
retaliation to detect 
deficiencies and promote 
accountability 
 Facilitating independent 
scrutiny over public 
sector operations to detect 
deficiencies and promote 
accountability
 Organization of internal 
controls (financial, 
management control, and 
internal audit) on a regular 
basis that are supported by 
follow-up mechanisms to 
implement and monitor 
recommended measures for 
improvement
 Availability and publicity 
of procedure(s) and 
obligations for public 
servants to report 
misconduct 
 Availability and publicity of 
procedures and supporting 
institutions for the public 
to expose misconduct of 
public servants 
 Availability of mechanisms 
to protect whistleblowers 
against retaliation 
 Organization and 
publication of external 
audits on a regular basis 
that bring misconduct to 
the attention of bodies 
exercising independent 
scrutiny on public service 
activities (e.g. court of 
audit, ombudsman, 
parliamentary committee)
 Whether controls 
reduce opportunities for 
corruption and provide 
sufficient disincentives for 
misconduct
 Whether public servants 
are aware of the procedures 
to report misconduct, feel 
safe reporting, and actually 
report misconduct when 
witnessed
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
1.4 Enforcing 
  standards
 Ensuring enforcement 
through disciplinary 
procedures and sanctions 
that are dissuasive while 
ensuring fair treatment
 Ensuring the independence 
of investigative and 
prosecution bodies
 Description of disciplinary 
rules and sanctions (e.g., 
in legislation, agency 
documents)
 Existence of guarantees 
for equal treatment, in 
particular availability of 
legal redress 
 Provision of adequate 
legal and financial means 
to investigation and 
prosecution (e.g., status and 
accountability of bodies, 
power to bring suspected 
cases of corruption directly 
to court, cooperation 
between bodies, and 
resources available)
 Whether disciplinary 
sanctions are applied 
in a consistent and 
proportionate manner 
 Whether officials in the 
public service perceive that 
the sanctions applied are 
timely and dissuasive
 How often officials use legal 
redress
1.5 Fostering 
  integrity in 
  daily 
  management 
 Providing adequate 
incentives for integrity 
in daily management 
through merit-based 
selection, promotion, and 
remuneration
 Design of open selection, 
promotion, and 
performance appraisal 
procedures
 Definition of criteria for 
selection and promotion 
 Introduction of safeguards 
for senior public officials 
to ensure consideration of 
merit for appointment
 Provision of sufficient and 
fair remuneration 
 Integration of ethics 
in recruitment and 
performance assessment
 Use of performance targets 
and evaluation in relation 
to career management
 Whether officials in public 
service are selected and 
promoted in a transparent 
manner 
 Whether criteria for the 
selection, promotion, and 
performance appraisal 
are clear and used in a 
consistent manner 
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
CIRCLE II. — CORRUPTION RESISTANCE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE
Anticipating risks to integrity and building corruption resistance of officials who are vulnerable to corruption in 
order to improve public trust
2.1 Assessing 
  the main risks 
  to integrity 
 Assessing risks through 
the identification 
of situations and/or 
positions that are 
particularly vulnerable to 
corruption (risk areas)
Mapping out of situations 
and/or positions where 
officials are vulnerable to 
corruption, in particular:
 at the interface 
with private sector 
(e.g., involved in 
public procurement, 
contract management, 
sponsorship; leaving the 
public sector to work in 
the private sector)
 at the political/
administrative interface 
because of their level (e.g., 
public office holders)
 at the interface with 
citizens (e.g., working 
in law enforcement, tax 
administration, customs, 
etc.)
 Whether existing and 
emerging risks to integrity 
have been mapped out in 
the public service 
 Whether public officials 
are aware of the main 
risks to integrity in 
relation to a situation 
and/or position in the 
administration
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
2.2 Building 
  corruption 
  resistance
 Developing corruption 
resistance measures (e.g., 
specific guidelines and 
requirements) for officials 
working in risk areas 
 Use of background check 
for certain positions 
and/or security-vetting
 Rotation of personnel on 
a regular basis
 Separation of duties and 
authorization (e.g., four-
eyes principle)
 Development of specific 
standards (e.g., specific 
conflict-of-interest 
legislation, specific code 
of conduct for ministers 
and public office holders)
 Declaration of assets/
financial interests to 
prevent conflict of 
interest or detect illicit 
enrichment
 Stricter internal control or 
verification measures
 Specific training and 
briefing
 Direct social control 
to ensure public 
scrutiny on government 
process (e.g., in public 
procurement and contract 
management)
 Whether officials 
are carefully selected 
for positions that are 
vulnerable to corruption 
 Whether officials in 
positions vulnerable to 
corruption are aware of 
corruption resistance 
measures and understand 
what is required of them
 Whether specific/
tightened controls 
reduce opportunities for 
corruption and provide 
sufficient disincentives for 
misconduct
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
CIRCLE III. — SUPPORTIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE CONDITIONS 
Ensuring the coherence of pro-integrity and anti-corruption measures in the administration and fostering a supporting 
public management and governance environment 
3.1 Ensuring 
  overall 
  coordination 
  of pro-integrity 
  and anti-
  corruption 
  efforts in the 
  government
 Articulating policy 
measures to ensure 
consistency of pro-
integrity and anti-
corruption efforts
 
 Development of 
articulated pro-integrity 
and anti-corruption 
measures (e.g., in the 
form of a strategy 
and action plan, risk 
assessment) together with 
key stakeholders
 Coordination and 
management of the 
implementation of 
pro-integrity and anti-
corruption measures (e.g., 
by a central agency)
 Provision of adequate 
powers and capacity for 
coordination (e.g., status 
and resources for a pro-
integrity/anti-corruption 
agency)
 Whether pro-integrity 
and anti-corruption 
measures form a coherent 
and up-to-date framework 
that reflects stakeholders’ 
expectations
 Whether pro-integrity 
and anti-corruption 
measures are 
implemented consistently 
across the administration
3.2 Ensuring that 
  public 
  management 
  conditions 
  support 
  integrity and 
  overall 
  performance
 Enhancing transparency 
and accountability in 
critical phases of the 
budget through the 
disclosure of relevant 
fiscal information in a 
timely and systematic 
manner 
 Supporting a transparent 
and predictable decision-
making process through 
simplified administrative 
procedures 
 Statement of accounting 
policies accompanying all 
reports on the budget 
 Organization of a 
dynamic system of 
internal financial controls 
on the budget, with 
reports containing a 
statement of responsibility 
 Regular audit of the 
report by the Supreme 
Audit Institution
 Fiscal report subject to 
parliamentary and public 
scrutiny
 Use of government 
procedures to reduce 
administrative burdens 
(e.g., setting time limits 
for administrative 
decisions, simplification/
reduction of licensing)
 Whether internal 
controls, auditing and 
legislative oversight are 
well coordinated to fill in 
gaps and maximize the 
information produced on 
the budget
 Whether administrative 
procedures are simple, 
user-friendly, and 
minimize opportunities 
for misconduct
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
3.2 Ensuring that 
  public 
  management 
  conditions 
  support 
  integrity and 
  overall 
  performance
  (continued)
 Measurement of 
administrative burdens on 
investors
 Use of new technologies, 
for instance, one-stop 
shops to enhance 
transparency and 
effectiveness in 
administrative procedures
3.3 Assessing the 
  wider 
  governance 
  context for 
  pro-integrity 
  and anti-
  corruption 
  reforms
 Identifying the main 
political, economic, 
and social drivers for 
corruption in the country 
to understand context of 
reform
 Demonstrating 
commitment for reform 
by political leaders
 Assessment of risks 
through public trust 
surveys, anti-corruption 
assessments, feedback 
from stakeholders (e.g., 
public service users)
 Development of anti-
corruption legal and 
institutional arrangements 
and provision of adequate 
powers and resources 
 Development of legal and 
institutional arrangements 
for enhancing 
transparency and 
accountability in lobbying 
(e.g., registration)
 Enhancement of 
transparency and integrity 
in the election financing 
framework (e.g., 
disclosure requirements, 
restrictions for donations)
 Development of legal and 
institutional arrangements 
to limit the degree of 
media concentration and 
encourage diversity of 
ownership
 Limitations on 
investigations and 
prosecutions of public 
office holders (e.g., 
through immunity)
 Whether main drivers 
of corruption have 
been mapped out in the 
country
 Whether anti-corruption 
legal and institutional 
arrangements cover 
emerging risks and are 
properly functioning
 Whether investigations 
and prosecutions of 
public office holders are 
excessively constrained by 
immunities
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CIRCLES OBJECTIVES BUILDING BLOCKS/
MECHANISMS
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITATIVE 
ASSESSMENTS
3.3 Assessing the 
  wider 
  governance 
  context for 
  pro-integrity 
  and anti-
  corruption 
  reforms
  (continued)
 Ensuring that media, civil 
society, the private sector, 
and the wider public are 
drivers for cultural change 
 Information, 
consultation, and active 
participation of citizens 
(e.g., legislative and 
administrative framework 
on access to government 
information)
 Direct and indirect public 
scrutiny over government 
processes (e.g., role of 
parliament, involvement 
of NGOs, and other 
watchdogs)
 Education on ethics to 
the private sector and the 
wider public (e.g., specific 
curricula)
 Whether there is a 
freedom of information 
legislation guaranteeing 
access to government 
information 
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Annex 2. 
Possible Indicators and Benchmarks*
Indicator Effects of past 
corruption
Incentives to 
further corruption
Possible 
benchmarks
Actions indicated
Citizen assessments 
of public services 
and quality of 
inspected businesses
Poor quality services 
and/or low levels of 
satisfaction: graft, 
theft, kickbacks, 
favoritism; bid-
rigging and other 
tendering problems; 
weak accountability 
and oversight of 
agents; theft of time, 
moonlighting
Persistently poor 
quality in services 
encourages citizens 
to pay for services 
to which they are 
entitled, weakens 
expectations of 
performance and 
accountability, 
creates incentives 
for black-market 
provision (often 
involving 
government workers 
and materials)
Levels of satisfaction 
can be regularly 
assessed via 
household, business 
surveys, “Citizen 
Report Cards,” and 
related consultation
Build citizen 
evaluations into 
agency routines; 
follow-up surveys 
with consultation 
between citizens and 
agencies, managers; 
reward agencies and 
leaders winning 
high marks
Time, steps, 
fees involved 
in registering a 
business
Too slow, elaborate, 
official fees too 
high: extortion, 
bribery, official 
collusion with 
business competitors
Too fast or variable: 
favoritism, bribery, 
non-enforcement of 
policy
Too slow, official 
fees too high: 
opportunity to 
demand bribes, 
reasons to pay, 
exposure to 
officially-favored 
competitors, 
“consultants”
Too fast or 
variable: favoritism, 
unfair business 
competition, links 
to bid-rigging
Case handling in 
other jurisdictions: 
speed, costs, data/
paperwork required, 
frequency and 
scope of variations, 
frequency of use of 
consultants
Review officials’ 
monopoly power, 
discretion, 
accountability; 
enforce reasonable 
performance 
standards; gather 
info from clients; 
randomly audit 
cases; create client 
advocates
*  Based on Michael Johnston. 2007. Benchmarks for Integrity: Tracking trends in Governance. Paris: OECD.
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Indicator Effects of past 
corruption
Incentives to 
further corruption
Possible 
benchmarks
Actions indicated
Speed and accuracy 
with which vendors’ 
invoices are paid
Slow/inaccurate 
payment, 
underpayments: 
extortion of 
vendors, official 
theft
Very rapid payment, 
overpayments: 
kickbacks, self-
dealing, favoritism, 
“ghost vendors,” 
substandard goods
Departures from 
reasonable norms 
allow kickbacks, 
theft, extortion; 
create cover for 
“ghost vendors” and 
self-dealing 
Multi-agency 
and private-
sector norms for 
speed, error rates; 
aiming at rising 
performance levels, 
and at published 
goals negotiated as 
appropriate with 
vendors
Real-time 
monitoring of 
procurement, 
payments; random 
auditing of tenders, 
contracts, provision, 
payment; solicit 
feedback from 
vendors 
Amount or 
percentage of 
time spent by 
businesspeople in 
dealing with officials
Too much: 
bureaucratic 
harassment, foot-
dragging, in pursuit 
of bribes; extortion
Too little or wide 
variation: favoritism; 
bribery initiated by 
business 
Too much: time 
lost, threat of fines 
and charges, and 
uncertainty increase 
incentive to pay
Too little: bribe 
payments can reduce 
administrative 
overhead costs, 
delays, uncertainty
Typical amounts 
of time spent, by 
sector, as established 
by business surveys
Reducing 
administrative 
discretion; 
revise queuing 
arrangements and 
case loads to break 
up personal links 
between officials 
and business people; 
continued surveys 
of business; internal 
data-gathering on 
frequency, duration 
of interactions
Time, steps, 
charges involved in 
obtaining routine 
information, 
passports, or 
documents
Too slow, elaborate, 
expensive: extortion, 
bribery, lack of 
transparency
Too fast or variable: 
favoritism, bribery, 
forgery, blackmail, 
sale of official/
confidential data
Too slow, official 
fees too high: 
opportunity to 
demand bribes, 
reasons to pay
Too fast or variable: 
payments to buy 
time, preserve 
confidentiality, 
avoid blackmail
Case handling in 
other jurisdictions: 
speed, fees, 
frequency, and scope 
of variations
Review officials’ 
monopoly power, 
discretion, 
accountability; 
enforce standards 
for speed of 
handling cases; 
gather info from 
clients; random 
audits of cases; 
create client 
advocates
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Indicator Effects of past 
corruption
Incentives to 
further corruption
Possible 
benchmarks
Actions indicated
Time, steps, and 
frequency/scope of 
variation involved 
in tax assessments 
and other revenue 
collections
Too slow/elaborate: 
extortion, bribery
Too fast, or excessive 
variation: favoritism, 
bribery
Too slow or too 
fast, variable: 
Taxpayers/property 
owners vulnerable to 
manipulation, and/
or believe payments 
can win favorable 
treatment
Case handling in 
other jurisdictions: 
speed, frequency, 
and scope of 
variances
Review assessors and 
collectors’ monopoly 
power, discretion, 
accountability; 
enforce standards 
for handling cases; 
gather info from 
clients; random 
audits of cases; 
create ombudsmen 
or citizen advocates; 
monitor assessments 
for frequent 
variances
Number, frequency, 
variation of routine 
inspections of 
businesses
Too many, too 
variable: extortion, 
often on-the-spot
Too few, or
low-quality:
bribery over the 
longer term, 
favoritism, 
often involving 
supervisors 
Too many, too 
variable: reasons to 
pay on the spot
Too few or low-
quality: reward 
for cultivating, 
participating in 
longer-term links 
with officials
Frequency and 
range of variation 
of inspections in 
other jurisdictions; 
frequency of 
citations or 
infractions; share 
of cases settled 
informally
Review internal 
accountability, 
inspectors’ powers 
and discretion in the 
field; set reasonable 
performance targets 
and investigate 
divergences; 
gather information 
from businesses, 
customers
Trends in the 
numbers of subsidy 
or benefit payments 
granted by an 
agency
Too many: 
kickbacks, 
possibly shared 
with superiors; 
political pressures to 
distribute patronage
Too few, or 
arbitrarily 
distributed: 
favoritism, possibly 
in response to 
political pressures
Too many: signal 
that bribes can 
obtain benefits, 
funds; voter fraud
Too few, or 
arbitrarily 
distributed: political 
manipulation of 
agencies, citizens; 
problems with 
accountability, 
transparency 
Patterns of benefit 
distribution in other 
jurisdictions
More specific 
legislation, rules for 
eligibility, benefits; 
audit successful 
and unsuccessful 
applications; review 
agencies’ internal 
accountability, 
independence; 
establish citizen 
advocates
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Indicator Effects of past 
corruption
Incentives to 
further corruption
Possible 
benchmarks
Actions indicated
Number of 
inspections 
performed per 
member of field 
staff in regulatory 
agencies
Too many: extortion 
on small-medium 
scale 
Too few: corrupt 
pressures from 
supervisors, bribery/
extortion on larger 
scale; theft of time, 
moonlighting
Too many, 
too variable: 
vulnerability to 
extortion, reasons to 
pay on the spot
Too few: signal 
that supervisors 
will reward 
larger/longer-term 
payments
Number, and range 
of variation, of 
inspections per 
staff member in 
other jurisdictions; 
frequency of 
citations or 
infractions; share 
of cases settled 
informally
Review 
accountability 
within agencies, 
inspectors’ powers 
and discretion 
in the field; set 
performance targets 
and investigate 
divergences; 
gather information 
from businesses, 
customers
Prices charged for 
basic services (school 
meals, telephone 
equipment)
High prices: 
graft/skimming/
embezzlement
Low/unusually 
variable prices: 
favoritism
Extra revenues 
finance graft
Low/variable prices 
invite favoritism/
side deals between 
clients and officials
Market prices for 
commodities, and 
median prices 
charged by other 
governments or 
agencies
Impose published 
price ceilings and 
floors, monitor 
client access, 
quality of provision, 
monitor revenue 
flows, tendering, 
and bidding
Prices paid for 
basic commodities 
involved in a public 
service (e.g., fuel, 
food, concrete, 
vehicles, tools)
High prices: 
kickback schemes
Unusual variation: 
favoritism, 
nonstandard goods, 
breakdown of 
bidding
High prices finance 
kickbacks
Variation invites 
exploitation of 
vendors, provision 
of substandard 
goods
Market prices for 
commodities, and 
median prices 
paid by other 
governments or 
agencies
Impose published 
price ceilings and 
floors, monitor 
quality of provision, 
monitor revenue 
flows, tendering, 
and bidding 
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Indicator Effects of past 
corruption
Incentives to 
further corruption
Possible 
benchmarks
Actions indicated
Frequency 
and costs of 
outsourcing agency 
work to consultants
Too high: 
agency budget 
being diverted 
to politically 
connected 
“consultants”; 
consultants 
may operate as 
“middlemen” 
between agency 
and clients; 
agency employees 
may be devoting 
most effort 
elsewhere (shadow 
enterprises, 
political duties)
Too high: 
agency budget 
becoming a pool 
of “spoils,” spent 
with insufficient 
oversight; 
politically-favored 
but unskilled 
employees can be 
hidden on payroll 
as professional tasks 
are outsourced; 
political 
operators become 
“consultants”
Frequency, costs 
for consultants 
in comparable 
agencies in other 
jurisdictions; skill 
and training level 
workforce in those 
agencies 
Restrict, increase 
oversight over, 
consultant 
hiring; invest in 
training agency’s 
own workforce, 
weeding out the 
unproductive; 
analyze budgets 
and outlays in 
proportion to tasks 
accomplished
Staffing levels in 
proportion to tasks 
accomplished
Too many 
employees: political 
interference 
converts payroll 
into a patronage 
pool; nepotism or 
communalism may 
have similar effects
Too few employees: 
resources and 
workforce diverted 
to corrupt 
endeavors (an 
unlikely finding, 
if agency records 
conceal such 
practices)
“Ghost workers”: 
people paid for 
work elsewhere 
or do not exist; 
payroll diverted by 
corrupt officials 
(difficult to show 
without comparing 
workforce records 
to actual tasks and 
accomplishments) 
Too many: 
weak auditing, 
accountability 
allow payroll 
to be used for 
political, personal 
advantage; political 
interference a 
problem
Too few: weak 
auditing, 
accountability 
allow payroll and 
resources to be 
diverted to private 
enterprises; 
“Ghost workers”: 
extremely weak 
controls allow theft 
of payroll; pervasive 
corruption likely 
to be sustained 
by involvement 
of top leaders and 
managers, and 
collusion with 
other officials
Compare 
workforce to 
similar agencies in 
other jurisdictions, 
or (if possible) 
to private-sector 
firms doing similar 
tasks; audit actual 
execution of tasks 
and use of resources 
to compare size of 
workforce to tasks 
accomplished, or 
to reveal “ghost 
worker” problems. 
Problems in this 
area, and “ghost 
worker” situations 
in particular, are 
likely to emerge as 
secondary findings 
based on analysis 
of other indicators 
and benchmarks
Tighten external 
oversight, internal 
auditing, and 
managerial/
workforce 
supervision; 
monitor “output” 
indicators of tasks 
accomplished and 
client satisfaction 
in light of resources 
and workforce 
employed; revise 
personnel practices 
at all levels
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Indicator Effects of past 
corruption
Incentives to 
further corruption
Possible 
benchmarks
Actions indicated
Budgetary levels in 
proportion to tasks 
accomplished
Too high: funds 
are being diverted, 
wasted; excess or 
inefficient staffing 
reflects patronage
Too low: funds are 
apportioned among 
agencies based on 
political loyalties 
of managers, or 
their potential 
as reservoirs of 
patronage; funds 
are being diverted 
to political uses, 
favored consultants
Too high: agency 
budget seen as 
political slush fund, 
or may be diverted 
by managers; 
patronage easily 
hidden, workforce 
poorly supervised
Too low: funds 
are being diverted 
before reaching the 
agency
Funding levels 
in comparable 
agencies in other 
jurisdictions, 
assessed in 
proportion 
to agency 
activities and 
accomplishments
Tighter oversight 
of budgetary, 
personnel, 
supervision 
functions
Set specific 
goals for agency 
accomplishments 
and move them 
upwards over time
Supervisory/staff 
vs. line workforces
Too many 
supervisors: agency 
has been colonized 
by elite families 
and their favorites
Supervisory payroll 
too large: payroll 
has become an elite 
slush fund; funds 
may be diverted to 
shadow enterprises 
and corrupt deals
Too many line 
employees: payroll 
has become a 
patronage pool for 
unskilled political 
loyalists
Too many 
supervisors: payroll 
accessible to abuse 
by top managers, 
political elites
Supervisory payroll 
too large: funds 
available for theft, 
diversion into 
shadow enterprises
Too many line 
employees: 
patronage likely 
to continue; line 
employees likely to 
be underpaid, and 
thus to demand 
payments from 
citizens 
Examine the 
size of staff and 
line workforces 
in comparable 
agencies, 
particularly in 
other jurisdictions; 
relative size of 
each, in proportion 
to the other, 
an important 
indicator; 
examine size of 
supervisory payroll 
in comparison to 
agency tasks and 
accomplishments; 
gather data on 
citizen satisfaction 
levels, where 
appropriate
Tighten auditing 
and internal 
accountability 
measures; bring 
proportions and 
size of workforces 
and payroll toward 
multi-agency 
norms; examine 
personnel processes 
(hiring, review) 
and day-to-day 
supervision 
arrangements
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A b s t r a c t
Fiscal transparency has become one of the articles of faith in government budgeting. 
While fiscal transparency is widely accepted, it is seldom very clearly defined. For this reason 
this chapter starts with some conceptual clarifications related to this concept. In the rest 
of the chapter we look in more detail at what the specific decisions and actions are that 
government takes in producing an executing a budget, and what information is needed to 
hold government to account for these actions and decisions. The mere production of this 
information is, however, not sufficient to assure the usefulness of this information. The 
chapter later reveals some of the qualities of budget information that makes it useful for 
accountability purposes. Finally, the chapter analyzes some of the results of the 2006 Open 
Budget Index to see how transparent are a selection of 59 countries in the world.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal transparency has become one of the articles of faith for everyone involved in 
government budgeting in whatever way. It is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd anyone that is prepared 
to argue against it. 
Premchand (2001) argues that there are three major factors that have contributed 
to the exalted status of ﬁscal transparency in recent years. 
First, since the mid-1990s there has been a growing awareness of the limits of 
enforcement mechanisms in accountability relationships. As a result, especially donor 
agencies have progressively emphasized the development of “answerability” relationships. 
This, in turn, has led to a growing emphasis on the role of civil society in demanding 
accountability. The strengthening of civil society, however, requires greater transparency 
in governmental actions.
Second, especially since the Second World War, governments have grown enormously 
in size and in the range of tasks undertaken. Most governments, however, are perceived 
to be failing in this task in one way or another. This erosion of trust in government and 
political leadership has spread across the developing and developed world. The demand 
for ﬁscal transparency is a response to this sense of disappointment. People want more 
information about what governments do because they no longer trust them.
The above refers to what Heald (2003) calls the “ﬁscal visions of the state” that 
often underlie the view that people take of ﬁscal transparency. A more favorable view of 
the state may see government as a protector against expenditure and tax lobbies. Some 
limitations of transparency may then be justiﬁed to protect government’s ability to play 
this protector role. More negative visions of the state may be very skeptical about such 
limitations in transparency. If the state is composed of corrupt oﬃcials and self-interested 
bureaucrats, then it is in the interest of citizens to expose their dealings to the light of 
day. However, it is safe to say that in most countries the public perception of govern-
ment leans towards mistrust, hence the growing demand for transparency.
Third, the series of ﬁnancial crises experienced during the 1990s conﬁrmed the 
linkages in the global ﬁnancial architecture. It has also become clear that governments 
no longer control their ﬁscal destinies and are largely dependent on how their ﬁscal 
management is perceived. In order to manage these perceptions, governments have been 
encouraged to be as transparent as possible about both their current ﬁscal status as well 
as their future ﬁscal intensions. As Potter (1999) puts it: 
In ﬁscal policy perhaps nothing matters quite so much these days as what the ﬁnancial 
markets think you are doing and how well you are doing it, and to add to the ﬁnancial 
markets I think you increasingly have to take into account the fact that the donors like 
to know what it is that a country is doing and how well it is doing it.
The eﬀort to manage the perception of future intensions in particular has spawned 
a range of new tools such as medium-term expenditure frameworks and pre-budget 
statements.
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While ﬁscal transparency is widely accepted, it is seldom very clearly deﬁned. One 
of the more comprehensive deﬁnitions is provided by Kopits and Craig (1998: 1):
Fiscal transparency is deﬁned… as openness toward the public at large about govern-
ment structure and functions, ﬁscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and 
projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, 
and internationally comparable information on government activities… so that the 
electorate and ﬁnancial markets can accurately assess the government’s ﬁnancial posi-
tion and the true costs and beneﬁts of government activities, including their present 
and future economic and social implications. 
This deﬁnition underlines that ﬁscal transparency is not just about current public 
sector accounts, but also about government’s ﬁscal intentions for the future. Although 
Kopits and Craig do not mention this, it could be argued that past accounts are equally 
important. 
In addition, government structure and functions are central to transparency. One 
of the reasons for this is the close link between transparency and accountability. So 
while the budget ﬁgures can tell us what the state of ﬁscal aﬀairs is, they alone cannot 
tell us who is responsible for the decisions that produced this state of aﬀairs. It is only 
when we know who made these decisions that ﬁscal information becomes useful for 
accountability purposes. For this we need to know what the government structure and 
the assignment of functions and responsibilities are.
We should also distinguish between de jure and de facto transparency arrangements. 
Financial and budgetary laws and regulations are probably amongst the least respected 
of all. So even where legislation may, for example, specify that audit reports should be 
released within six months of the end of the ﬁnancial year or that government should 
include performance targets in its budget proposals, such legislation is often not respected 
in practice. So if one is interested in transparency for accountability reasons, it is far 
more important to know what the actual government ﬁscal practice is on a speciﬁc issue 
than what is legislated for.
The link between transparency and accountability also signiﬁes that transparency 
is about more than the production of books and information. As Heald (2006) puts 
it: in order for transparency to be eﬀective, there must be actors capable of processing, 
digesting, and using the information. So transparency is not just about what government 
chooses to show of its transactions, but also about who is watching these transactions 
and what they do about it.
While transparency is widely valued one could argue against it having absolute 
value. As Heald (2003) argues: more transparency trades oﬀ the value of sunlight with 
the danger of over-exposure. There is a strong case to be made that there are stages of 
government ﬁnancial processes that should not be made public at speciﬁc times. One 
often-cited example is where government subjects a tax or tax provision to review. If the 
private sector were to become aware of this, they could base their investment decisions 
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on the mere fact that a tax is being reviewed. And these investment decisions could 
ironically itself bias the outcome of government’s review. Other obviously sensitive areas 
would include plans for debt transactions, privatization decisions, exchange-rate policies, 
etc. This does not mean that parliament should not review and decide on the executive’s 
eventual proposal that derives from such a review. Or that government as whole should 
not be held accountable for the decision that eventually made.
One of the ways of navigating through these diﬃcult deﬁnitional issues is to follow 
Heald’s distinction between event and process transparency. This means that govern-
ment should be completely transparent about its inputs, outputs, and outcomes, but 
not necessarily about the processes that produce these inputs, outputs, and outcomes.
As we will show below, though, very few governments run a real risk of producing 
too much information. It is more often the case that governments produce but neglect 
to publish fairly innocuous information.
A lot of analytical and empirical work has been done that measures the level of 
transparency in countries and speaks to what would be made possible by greater trans-
parency. We know a lot less about what factors drive governments to being more ﬁscally 
transparent. One exception is the groundbreaking work of Alt, Lassen, and Rose (2006) 
who found that both politics and ﬁscal policy outcomes inﬂuence the level of transpar-
ency. They found that more equal political competition and power sharing are associated 
with both greater levels of ﬁscal transparency and increases in ﬁscal transparency. Much, 
however, remains to be done before we know what the role of parliament, the media, 
civil society, and investor perceptions are in producing greater ﬁscal transparency.
In what follows we will look in more detail at what the speciﬁc decisions and actions 
that government takes in producing and executing a budget (section 2). In section 3, we 
look at what information is needed to hold government to account for these actions and 
decisions. The mere production of this information however is not suﬃcient to assure 
the usefulness of this information. So in section 4, we look at some of the qualities of 
budget information that makes it useful for accountability purposes. Finally, in section 
5 we look at some of the results of the 2006 Open Budget Index to see how transparent 
59 countries in the world actually are.
2. What Actions and Decisions Do Governments Take in the 
 Formulation, Implementation, and Audit of a Budget?1
Before we know what information to demand to make government ﬁscally transparent, 
we need to know what decisions and actions government performs during the budget 
process. In what follows we describe the skeleton of a generic budget process. Naturally, 
each country and each level of government (central, local, or regional) will have its own 
variations of the process described below.
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The term “budget” is often mistakenly taken to refer only to government’s spending 
plans. Government’s intended spending plans are only one part of the process that deter-
mines what government spends and where it spends it. The executive’s budget proposal 
only marks the end of the formulation phase of the budget process. After this it is the 
turn of the legislature to amend and/or approve the budget and pass it into legislation. 
This phase of the budget process comes to an end when the ﬁnance act is passed that 
codiﬁes the budget into law.
The budget execution phase of the budget process starts when funds are trans-
ferred to ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) on the budget of the ﬁnance 
act. During this phase government spends the budget to pay salaries, provide services, 
etc., as provided for in the approved budget. This phase of the budget process 
comes to an end when the ﬁnancial year comes to an end and the relevant MDAs 
close their accounts. 
The audit phase of the budget process starts when government accounts for the 
ﬁnancial year are submitted to the supreme audit institution for auditing. This phase of 
the budget process ends when the supreme audit institution (SAI) submits its report to 
the legislature and the legislature taken any actions that may be necessary to conclude 
the budgeting cycle.
In the rest of this section we discuss each of these phases of the budget process in 
greater detail. 
2.1 Budget Formulation 
The budget process is initiated when the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, 
and sometimes donors and representatives from the Head of State (president or prime 
minister) decide on the ﬁscal framework within which the budget will be formulated. 
The ﬁscal framework typically determines overall levels of expenditure and revenue 
as well as the resultant budget deﬁcit and borrowing requirements. In order to project 
the overall levels of revenue, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank must 
also determine any changes in the levels or composition of taxes. In some cases the 
document in which the ﬁscal framework appears (pre-budget statement or budget 
circular) also includes government’s broad expenditure priorities for the relevant 
ﬁnancial year(s). 
The next step in the budget formulation process is for the Ministry of Finance and 
the Cabinet or Council of Ministers to determine the overall indicative amount of 
money to be allocated to each government function or MDA. 
Once these levels have been determined, MDAs are asked to formulate their 
individual budgets within these budget ceilings. Within each of these units of govern-
ment, trade-oﬀs between programs and activities will be made before the relevant 
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accounting oﬃcer and the political head of the MDA decide on the composition of 
its budget.
Within each of the programs that make up the budget of the relevant MDA, the 
relevant program head will decide how the money allocated to that program is to be 
divided up into speciﬁc activities. 
Once these MDA details have been decided on, each such budget proposal typi-
cally is sent to the Ministry of Finance which consolidates the spending proposals and 
submits it to the Cabinet or Council of Ministers for ﬁnal approval before the Minister 
of Finance (or the Head of State in some cases) tables the executive’s budget proposal 
in the legislature.
2.2 Legislative Phase
The legislative stage of the budget process starts when the Executive’s budget proposal is 
tabled in the legislature. The plenary of the legislature typically refers the draft budget 
to its Finance Committee for consideration. 
The Finance Committee holds a series of hearings with the political and adminis-
trative heads of each of the MDAs, during which time their budgets are examined and 
potential amendments formulated. 
Sometimes a Finance Committee would refer individual MDA budgets to specialist 
committees who would examine the relevant budget and refer recommendations and 
amendments back to the Finance Committee who would consolidate all of these into 
a coherent set of proposals that would go back to the plenary.
It should be noted that while the executive tables its entire set of revenue and 
expenditure proposals in the legislature, it is generally a very abbreviated version of 
its proposals that is reﬂected in the Finance Bill. And it is only the Finance Bill that is 
ﬁnally voted into law, not the entire revenue and expenditure proposal. 
It should also be noted that the nature and the extent of the amendments that the 
legislature can make to the Finance Bill is generally limited. In many cases legislatures 
may not increase the overall size of the deﬁcit. This means that where it wants to increase 
a speciﬁc expenditure item, it needs to propose a cut to another or else propose an 
increase on the revenue side that would fund this increased expenditure.
Once the Finance Committee has ﬁnalized its recommendations and proposed 
amendments, it refers these to the plenary where amendments are voted on and the 
resultant Finance Bill voted into law. The legislative phase of the budget process comes 
to an end once the Bill is voted.
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2.3 Implementation Phase
The budget implementation phase of the budget process starts when funding is released 
to the relevant Ministry, Department, or Agency (MDA). Such a release can only take 
place once the budget has been passed into law by the legislature. These transfers also are 
made by means of formal warrants that authorize them legally and which may specify 
the line items against which the MDA may incur expenditure. Such speciﬁcations are 
derived from the enacted budget.
These transfers to MDAs are generally released in quarterly or even monthly 
payments from a central revenue fund. In Commonwealth countries this account is 
known as the Consolidated Fund. This account is often held with the Central Bank, 
but can also be held with commercial banks. 
Spending is initiated
After funding is released to MDAs, program oﬃcers initiate spending proposals in terms 
of their budgets and areas of competence. These proposals are subject to review by the 
Chief Accounting Oﬃcer or his or her delegated oﬃcial (often the Chief Financial 
Oﬃcer) of the same MDA to ensure that the proposed expenditure falls within the 
provision of the approved budget, that the decision to commit funds has been taken 
at the appropriate level of delegated authority, and that where relevant, government 
procurement procedures have been followed (Fozzard and Foster 2000). Once approved 
by the accounting oﬃcer, the MDA signs a contract or places an order for the delivery 
of goods and services. 
Next the goods or services are delivered and the supplier or contractor presents the 
MDA with an invoice for the goods and services delivered. The department which initi-
ated the order conﬁrms that the goods or services were received, in compliance with the 
terms and conditions, and requests that the accounts department makes payment.
Payment is made
Payment is made by the accounts department of the MDA by check or bank transfer. This 
may vary in some countries where all payments are made by the Central Treasury. In many 
Francophone countries the person making the payment (“le comptable”) is legally protected 
against undue inﬂuence from the person making the decision to spend (“l’ordonnateur”).
Transaction is recorded
The transaction is registered as complete in the accounts once the payment has been made, 
immediately following the issue of a payment order. Nearly all developing countries use 
cash accounting systems which means that transactions are only recorded once the payment 
has been made. Because cash-based systems eﬀectively hide decisions and transactions with 
credit and debit implications, they obviously allow for less ﬁscal transparency. 
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Accounts are closed for the year
The one-year period for which a budget is voted is called the ﬁnancial year. Although a 
twelve-month period, it does not necessarily coincide with the calendar year and varies 
by country. At the end of this period, accounting oﬃcers or their delegated staﬀ (often 
the Chief Financial Oﬃcer) record all the outstanding revenue and expenditure trans-
actions that were eﬀected in the relevant ﬁnancial year. Once all these transactions are 
recorded, the accounting oﬃcer prepares ﬁnal accounts of the entity’s ﬁnancial opera-
tions for the relevant year. These ﬁnal accounts are included in the year-end report that 
is forwarded to the SAI for auditing.
2.4 Audit Phase
Auditing is a process undertaken to enable an auditor to express an opinion as to whether 
or not the ﬁnancial statements of an MDA fairly present the ﬁnancial position of the 
entity at a speciﬁc date in accordance with a speciﬁed ﬁnancial reporting framework 
and/or statutory requirements. Similar objectives apply to audits of non-ﬁnancial infor-
mation conducted in accordance with a non-ﬁnancial reporting framework.
There are three main types of audit that are undertaken by supreme audit institu-
tions:
  First, a compliance audit tries to establish whether the relevant entity has 
complied with the relevant statutory obligations with regards to ﬁnancial 
management and accounting. Compliance auditing does not determine whether 
the ﬁnancial transactions of the entity have been conducted appropriately but 
merely whether the relevant rules have been complied with. 
  Second, a ﬁnancial audit tries to establish whether or not the ﬁnancial statements 
of the relevant entity are accurate, complete, and fairly presented. Such audits can 
be conducted in two ways. First where internal systems and controls are strong 
enough, the auditors compare sets of ﬁnancial information with non-ﬁnancial 
information to test for consistency and see whether any apparent inconsistencies 
can be explained. Where internal systems and controls are not strong enough to 
produce reliable ﬁnancial information, auditors compare ﬁnancial information 
to hard evidence for such information such as invoices or bank statements.
  The third main type of audit is a performance audit (also known as Value for 
Money or  VFM auditing). Performance audits measure the economy, eﬃciency, 
and eﬀectiveness in the use of available resources. In short, these audits try to 
measure the extent to which the relevant entity is achieving its stated mission 
or objectives.
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In Francophone countries, the supreme audit institution is part of the justice system 
and is known as the “Cour de Comptes.” This body’s reports, however, are still referred 
to the legislature and processed as described below.
The role of the legislature in the audit process can be inﬂuenced by the audit 
system that is followed by the country. In countries following the “Cour des Comptes” 
system—or Court of Accounts (typically in Francophone countries)—audit issues are 
dealt with by judges of the Court of Accounts. Under this system, the legislature has 
a limited role in the audit process and the President of the Court of Accounts sends 
audit reports to the legislature only at his/her discretion. However, even in this system, 
the Court of Accounts submits a report to the legislature on the extent to which the 
implementation of the budget corresponds to budgeted appropriations—and the legis-
lature has the power to request the Court to conduct an audit of a speciﬁc government 
entity. Importantly, the Court of Accounts has the power to impose sanctions on the 
executive for failure to comply with the ﬁnancial management laws of the country. The 
legislature can support sanctions imposed by the Court of Accounts by adding political 
weight to the sanctions.
In countries following the board (or collegiate) system, the national audit institution 
submits its audit reports to the executive (speciﬁcally, to the national Cabinet or Council 
of Ministers). The executive in turn sends its annual report (along with audit ﬁndings 
and its comments on speciﬁc audit ﬁndings) to the legislature. Legislative deliberations 
on the executive’s annual report are attended by the staﬀ of the national audit institu-
tion, who explain the audit opinions and decisions contained in the report. 
In countries following the Westminster system of government, the national audit 
institution actively supports legislative oversight of budget implementation. In this system, 
the legislature’s oversight function is largely directed by the contents and ﬁndings of audit 
reports. The legislatures in these countries often establish committees known as Public 
Accounts Committees (or PAC), which are responsible for overseeing the audit reports on 
behalf of the legislature. The PAC organizes hearings on audit ﬁndings at which oﬃcials 
from the relevant government agencies testify on the contents of audit reports. 
In some countries, PACs also have a formal mandate to initiate and conduct their 
own investigations so that their oversight is not limited to the issues contained in audit 
reports. These PACs are empowered to summon oﬃcials to appear before them—though 
relatively few actually use their power to take up issues that are not contained in audit 
reports. Upon completion of their hearings, PACs compile reports oﬀering recommenda-
tions for speciﬁc actions to be performed by the relevant agencies and submit them to 
the entire legislature for debate and action. Importantly, the audit institutions generally 
do not have the power to sanction the executive for non-adherence to public ﬁnance 
laws and instead rely on the legislature to impose such sanctions on the government. 
The legislature’s role in the budget process should not end with the submission of 
its recommendations for actions needed to respond to audit ﬁndings. In some coun-
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tries, the executive is required to formally respond to the recommendations made by 
the legislature—normally within a certain period, such as within two to six months 
of receiving the report from the legislature. The legislature, in turn, can review the 
executive’s response to its recommendations and decide to take further action if it is 
not satisﬁed with the response. Unfortunately, in practice, governments often choose 
to ignore legislative audit recommendations. 
Sometimes, however, audit reports produced by the national audit institution may 
include information on its previous audit ﬁndings and on the government’s response 
to those ﬁndings. This type of reporting allows the legislature to continue to review the 
executive’s response to its recommendations and make additional recommendations to 
the executive on matters previously raised. 
For example, in India, the executive is required to report to the PAC on the actions 
taken or proposed to be taken by it on the recommendations contained in the PAC’s 
report within six months of the presentation of this report by the PAC. The reported 
information is used by the PAC to prepare an Action Taken Report, which is presented 
to the entire legislature. The executive is also required to report to the PAC regarding 
the action taken or proposed to be taken by it in response to the recommendations 
contained in the Action Taken Report. The executive then furnishes ﬁnal replies 
regarding actions made in response to items contained in the original PAC report for 
which ﬁnal responses had not previously been received. This information is presented to 
the legislature as a statement without any further comments by the PAC. This iterative 
system not only ensures the executive remains accountable to the legislature but also 
enables the legislature and the public to review the executive’s responses to the PAC’s 
recommendations. 
3. Which Information Is Needed to Monitor These Actions and
 Decisions? 
In this section we look at the documents that need to be produced in each phase of the 
budget process in order to make government’s ﬁscal operations transparent.
3.1 Budget Formulation Phase 
Pre-budget Report
A pre-budget report serves the purpose of concluding and formalizing the broad priori-
tization phase of the budget process and consolidating the main budgeting ceilings. 
According to the OECD’s Best Practice Guide to Budget Transparency (2000), a pre-
budget report should state explicitly the government’s long-term economic and ﬁscal 
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policy objectives and the government’s economic and ﬁscal policy intentions for the 
forthcoming budget and, at least, the following two ﬁscal years. It should highlight the 
total level of revenue, expenditure, deﬁcit or surplus, and debt.
As the only document released on the budget during the formulation phases, it has 
the ability to encourage debate on the budget aggregates and how they interact with 
the economy and to create appropriate expectations for the budget itself. The OECD 
also recommends that this document should be released no later than one month prior 
to the introduction of the budget proposal.
Executive’s Budget Proposal
The executive’s Budget Proposal is the detailed statement of the executive’s proposed 
revenue and expenditure plans that is tabled in the legislature. As such it should contain 
extensive detail on all categories of expenditure and all source of tax revenue. Some of 
the more detailed elements that OECD’s transparency code demands are:
  A detailed commentary on each revenue and expenditure program. 
  Non-ﬁnancial performance data, including performance targets, should be 
presented for expenditure programs where practicable.
  The budget should include a medium-term perspective illustrating how revenue 
and expenditure will develop during, at least, the two years beyond the next ﬁscal 
year. Similarly, the current budget proposal should be reconciled with forecasts 
contained in earlier ﬁscal reports for the same period; all signiﬁcant deviations 
should be explained.
  Comparative information on actual revenue and expenditure during the past 
year and an updated forecast for the current year should be provided for each 
program. Similar comparative information should be shown for any non-ﬁnan-
cial performance data.
  Expenditures should be presented in gross terms. Ear-marked revenue and user 
charges should be clearly accounted for separately. This should be done regardless 
of whether particular incentive and control systems provide for the retention of 
some or all of the receipts by the collecting agency.
  Expenditures should be classiﬁed by administrative unit (e.g., ministry, agency). 
Supplementary information classifying expenditure by economic and functional 
categories should also be presented.
  A comprehensive discussion of the government’s ﬁnancial assets and liabilities, 
non-ﬁnancial assets, employee pension obligations, and contingent liabilities.
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3.2 Legislative Phase
Enacted Budget2 
After debating the executive’s budget, the legislature typically votes some form of the 
budget or appropriation into law. The term “enacted budget” refers to the document 
that has been passed into law by the legislature. Countries include very diﬀerent levels 
of detail into this law. Some would legally specify allocations to individual spending 
agencies and even programs within them, while others would only specify overall 
expenditure levels. This level of detail is important because the enacted budget is the 
only document that has a legal status. The level of detail in it therefore delimits the 
extent to which government can change the budget during the year without returning 
to the legislature for authorization to change spending plans. 
The enacted budget is important for monitoring purposes because it states what 
government is supposed to spend in the coming ﬁnancial year. As such it provides a 
standard against which to measure expenditure.
Naturally, the amount of detail that can be included in the enacted budget (and the 
budget proposal even) would depend on the information that is generated by the budget 
system of the relevant country. So, for example, countries that do not have a program 
budget might ﬁnd it diﬃcult to produce budget information for budgeted programs.
Report of the Finance Committee
Apart from the Finance Act, the only other document that is produced in this phase of 
the budget process is the Finance Committee report on its review of the budget. While 
these reports have no standard format, this is generally where proposed amendments 
are recorded and passed on to the plenary.
3.3 Budget Implementation
Within government, the monitoring of implementation generally occurs over speci-
ﬁed periods ranging from monthly to quarterly to annually, and to the related reports 
produced. 
In the budget implementation phase, governments traditionally monitor expendi-
ture, revenue, and debt levels much more thoroughly than they monitor delivery. Many 
governments produce monthly, quarterly, biannual, and annual reports that provide 
this information. 
Such information is used for political as well as administrative accountability. At an 
administrative level, departmental accounting oﬃcers would use such information to 
hold their line managers to account. Politically, ministers and cabinets use this informa-
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tion to hold accounting oﬃcers and each other to account. In some cases the legislature 
also uses such information to hold the executive to account.
Given the nature of these reports, they are more useful for monitoring inputs and 
compliance with the budget rather than outputs, outcomes, and delivery. All that many 
of these reports succeed in doing is to show whether the expenditure, revenue, and debt 
provisions of the budget are being adhered to. They do not show whether the budget is 
delivering the services that it was meant to. Monitoring of service delivery only becomes 
possible where government monitors and reports on service delivery. Very few countries 
however succeed in doing so.
In-year Reports
In-year reports report on government expenditure and revenue collection during the 
ﬁnancial year. They typically report on a quarterly or monthly basis. For this reason they 
are sometimes also referred to as monthly reports or quarterly reports. In-year reports can 
be issued in the form of one consolidated report for the entire government, or multiple 
reports can be issued by diﬀerent agencies. For example, the Central Bank can issue 
them, in addition to the Ministry of Finance. In some cases, revenue collection agencies 
issue their own separate reports.
In some countries, the Central Bank, rather than the executive, issues these reports 
based on the status of the government’s bank accounts. In these cases, the Central Bank’s 
reports can be used as in-year reports, as long as they report what has actually been spent, 
rather than on the monthly sums that have been transferred to administrative units. 
As was the case with enacted budgets, countries do not report at the same level of 
aggregation; some would report in the ﬁnest detail on individual program expenditure 
and revenue from individual taxes while others would only reﬂect total revenue and 
expenditure for the government as a whole. 
In some countries, the reports are issued individually by each administrative unit, 
while in other countries the information is consolidated into one report, which is 
typically issued by the Treasury. Either individual reports or one consolidated report is 
acceptable for responding to these questions.
Year-end Reports
Year-end reports consolidate information on the actual expenditures of administrative 
units, revenue collections, and debt. In some countries this would be a single document 
for all of government, while in other countries, individual administrative units issue 
their own year-end reports. Similarly, year-end reports may be stand-alone documents 
or may be included in larger documents, such as the budget. The form of the report is 
less important than its content. 
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The OECD recommends that a year-end report be released within six months of the 
end of the ﬁscal year. The reports should cover all of the major items that were presented 
in the budget, explaining diﬀerences between the original estimates (as amended by 
the legislature during the year) and actual outcomes for expenditure, revenue, debt, 
and macroeconomic assumptions. They should also include non-ﬁnancial performance 
information.
In-year and year-end reports are important for monitoring purposes because 
they indicate to what extent the government adhered to the content of the enacted 
budget.
Supplementary Budget
Supplemental budgets are eﬀectively amendments to the enacted budget. Although 
supplemental budgets are not uncommon in most countries, the habitual use of large 
supplemental budgets can be an indication of poor budgeting practices. Routine supple-
mental requests undermine planning within ministries and agencies. They also interfere 
with open and public debate on allocation of resources among budget categories, since 
in theory this should occur as the legislature reviews the executive’s budget proposal 
each year. 
Supplementary budgets are important for monitoring purposes because they indicate 
which deviations from the enacted budget have been agreed to by the legislature.
3.4 Auditing Phase
“Audit reports” refer to the report or reports issued by the Supreme Audit Institution 
attesting to the completeness and reliability of the government’s year-end ﬁnal accounts. 
These audits are sometimes known as “certiﬁcation of the government accounts.” 
According to OECD best practices, the SAI should complete these audits within six 
months of the end of the budget year for administrative units (i.e., ministries, depart-
ments, or agencies). 
Audit reports are important for monitoring for two reasons. First, audit reports 
typically indicate whether ﬁnancial management procedures were adhered to in the 
implementation of the budget. Second, audit reports indicate whether deviations from 
the enacted budget were justiﬁed or not. 
The other important document that is produced in this phase of the budget process 
is the legislature’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report that is produced after the 
PAC has considered the audit reports that were produced on the government’s accounts. 
These reports are referred to the plenary for further discussion and action.
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4. Quality of Fiscal Information 
Fiscal information has very little inherent value. A whole series of qualities described 
below need to be reﬂected in this information before it becomes useful for account-
ability purposes.
4.1 Accuracy/Validity of Fiscal Information
One of the most important requirements of ﬁscal information is that it corresponds 
to the reality of the government’s ﬁnances. At a ﬁrst level this means what government 
actually spends and collects in revenue must correspond to some degree with what its 
budget proposals show. So when, for example, less than half of what was budgeted for 
primary healthcare is spent on primary healthcare, then the printed estimates for primary 
healthcare cease to be a useful accountability tool.
At a second level, actual revenue and expenditure ﬁgures also cease to be useful when 
they do not reﬂect what government has actually spent. In many cases governments’ 
actual expenditure is, for example, given the lie by outstanding payments or transactions 
that have been eﬀected but not captured by the accounting system. 
Obviously, the vagaries of budget implementation makes some level of divergence 
from budgeted ﬁgures inevitable. For this reason many governments make provision 
for such divergence through virement regulations and contingency reserves. Virement 
regulations govern the amounts of money that may be shifted between items in the 
budget. In many countries such shifts would be limited to a certain percentage of the 
original amounts approved by the legislature. In other cases these regulations would 
limit the kinds of expenditure that may be shifted, for example, forbidding shifts from 
infrastructure to personnel expenditure provisions.
Many governments also plan for the unforeseen by creating contingency reserves. 
These reserves are amounts of money set aside for unforeseen and unavoidable expendi-
tures such as ﬂoods or sudden changes in the price of fuel. 
4.2 Timeliness 
From a transparency and accountability perspective, the value of ﬁscal information is 
bound to speciﬁc decisions and their consequences. Information on how much money 
is to be spent on healthcare, for example, has value while that decision is being made, 
implemented, and audited, but after each of these steps the relevant information ceases 
to be useful. So information that government releases too late ceases to be useful, regard-
less of how accurate it may be. 
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An example of information that becomes useless because it is released late would 
be when the executive’s budget proposal is only released to the public after it has been 
approved by the legislature. This information could still be useful to monitor the 
implementation of the budget, but it has ceased to be useful for the debate about what 
government should spend because that decision has been made.
Another example would be when governments only release audit report a number 
of years after the ﬁnancial year that it refers to. Very often the oﬃcials and politicians 
that were responsible for the decisions reﬂected in such reports are no longer in the same 
posts, so such reports cease to be useful in holding the executive to account.
4.3 Comprehensiveness
Very often budget information that is both accurate and timely is still limited if it is not 
comprehensive. Governments often leave speciﬁc transactions out of their budgets or 
even whole institutions such as parastatals or designated development funds. 
Governments often go to great lengths to hide their ﬁscal risks, levels of indebtedness, 
or contigent liabilities. Such hiding often takes place in developing countries that are 
dependent on positive perceptions of their ﬁscal health to access concessional debt.
4.4 Levels of Disaggregation of Information
Apart from the actual quality of ﬁscal information, the ways in which it is presented 
also inﬂuences how useful ﬁscal information is. The most important presentation issue 
is the level to which it is disaggregated. As a general rule ﬁscal information should be 
suﬃciently disaggregated to allow scrutiny of all its ﬁscal operations and decisions. For 
example, an education department would make decisions on how much money to spend 
on school books in its primary education program. A budget that only gives the total 
budget for education would not allow us to examine that decision. Nor would one that 
only gives us a total for primary school education.
4.5 Comparability 
The appropriateness of proposed revenue and expenditure projections or actual expendi-
ture can generally only be examined by comparing it to something else. These projec-
tions are often compared to last years allocations. Or comparisons are made between 
countries. Or budgeted expenditure is compared with actual expenditure. But these 
comparisons are only possible if these sets of information are produced using the same 
classiﬁcations and categorizations.
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For this reason governments should not incessantly tinker with their budget classiﬁca-
tion system because it undermines the comparability of its data. Over the last 20 years 
or so, the International Monetary Fund has had some success in introducing a standard 
classiﬁcation system called Government Financial Statistics (GFS).
4.6 Simplicity
A less speciﬁc presentation rule that ﬁscal information should adhere to is simplicity. In 
many countries governments have had some success in presenting tables and pictures 
that make complex statistics more generally comprehensible.
5. How Fiscally Transparent Are Governments? 
This section is a discussion of the results of the IBP’s 59-country Open Budget Initiative 
(OBI). Table 1 shows that, with the exception of pre-budget statements and mid-year 
reports, the majority of countries provide some version of the reports that make up 
ﬁscal transparency.
Table 1.
Open Budget Index 2006
What Countries Open Their Budget Books to Citizens?
Provides Extensive 
Information to Citizens
France, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa, United Kingdom, 
United States
Provides Significant 
Information to Citizens
Botswana, Brazil, Czech Republic, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, 
South Korea, Sweden
Provides Some 
Information to Citizens
Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Namibia, Pakistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey
Provides Minimal 
Information to Citizens
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Georgia, Honduras, Nepal, Uganda, Zambia
Provides Scant or No 
Information to Citizens
Angola, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Vietnam
Note: A country’s placement in a performance category was determined by averaging the responses to 
the 91 questions on the Open Budget Questionnaire related to information contained in the 
seven key budget documents that all countries should make available public. The countries that 
scored between 81–100 percent were placed in the performance category Provides Extensive 
Information, those with scores 61–80 percent in Provides Signiﬁcant Information, those with 
scores 41–60 percent in Provides Some Information, those with scores 21–40 percent in Provides 
Scant or No Information.
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The more detailed examination that follows, however, points out that while many 
countries produce some information, this information is often not of particularly 
good quality.
A second important point that can be deduced from this summary table is that in 
a signiﬁcant number of cases government produces more information than it releases 
to the public. It would therefore be possible for governments to become more ﬁscally 
transparent without having to invest in producing more information.
5.1 Budget Formulation
Table 2 below shows that of the 59 countries surveyed only nine provide no executive 
budget proposal at all. However a total of 39 provide limited or no information on the 
executive’s budget proposal. This imposes a substantial limit on the ability of the public 
to engage with the executive’s spending and taxation priorities.
This needs to be seen against the context of 36 countries either not releasing or not 
producing a pre-budget statement. So in more than half the countries surveyed, there 
is limited or no information available on the executive’s spending plans.  
Table 2.
Executive’s Budget Proposal
Quality of Publicly Available Information by Country
Provides Extensive 
Information to Citizens
France, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States
Provides Significant 
Information to Citizens
Botswana, Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Ghana, Malawi, Norway, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea
Provides Some 
Information to Citizens
Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda
Provides Minimal 
Information to Citizens
Bolivia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Nigeria, Russia, Zambia
Provides Scant or No 
Information to Citizens
Albania, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Vietnam
Note: A country’s placement in a performance category was determined by averaging the responses to 
the 91 questions on the Open Budget Questionnaire related to information contained in the 
seven key budget documents that all countries should make available public. The countries that 
scored between 81–100 percent were placed in the performance category Provides Extensive 
Information, those with scores 61–80 percent in Provides Signiﬁcant Information, those with 
scores 41–60 percent in Provides Some Information, those with scores 21–40 percent in Provides 
Scant or No Information.
99
F i s c a l  T r a n s p a r e n c y  i n  t h e  F o r m u l a t i o n ,  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n ,  a n d  A u d i t i n g  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  B u d g e t s
Of course, ﬁscal transparency is not just about what government intends to spend, 
but also about what it intends to buy or deliver with the money that is allocated. 
Information about what will be delivered and in which quantities make it possible 
for us to monitor the extent to which government spending is contributing to policy 
goals. Two-thirds of the countries surveyed provide no performance indicators in the 
executive budget proposal. This gap in budget documentation makes it close to impos-
sible to measure government’s eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency in the use of public money. 
This turns most of the public budgeting and accountability process into a compliance 
exercise where the evaluation of government ﬁscal performance is limited to discussions 
of whether regulations were complied to rather than dealing with whether stated policy 
goals were reached.
Of the countries that do publish such performance information, only one does so 
reasonably well (United Kingdom). In most other cases performance measures are either 
not measurable or bear no relation to the stated policy goals of the government.
5.2 Budget Implementation
The picture looks slightly better when in comes to information on budget implemen-
tation. Table 3 below shows that only 12 of the 59 countries surveyed provided no 
information on the implementation of the budget during the ﬁnancial year.
Table 3.
In-year Reports on Execution
Quantity of Publicly Available Information by Country
Top Performer:
Provides Much 
Information to Citizens
Brazil, Bulgaria, France, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, United States
Provides Partial 
Information to Citizens
Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Colombia, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemela, 
Honduras, India, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nepal, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Russia, South Korea, Tanzania, United Kingdom, Zambia
No In-year Reports Made 
Available to the Public
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Costa Rica, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uganda, Vietnam
Note: The country’s percentage score for In-Year Reports on Execution was obtained by averaging the 
responses to Questions 84–92 on the Open Budget Questionnaire. The countries that scored 
between 90–100 percent were placed in the performance category Top Performer, those with 
scores 89 percent or below, but more than zero percent were placed in performance category 
Provides Partial Information, those with scores of zero percent were placed in the category No 
In-year Reports Made Available to the Public.
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However, another 32 only provide partial information on execution. This normally 
means that the ﬁgures that are released are very highly aggregated, with the worse case 
scenario being where quarterly or monthly reports only contain information about 
overall levels of government revenue and expenditure. In these cases the limitation lies 
with the fact that such ﬁgures do not allow one to monitor progress with the collection 
of any speciﬁc tax or realization of any speciﬁc expenditure.
In-year reports allow one to monitor the implementation of the budget of the year 
currently in progress. Year-end reports are generally more comprehensive and allow 
an overview of how the budget as a whole was implemented. It also forms the basis 
for the work of the Supreme Audit Institution and the Public Account Committee in 
parliament. 
Table 4 below shows similar picture to the one painted above. Only nine countries 
do not release any year-end report at all, but another 32 countries’ reports only contain 
limited information.
Table 4.
Year-end Report
Quantity of Publicly Available Information by Country
Top Performer:
Provides Much 
Information to Citizens
Brazil, France, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sweden, United Kingdom
Provides Partial 
Information to Citizens
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, United States, Vietnam, Zambia
No Year-end Report 
Made Available 
to the Public
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Uganda
Note: The country’s percentage score for Year-end Report was obtained by averaging the responses to 
Questions 102–111 on the Open Budget Questionnaire. The countries that scored 80–100 percent 
were placed in the performance category Top Performer, those with scores 79 percent or below, 
but more than zero percent were placed in performance category Provides Partial Information, 
those with scores of zero percent were placed in the category No Year-end Report Made Available 
to the Public.
Given the limited amount of performance information provided in the executive’s 
budget proposal, it is unsurprising that most countries also do not include much perfor-
mance information in their year-end reports. Table 5 tells the story.
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Table 5.
Level of Information in Year-end Budget Documents Comparing Original 
Performance Indicators and Actual Outcomes in 59 Countries
An extensive explanation of the differences is presented, 
including both a narrative discussion and quantitative estimates.
4
An explanation is presented, highlighting key differences, but some details are excluded. 7
Some explanation is presented, but it lacks important details. 4
An explanation is not presented, or such a report is not released. 44
Source: IBP’s Open Budget Index 2006.
5.3 Audit Phase
Disappointingly, 18 of the countries surveyed do not release the audited reports of 
government accounts to the public. In thirteen of these cases audit reports are not 
produced at all, while ﬁve produce them, but do not release them to the public.
Another 25 release audit reports publicly, but limit the information contained in 
them. This severely limits the ability of the public to engage with the review of the 
integrity of government accounts. In many cases it also limits the ability of the legislature 
to perform its oversight function.
Table 6.
Auditor’s Report
Quantity of Publicly Available Information by Country
Top Performer:
Provides Much 
Information to Citizens
Colombia, Croatia, France, India, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States
Provides Partial 
Information to Citizens
Albania, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Uganda, Zambia
No Auditor’s Report 
Made Available 
to the Public
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Chad, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Malawi, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam
Note: The country’s percentage score for Auditor’s Report was obtained by averaging the responses to 
Questions 112–114, and 116 on the Open Budget Questionnaire. The countries that scored 
80–100 percent were placed in the performance category Top Performer, those with scores 79 
percent or below, but more than zero percent were placed in performance category Provides 
Partial Information, those with scores of zero percent were placed in the category No Auditor’s 
Report Made Available to the Public.
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5.4 Engagement with Fiscal Information
As was indicated in the text above, substantial ﬁscal transparency does not only demand 
that government produces and distributes the relevant documents, but also that the 
appropriate institutions and sectors of society engage with them for accountability 
purposes. Below, we look at the extent to which one such institution, the legislature, 
engages with some of the documents produced by government.
Table 7 below shows that in 24 of the 59 countries surveyed in the OBI, no public 
hearings are held on the government’s proposed macroeconomic framework. In another, 
16 such hearings are held, but the public does not have the opportunity to engage 
with this framework itself. So in more than two-thirds of cases the legislature does not 
facilitate public scrutiny of one of the key aspects of the budget formulation phase of 
the budget process.
Table 7.
Are Public Hearings on the Budget’s Macroeconomic Framework Held?
Are Public Hearings on the Budget’s Macroeconomic Framework Held?
Testimony is heard from the 
executive and a wide range of 
constituencies
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Sloveina, South Africa, South 
Korea, Sweden, Uganda
Testimony is heard from the 
executive and some constituencies
Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Mexico, Russia, United Kingdom, United States
Testimony is heard from the 
executive branch, but no testimony 
is heard from the public
Albania, Argentina, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
El Salvador, France, Ghana, Malawi, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Turkey
Public hearings are not held on 
the macroeconomic and fiscal 
framework
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, 
Sri Lnaka, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia
Note: Response by country to Question 76 of the Open Budget Questionnaire.
Table 8 shows that in legislatures’ consideration of the executive budget proposal, 
almost half of them do not hold public hearings on the budgets of MDAs. Only eight 
of them have extensive hearings covering all or most of the MDAs included in the 
budget. This gives some indication of a lack of demand for transparency on behalf of 
the legislature that is independent of the willingness of the executive to supply it. 
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Table 8. 
Do Legislative Committees Hold Public Hearings 
on the Individual Budgets of MDAs?
Extensive public hearings are held. 8
Hearings are held, but only cover key administrative units. 15
A limited number of hearings are held. 11
Public hearings are not held. 25
Source: IBP’s Open Budget Index 2006.
The picture looks considerably better when one looks at legislatures’ role in the 
audit phase of the budget process. Half of them scrutinize all audit reports while only 
10 do not scrutinize any reports. 
Table 9. 
Level of Scrutiny of Audit Reports by Legislative Committee in 59 Countries
All audit reports are scrutinized. 29
Most audit reports are scrutinized. 7
Some audit reports are scrutinized. 13
Audit reports are not scrutinized. 10
Source: IBP’s Open Budget Index 2006.
The picture gets a little darker again when one looks at whether legislatures report 
on the actions that they take a result of their scrutiny of Audit reports. In almost three-
quarters of cases no report is released or it lacks signiﬁcant details. So while the legislature 
may be holding government to account for audit ﬁndings, it does not allow the public 
to enhance this process by releasing its work publicly.
Table 10.
Level of Reporting on Action Taken in Response to Audit Findings in 59 Countries
A comprehensive report is released regularly that tracks actions taken 
by the executive to address audit recommendations.
3
A report is released covering key audit recommendations, but some details are excluded. 10
A report is released, but it lacks important details. 7
A report is not produced or it is prepared for internal purposes only. 39
Source: IBP’s Open Budget Index 2006.
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6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we started oﬀ by looking at some of the historical and deﬁnitional issues 
around ﬁscal transparency. Next, we looked at the decisions and actions that make up 
the government budget process as well as the information and documents that would 
render it transparent. Lastly, we looked at how some governments perform with regards 
to ﬁscal transparency.
The overview of the results of the Open Budget Index 2006 show that on currently 
available information there are signiﬁcant parts of the budget process where the execu-
tive cannot be held accountable because it does not release public information that 
shows us what it is doing.
In order to improve this situation, we need to learn a lot more about what encour-
ages and drives eﬀective ﬁscal transparency. In many developing countries a “pro forma” 
transparency has been enforced by the conditionalities of international ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. But in most of these cases the accountability institutions that would enliven 
ﬁscal transparency and accountability relationships are virtually dormant. This is the 
ﬁrst point where transparency could be shored up; namely by better understanding the 
contribution of accountability institutions and then building them.
The second, fairly easy, way of improving on transparency would be for governments 
to release more of the information that they already produce. In many cases the reasons 
are more linked to defunct organizational culture than any substantive issue.
The third and more challenging improvement would be to strengthen the executives’ 
ability to produce reliable ﬁscal information.
In the long run executives are under pressure from markets, donors, and account-
ability institutions to render its ﬁscal operations more transparent. So it is easy to predict 
improved production and distribution of ﬁscal information. The bigger challenge is to 
ensure that legislatures, civil society and the media are capable of using this information 
to ensure greater accountability.
Sources Cited
Alt, J.E., David Dreyer Lassen, and R. Rose. 2006. The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence 
from the American States. Economic Policy Research Unit Working Paper Series. Department 
of Economics, University of Copenhagen. Available online: www.imf.org/external/np/res/
seminars/2005/arc/pdf/alt.pdf.
Foster, Mick and Adrian Fozzard. 2000. “Aid and Public Expenditure: A Guide.” Working 
Paper 141. Overseas Development Institute. Available online: http://www.odi.org.uk/
publications/wp141.pdf.
105
F i s c a l  T r a n s p a r e n c y  i n  t h e  F o r m u l a t i o n ,  I m p l e m e n t a t i o n ,  a n d  A u d i t i n g  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  B u d g e t s
Heald, D. 2003. “Fiscal Transparency: Concepts, Measurement and UK Practice.” Public 
Administration. Vol. 81, No. 4.
Heald, D. 2006. “Varieties of Transparency.” In: C. Hood C and D. Heald (eds). Transparency: 
The Key to Better Governance? London: British Academy.
Kopits, G. and J. Craig. 1998. “Transparency in Government Operations.” IMF Occasional 
Paper 158.
Open Budget Index. Available online: http://www.openbudgetindex.org.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2001. “Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency.” Available online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/1905258.pdf.
Potter, B. 1999. “The IMF Transparency Code.” Washington, D.C.: International Budget 
Project of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Available online: http://www.
internationalbudget.org/conference/2nd/imf.htm.
Premchand, A. 2001. “Fiscal Transparency and Accountability: Idea and Reality.” Available online: 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN001892.pdf.
Ramkumar, V. 2007. A Guide to Monitoring Budget Execution. Washington, D.C.: International 
Budget Project of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Schedler, A. 1999. “Conceptualizing Accountability.” In: A. Schedle, L. Diamond, and M.F. 
Plattner (eds). The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Notes
1 This section draws on the author’s contributions to Ramkumar 2007 Mimeo.
2 These paragraphs and subsequent descriptions of budget documents draw heavily from 
the “Guide to the Open Budget Questionnaire: An Explanation of the Questions and the 
Response Options,” International Budget Project, October 2005, Mimeo.

C H A P T E R  5
Tax Policies and Tax Administration 
for Minimizing Fraud
Stan Beesley
108
Table of Contents
1. Tax Administration and Corruption .............................................................  110
2. The Many Faces of Corruption in Tax Administration .................................  111
 2.1 Political Corruption .............................................................................  112
 2.2 Administrative Corruption ..................................................................  113
 2.3 Extortion and Theft .............................................................................  113
3. Does Corruption Matter to a Tax Administration? .......................................  115
 3.1 Types of Taxes and Exemptions ............................................................  115
 3.2 Perceptions Matter ...............................................................................  116
 3.3 Black Economy: Loss or a “Grease” ......................................................  117
 3.4 Enforcement ........................................................................................  117
4. Anti-Corruption Measures: Systemic and Behavioral ....................................  118
 4.1 Mission and Values ..............................................................................  118
 4.2 Code of Conduct and Standards ..........................................................  119
 4.3 Income and Wealth Statements ............................................................  119
 4.4 Hotlines ...............................................................................................  120
 4.5 Organizational and Management Techniques .......................................  120
 4.6 Autonomous Administration ...............................................................  121
 4.7 Simpliﬁed Rules ...................................................................................  121
 4.8 Outsourcing .........................................................................................  122
5. Summary .....................................................................................................  122
Annex 1:  Deﬁnitions .........................................................................................  124
Annex 2:  US Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) .......  125
Sources Cited .....................................................................................................  127
Notes .................................................................................................................  128
109
A b s t r a c t
Corruption in a tax administration has serious, adverse consequences for the revenue 
collections of a government. As in other public institutions, corruption takes many forms 
in a tax administration. If a tax administration lacks transparency in its dealings, there 
will be a perception of corruption, whether real or not. To achieve its maximum effective-
ness, a tax administration depends on the voluntary compliance of the taxpayers it serves. 
A corrupt tax administration will not be able to gain the trust of the public, and therefore 
will not be effective in collecting the revenue necessary for its government to provide services 
to its constituency. There are many strategies for addressing corruption. Generally, focusing 
on one single strategy will not be adequate to deal with issues of corruption.
 This chapter examines:
 1. the various kinds of corruption that can occur with respect to taxes; 
 2. the impact of corruption (inefficiency, loss of trust, etc.), whether perceived or real; 
  and 
 3. some of the ways in which corruption in a tax administration can be minimized.
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1. Tax Administration and Corruption
The core activity of every revenue body is the eﬀective administration and implementa-
tion of the tax laws. This means collecting the tax legally due under domestic legislation 
while fully respecting the rights of taxpayers. Revenue bodies are under constant pressure 
to close the gap between the tax legally due and the tax actually collected. To do this, we 
strive to provide a tax administration system that is eﬃcient, eﬀective and provides high 
standards of service to taxpayers and other stakeholders and, at the same time, collect 
the revenues required by law to fund necessary public services (OECD 2006).
The tax system has become a means through which governments inﬂuence economic 
and social policies. From a theoretical view, a tax system should be neutral in terms 
of inﬂuencing investment and operational decisions of enterprises operating in the 
country or considering investment in a country. The OECD has addressed this issue in 
part through its Harmful Tax Practices Project.1 The administration of a tax system is 
clearly a factor in terms of providing certainty and transparency for domestic and 
international investors. For discussion of the impact of uncertainty on investment, 
particularly related to the Maquildora industry in Mexico, see McLees 2004. 
In a legal opinion from a case involving tax litigation, American Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes wrote, “Taxes are the price we pay for a civilized society.” 
There are few greater responsibilities of a government than to provide the environment 
and opportunities for its population to prosper. From the earliest days of recorded 
history, governments have collected taxes—initially, to pay for wars and defense, and 
in more recent times to pay for social programs, infrastructure, education, healthcare, 
police protection, ﬁre protection, and other programs that the public demands from 
its government in ensuring a “civilized society.”
The tax administration in a society touches virtually every member of that society, 
and, other than for certain public services, may be the only face of government that a 
citizen may see. Society has a right to expect that a tax administration will conduct its 
aﬀairs with transparency, provide certainty in treatment, serve taxpayers with a high 
standard, and collect the revenue eﬀectively and eﬃciently while respecting the rights 
of each taxpayer. When that does not happen, it weakens the fabric of society and 
generates doubts about the legitimacy of the government. “No problem does more to 
alienate citizens from their political leaders and institutions, and to undermine political 
stability and economic development, than endemic corruption among the government, 
political party leaders, judges, and bureaucrats” (USAID 2005).
Just as a tax system of some kind has existed since early days, so have opportunities 
for corruption in administering the tax system existed since the early days of recorded 
history. This chapter examines: 
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 1. the various kinds of corruption that can occur with respect to taxes; 
 2. the impact of corruption (ineﬃciency, loss of trust, etc.), whether perceived or 
real; and 
 3. some of the ways in which corruption in a tax administration can be minimized.
 
Obviously, in this short concept chapter it is not possible to cover the subject in 
depth. This chapter is not intended to be an academic research paper, but is written 
more from the perspective of a tax administrator, drawing on experiences gained over 
a career as a tax administrator, and is a review of some of the more pertinent writings 
on the subject of corruption and tax administration. For that reason, it is important to 
study the recommended reading and other sources in order to draw conclusions relative 
to best practices that may address corruption issues in a tax administration. This paper 
will not address issues related to tax fraud, although that often exists in connection 
with corruption. This paper is also directed at corruption in a national tax administra-
tion, recognizing that corruption in local tax administrations takes similar forms and 
approaches to those applied in national tax administrations, but that there are also 
diﬀerences created by the increased opportunities for corruption at the local level. Some 
common terms associated with tax administration are deﬁned in Annex 1. 
2. The Many Faces of Corruption in Tax Administration
A deﬁnition of corruption, widely accepted by many international organizations (World 
Bank, USAID, Transparency International, and others) is the abuse of public power. 
(USAID substitutes “entrusted authority” for private beneﬁt) 
Corruption in revenue administration is caused by the aggregate eﬀects of numerous 
decisions by taxpayers, revenue oﬃcers, and political decision makers. The literature 
distinguishes between two main categories of factors contributing to corruption:
 Elements that aﬀect the motivation (or incentives) to engage in corruption, and
 Elements that create windows of opportunity for corrupt activities.
The motivation for corrupt acts may diﬀer both within groups of stakeholders, for 
instance between diﬀerent taxpayers depending on the types of taxes, excises, and 
duties—and between groups of stakeholders. The various stakeholders’ perspectives 
must therefore be taken into consideration for identifying key factors impacting on their 
motivations and opportunities to engage in corruption (O-H Fjeldstad 2005).
The primary stakeholders relative to corruption in a tax administration are tax 
oﬃcials, taxpayers, and politicians. This chapter will look at some of the causes of 
corruption more closely in sections dealing with the impact of corruption and means 
of addressing corruption. 
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2.1 Political Corruption
Many writers divide corruption into two categories—administrative (bureaucratic) 
corruption and grand (political) corruption. Grand corruption usually involves high-
level oﬃcials of a tax administration, or tax policy organization, who may grant tax 
exemptions to companies in exchange for money or other favors. In many countries, 
the tax policy function and tax administration functions are in separate government 
organizations (tax policy usually in the Ministry of Finance and tax administration in 
a separate organization under the Ministry of Finance), so that the tax administration 
is isolated from the external pressures exerted on those who make policy. However, 
some countries still have policy and administration in the same organization. In these 
countries, the tax administration faces the additional risk of corruption associated with 
the passage of laws that may impact one group of taxpayers more than another, or may 
be more favorable to one group of taxpayers than another. 
Grand corruption is not limited to situations involving just one taxpayer. Industry 
lobbyists may engage in grand corruption with a senior tax administration oﬃcial in 
attempting to inﬂuence a tax ruling aﬀecting their industry by providing vacation homes, 
free travel, payment for children’s education, home remodeling, etc., in exchange for 
a favorable ruling. Many years ago, the revenue department in the Tanzania Ministry 
of Finance was nicknamed the Tax Exemption Department for its corrupt practices of 
granting tax-exempt status to businesses in exchange for favors (O-H Fjeldstad 2002). 
Another form of grand corruption is providing the political party in power with tax 
return information on political enemies in exchange for enhancing a career, monetary 
gain, personal satisfaction, etc. In the 1970s, in the United States, for example, then 
President, Richard Nixon, sought to use tax return information to discredit his political 
enemies and requested such information from the tax administration. Such abuses are 
not limited to developing countries. 
In countries with signiﬁcant corruption, attempts to pass tax legislation may meet 
resistance of the tax oﬃcials who may see the new legislation as interfering with their 
existing corrupt practices. As a result, they will resist the legislation and may even give 
misleading testimony regarding the proposed legislation. This is particularly true with 
respect to legislation designed to reform the tax administration. 
Nepotism, particularly in developing countries, is a form of corruption that does 
not necessarily result in receipt of any material beneﬁt in exchange for hiring a relative, 
unless the relative is a spouse. In many countries where family ties are stronger than 
government rules, it is customary to hire family members and failure to do so could 
adversely impact family relationships. In this case, the private gain is the ability to main-
tain family relationships. This can be a particularly debilitating form of corruption in 
that it often results in unqualiﬁed workers, workers more prone to corruption as they 
have minimal loyalty to the tax administration, or workers who do not put forth much 
eﬀort during the workday.
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2.2 Administrative Corruption
Administrative corruption is considered to be a lower level of corruption than grand 
corruption, but both kinds are destructive in a tax administration. It should be noted 
that most of these forms of corruption are not unique to tax administration, but can 
exist in any public organization.
Administrative corruption includes such activities as receiving bribes in exchange 
for favors (reducing tax assessments, for example), and usually involves lower-level 
tax administration employees. It can include staﬀ colluding with criminals to defraud 
the tax administration, providing tax return information to the media in exchange for 
money, unauthorized access to tax return information for personal gain, and other 
similar oﬀenses. The lower-level administrative corruption is often justiﬁed in developing 
countries as necessary to supplement low salaries of tax administration employees. This 
attitude, of course, results in minimal eﬀorts to curb the low-level corruption; however, 
there is no room for corruption of any kind in a tax administration that relies on the 
public trust for achieving a high degree of voluntary compliance.
Box 1.
Taxpayer Indicted for Bribery of an IRS Oﬃcial
On February 20, 2007, Yan Borr was indicted on two counts of bribery of a public oﬃcial in 
the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York. 
According to court documents, on December 3, 2004, and September 19, 2006, Borr 
knowingly, intentionally, and corruptly gave, oﬀered, and promised U.S. currency to a person 
acting on behalf of the IRS with the intent to inﬂuence an oﬃcial act. 
During several meetings, Borr and IRS Revenue Oﬃcers (RO) discussed his outstanding 
IRS tax liabilities. Borr indicated that he could not fully pay the outstanding tax liabilities, which 
were approximately $15,000 and indicated that he had a couple of “bonds” that he could cash 
and give to the RO if the RO could take care of his situation. At another meeting, Borr met with 
another RO and gave the RO an envelope containing $1,000 in exchange for the reduction of his 
tax liability from approximately $22,000 to approximately $8,500. Borr then oﬀered and gave 
the RO an additional $500 to reduce the tax liability by an additional $2,000. 
In the United Kingdom, a tax oﬃcial sold conﬁdential information to a criminal gang 
allowing them to steal £2.7 million (NAO).
 
2.3 Extortion and Theft
Tax oﬃcials may extort money from taxpayers that is not actually due. This may take the 
form of an additional assessment that the taxpayer ultimately agrees to under threat of 
severe sanctions. This often occurs in tax administrations where the sole measurement 
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of success is revenue; tax oﬃcials are rewarded for achieving certain revenue goals and 
take whatever actions are necessary to achieve those goals. When tax administrations 
have speciﬁc monthly revenue targets set by the government, they are tempted to engage 
in practices that are on the verge of extortion—demanding periodic payments that are 
not due, requiring taxpayers they know to be capable of making additional payments 
to make such payments even when tax is not due, reviewing returns when ﬁled, and 
demanding that additional income be reported and additional payment made, etc. The 
primary purpose of these acts is not immediate monetary gain, but increased recognition 
in the tax administration or government for delivering needed revenue that enhances 
the opportunity for advancement or the avoidance of dismissal for failure to meet 
the target. 
Theft, or misuse of revenues, is another form of corruption in a tax administra-
tion. In those tax administrations where employees come in direct contact with cash, 
checks, or other monetary instruments, theft is always a risk. For many years in the 
United States, taxpayers paid their taxes by check payable to the IRS (Internal Revenue 
Service). In the course of processing payments, an employee changed the name on the 
check to I.R. Smith and deposited the money into the account of “I.R. Smith.” As a 
result, the IRS has had to revise instructions to taxpayers to make their checks payable 
to the United States Treasury. Any checks received in an IRS oﬃce made payable to the 
IRS are required to be over-stamped with United States Treasury. 
In countries where taxpayers rely on receiving quick refunds of withheld taxes, as in 
the United States, electronic ﬁling of returns has been a major advancement and allows 
refunds to be paid within days of receiving the electronic ﬁle based on the showing of 
the bank routing number and bank account number in the ﬁle. In some cases, the tax 
administration makes a service available to taxpayers without reliable internet service 
and the taxpayer takes a paper return to the tax administration that then inputs the 
data for electronic ﬁling. There have been cases in which the employee inputting the 
return then changes the bank routing and account number so that the refund goes into 
an account set up by the employee.
As in other governmental organizations, misuse of funds can take place on a much 
larger scale in a tax administration than the types of theft discussed above. This often takes 
the form of kickbacks on contracts let for services or maintenance of tax administration 
facilities. It could also be a kickback on a contract let for construction or remodeling 
of a tax administration building. Maintenance of slush funds for payment of personal 
entertainment or travel expenses is another common form of misuse of funds.
This is by no means intended to be an exhaustive list of all the faces of corruption 
in a tax administration. There are as many variations in a tax administration as can be 
thought of by the human mind and there are undoubtedly a number of new schemes 
yet to be discovered.
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Box 2.
Former IRS Employee Sentenced for Theft of Government Funds
On January 4, 2007, former Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employee Therese Rivers was 
sentenced in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for theft of government 
funds. Rivers was sentenced to ﬁve years of probation, restitution in the amount of $11,083.83, 
a $100 assessment, and continued mental health treatment. 
According to court documents, Rivers was charged on September 20, 2006, with one count 
of theft of government funds for embezzling and knowingly converting to her own use $20,135 
that a taxpayer sought to apply to his tax obligations. The taxpayer ﬁled a tax return with the 
IRS, instructing it to apply prior tax overpayments in the amount of $20,135 to his other tax 
obligations. Instead of processing the tax return as Rivers was required to do, she altered the tax 
return and made it appear that the taxpayer sought a refund of the tax overpayments and asked 
the IRS to deposit the refund into a bank account that Rivers had opened under a false name.
3. Does Corruption Matter to a Tax Administration?
The impact of corruption on a tax administration mirrors the impact of corruption 
on other governmental institutions.2 However, corruption possibly impacts the tax 
administration more than most other governmental institutions. A basic premise in 
tax administration is the emphasis on voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers. 
It is expected that anyone subject to taxation will correctly report their tax obligations 
and make timely payment of any tax that is due. Even in countries in which the tax 
administration determines the tax due, there is an expectation that the taxpayer will 
accurately report income and expenses. 
If taxpayers question the integrity of the government, including tax oﬃcials, their 
interest in complying with the laws established by that government, including revenue 
laws, will be diminished. 
Tanzi and Davoodi [2001] with a focus on the composition of tax revenues, assuming 
that diﬀerent types of taxes respond diﬀerently to corruption, claim that a 1-point 
increase in corruption is associated with a 1.5 percentage point decline in total revenue 
relative to GDP, and a 2.7 percentage point decline in the ratio of taxes to GDP. Direct 
taxes suﬀer more from corruption than indirect taxes, suggesting that countries with 
high levels of corruption should rely more on indirect taxation—a feature that seems 
to be in line with current practice (J.G. Lambsdorﬀ 2007).
3.1 Types of Taxes and Exemptions
The fact that direct taxes suﬀer more from corruption reﬂects the taxpayer’s response to 
corruption and the resultant lack of interest, or apathy, in contributing to a government 
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that does not meet the expectations of the society. Direct taxes are taxes on income, 
while indirect taxes are generally taxes on consumption. Taxpayers have less choice in 
paying taxes on consumption than they have in paying taxes on income; therefore, it is 
generally through protesting against direct taxes that citizens make their dissatisfaction 
with government known. The protests can be active in terms of voicing concern and 
advocating reform, or it can be passive as demonstrated by non-payment of taxes, under-
reporting income, failing to submit required tax returns, etc. As a result, even though 
the economy may be growing, tax receipts do not keep pace with economic growth. 
The ratio of tax revenue to GDP is often used as a measurement of the eﬀectiveness of 
a tax administration, with the secondary indicator that there is a potential that there is 
corruption in the tax administration. 
A country with a high incidence of corruption is likely to have a narrow tax base in 
which the larger businesses (that have a lot to lose if they do not pay some amount of 
taxes) are responsible for the largest share of the revenues, along with those individuals 
whose wage income is subject to withholding. 
Fiscal corruption is likely to undermine government trustworthiness and thereby 
the legitimacy of the government. When the institutions are legitimate, citizens have 
a predisposition to consider obedience to them as reasonable and appropriate. A 
government’s lack of legitimacy on the other hand diminishes almost by deﬁnition 
the perceived moral justiﬁcation for obeying its laws. Of particular importance in this 
context is that citizens’ disrespect for tax laws may initiate disrespect for other laws, 
leading to a vicious circle where distrust breeds distrust. In contrast, government trust-
worthiness and widespread public support tends to legitimize the public sector, and 
may so impose some social norm for paying taxes (O-H Fjelstad 2005). 
Eliminating, or even reducing, corruption will assist the tax administration in its 
eﬀorts to increase the tax base, ensuring that the base is broad and everyone pays their 
fair share. A broader base brings more citizens into involvement in society, helping to 
ensure the legitimacy of the government; it also helps insure against economic catas-
trophe in the event one or two large businesses cease operations.
3.2 Perceptions Matter
Perceptions often play a major part in people’s attitudes toward the tax administration. 
A widely-accepted perception that corruption is pervasive in a tax administration will lead 
to seemingly honest people attempting to bribe tax oﬃcials. Just as corruption breeds 
corruption, so does one’s perception become another’s reality. A study done by the Centre 
for Tax System Integrity in Australia demonstrated this tendency in human behavior.3 
While this research related to tax cheating, the same principles apply to perceptions of 
corruption in a tax administration. One or two incidences of corruption in a tax admin-
117
Ta x  P o l i c i e s  a n d  Ta x  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  M i n i m i z i n g  F r a u d
istration may lead the public to conclude that the tax administration is corrupt—once 
the perception exists, it is diﬃcult to erase and can adversely impact compliance.
3.3 Black Economy: Loss or a “Grease”
Corruption can be a factor in the underground economy of a country. The existence of 
an underground economy, however, does not necessarily mean that corruption exists in 
the tax administration. Tax administrations worldwide are concerned about the level of 
the underground economy in their countries—including tax administrations in countries 
where corruption is not considered to be a problem (Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, 
and United States, for example). The extent of an underground economy is inﬂuenced 
by a number of factors, with the tax administration playing, at most, a minimal part.4 
Obviously, the size of an underground economy adversely impacts the revenue of a 
country, which is why even the most advanced economies search for ways to reduce its 
size and widen their tax base.
There are some writings that would tend to imply that corruption has a positive 
impact on economic growth and revenue. These studies have hypothesized that bribery 
helps to “grease the wheel” to assist in the importation of crucial supplies or encourage 
the investment by multinational enterprises, thus positively impacting economic growth. 
Per these studies, tax revenue increases in certain situations involving corruption. In 
the article, “Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?” authors Fjeldstad and Tungodden 
(2001) explore this issue, ultimately drawing the conclusion that corruption is not a 
positive inﬂuence, no matter its short-term gains. 
 
3.4 Enforcement
Corruption in other governmental institutions can have a signiﬁcant direct impact on 
the eﬃciency or eﬀectiveness of a tax administration. Many tax administrations depend 
on other governmental institutions for assistance in enforcement of tax laws. Perhaps a 
seizure or sale of assets seized for non-payment of taxes must be based on a court order. 
If the case is heard before a judge that is willing to accept a bribe, the tax administration 
is thwarted in its enforcement eﬀort. Perhaps a bailiﬀ is required to seize property of a 
taxpayer upon the request of the tax administration and pursuant to a court order. A 
bailiﬀ that is willing to take a bribe suddenly may have diﬃculty ﬁnding any assets that 
could be subject to seizure. Perhaps a tax administration needs assistance in prosecuting 
a tax evader and passes its case to a public prosecutor. If the public prosecutor is willing 
to take a bribe, the case may sit for an inordinate period of time before being brought 
to trial, the case may be presented in such a way as to ensure that the defendant is found 
not guilty, or the prosecutor may return the case to the tax administration based on 
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a determination that there is insuﬃcient evidence to pursue the case in court. Over a 
period of time, if these events frequently repeat themselves, the tax administration stops 
attempting to enforce the laws—or at least stops resorting to certain methods of enforcing 
their laws. In some cases, this could result in the tax administration taking matters into 
their own hands and undertaking actions that are outside their authority to take—thus 
adding to the cycle of corruption and causing a previously honest tax administration to 
become corrupt under the guise of actions necessary to enforce the law. 
 
4. Anti-corruption Measures: Systemic and Behavioral
A great deal of eﬀort is being expended by donor organizations to address corruption in 
governmental institutions, including tax administrations, particularly in underdeveloped 
or transition countries.5 In earlier years, these eﬀorts attempted to deal with corrup-
tion by addressing systemic issues, primarily directed at the lower-level administrative 
corruption, without giving appropriate consideration to the corruption imbedded in 
the political systems at the highest levels of government—grand corruption. As a result, 
many of the early eﬀorts were not successful or the results achieved were not sustained 
over a long period of time. For more on this topic, see USAID 2005. 
A World Bank PREM Note distinguishes strategies for combating corruption in a tax 
administration between motives (behavioral) for corruption and opportunities (systemic) 
for corruption (World Bank 1999). The PREM Note outlines a variety of approaches 
to address both the motives for corruption and the opportunities for corruption. It 
also analyzes the use of those approaches in conjunction with World Bank projects in 
Latvia, Guatemala, and Tanzania. 
4.1 Mission and Values
Many anti-corruption eﬀorts begin with a review of the tax administration mission, 
vision, and values. Those statements reﬂect the primary objectives of the tax adminis-
tration and what it stands for, creating the foundation documents from which other 
documents, such as a Code of Conduct, will ﬂow. 
Establishing a Code of Conduct establishes the minimum standards of employee 
conduct that will be accepted by a tax administration. The Code of Conduct will gener-
ally address such items as gifts or gratuities, employment outside the tax administration, 
employment of close relatives, professional conduct on the job, timely payment of debts, 
sexual harassment, conﬁdentiality of tax information, unauthorized access of tax infor-
mation, unauthorized use of tax information, criminal acts on or oﬀ the job, and other 
standards of conduct deemed appropriate for employees in public service positions. 
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Employees must be aware of the provisions of the Code of Conduct from the day they 
begin their employment with the tax administration. Most tax administrations require 
the employee to sign a document acknowledging receipt of the Code of Conduct as 
part of the entry on duty process.
4.2 Code of Conduct and Standards
Enforcement of the Code of Conduct and other standards of employee conduct is an 
integral part of any anti-corruption eﬀort. Tax administration oﬃcials at all levels of the 
organization must understand and be aware of the consequences of violating the Code 
of Conduct and standards of employee conduct. Some tax administrations have their 
own unit to investigate allegations of employee misconduct, while others must rely on 
external investigative functions. Lack of eﬀective enforcement of Codes of Conduct is 
a factor in the level of corruption in a country—revenue oﬃcials measure the beneﬁts 
of corruption against the costs/potential of being caught. 
An eﬀective internal audit function is an important factor in actually discovering 
corruption or in identifying practices or systems that have a high degree of risk. The internal 
audit function also provides oversight to determine if management controls are in place or 
are eﬀective. An internal audit can identify areas in which policies or procedures are not 
being followed. Such oversight is another factor that a potentially corrupt oﬃcial must 
weigh in measuring the beneﬁts of corruption against the potential of being caught. 
In the United States, the function for investigating matters involving employee 
conduct was part of the tax administration for nearly 50 years. In 1998, Congress 
determined that the function was too closely associated with the tax administration and, 
therefore, was not suﬃciently objective in its investigations of misconduct, especially 
misconduct allegations involving high-ranking oﬃcials. As a result, the investigative 
function was transferred to the Treasury Department, the cabinet-level department of 
which the tax administration is a part, creating the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration (TIGTA). As the name implies, TIGTA deals only with tax administra-
tion issues. Included in Annex 2 is a description of the strategies employed by TIGTA. 
These misconduct cases are largely illustrative of petty corruption in tax administration, 
along with summaries of cases recently investigated.
4.3 Income and Wealth Statements
Along with the Code of Conduct, many tax administrations require tax oﬃcials to submit 
annual statements of income and wealth. In some tax administrations, these annual state-
ments may be required of all tax administration employees, others require only high-level 
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senior oﬃcials to submit annual statements, and yet others fall somewhere in between. As 
in the case of the Code of Conduct, these statements are valuable in ﬁghting corruption 
only if something is done with them. Occasionally, tax oﬃcials will react to the reporting 
requirement by placing assets in names of relatives or other nominees, an oﬀense in itself. 
Persistent investigation and follow-up is required to ensure that the statements accurately 
reﬂect the tax oﬃcial’s ﬁnancial situation. Because of the large number of tax administra-
tion employees, it is generally not feasible to verify all annual statements, so the reporting 
requirement is limited to those in positions of greatest risk of corruption. 
4.4 Hotlines
Establishing “hotlines” for citizens to report allegations of employee misconduct is 
a frequent part of an anti-corruption strategy. The hotline is usually directed to the 
function in the tax administration responsible for investigating these allegations. The 
existence of the hotline and assurances of conﬁdentiality must be widely publicized in 
order to gain citizen support in the eﬀort against corruption. In some cases, citizens 
may have their allegations published in the news media. In the extreme, citizen discon-
tent with the level of corruption in a tax administration may result in a level of protest 
and civil disobedience that cannot be ignored, forcing the government to take action 
against corrupt tax oﬃcials. Without the involvement of the citizens of the country in 
demanding an honest government (including the tax administration) and demanding 
that government have the political will to eliminate corruption, most eﬀorts to curb 
corruption will be unsuccessful. 
4.5 Organizational and Management Techniques
To address the increased potential for corruption generated by familiarity with taxpayers, 
tax administrations establish policies for rotating staﬀ among oﬃces or between similar 
positions. Where rotation is not feasible, there may be a policy that an individual cannot 
audit the same company more than a certain number of times in a speciﬁed period of 
time, with a diﬀerent auditor to conduct the audits of that company once the initial 
auditor has reached the maximum number of audits. The frequency of rotation is a 
decision to be based on considerations of the disruption caused by rotations, employee 
considerations, needs of the tax administration, etc. In countries where patronage is a 
factor in human resource decisions, rotation of staﬀ can create its own form of corrup-
tion in which employees pay high prices for more attractive posts. 
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4.6 Autonomous Administration
Many countries have attempted to deal with the systemic causes of corruption in a 
tax administration by creating an autonomous revenue administration. The concept 
behind the establishment of autonomous revenue administrations is that removal of 
the tax administration from the constraints imposed by civil service regulations related 
to pay and employment will give the tax administration more ﬂexibility in hiring and 
ﬁring employees, as well as more ﬂexibility in establishing pay scales. The argument 
is that without these ﬂexibilities, the tax administration will be unable to ﬁre corrupt 
employees and that higher pay will eliminate one motive for corruption. The results 
have been somewhat mixed. The Tanzanian experience seems to demonstrate that gains 
can be made in the early years, but old networks of corruption may resurrect themselves 
(Fjeldstad 2002).
The eﬀectiveness of higher wages in combating corruption is subject to some ques-
tion. In some cases, the higher wages have only resulted in better-paid corrupt oﬃcials. 
This seems particularly true in countries where the potential for discovery or the potential 
for severe sanctions were minimal (Fjeldstad 2005). 
 
4.7 Simpliﬁed Rules
 
Simpliﬁcation of tax rules and regulations is another means by which corruption is 
addressed. More complex tax laws that require interpretation by tax oﬃcials are often 
areas that generate opportunities for corruption. Where rules are interpreted diﬀerently 
for diﬀerent taxpayers dependent on the amount of bribe paid for favorable rulings, 
there is minimal transparency, which in itself is a factor in the level of corruption in 
a tax administration. Many reform projects aimed at reducing corruption address the 
systemic issue of complex rules and regulations, with the goal of simplifying laws to 
the point that taxpayers understand them and there is minimal room for diﬀerent 
interpretations. As previously noted in this paper, certainty in tax administration is a 
feature that all taxpayers desire and support. Simpliﬁed laws generally result in greater 
certainty and fewer opportunities for corruption.
In addition to eﬀorts to simplify rules and regulations, reform eﬀorts are also directed 
at reviews of systems and processes to identify and reduce opportunities for corruption. 
The more contact the tax administration has with the public, the greater the opportu-
nities for corruption. This creates somewhat of a dilemma in that the public demands 
service while the tax administration may be attempting to revise the method of delivering 
that service in order to reduce the opportunities for corruption. The tax administration 
must determine what is an acceptable level of risk in designing its systems and include 
methods of discovering corruption in the design if it does exist. 
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4.8 Outsourcing
Private management of tax administration or some portion of a tax administration has 
been suggested as a possible means of addressing corruption in developing countries 
where corruption is particularly signiﬁcant. 
However, historical evidence and recent experiences from Africa, for instance 
Mozambique, give reason for concern: Such reforms have achieved few lasting 
results—the transfer of skills by foreign contractors has been limited and the contract 
has been very expensive for the government. Tax practitioners are therefore increasingly 
questioning the value of outsourcing tax administration (Fjeldstad 2005). 
There is also the question of why private tax administrators would be any less likely 
to be honest than the tax administration oﬃcials they replaced. This is particularly true 
if local contractors are used.
 The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) has 
taken a proactive approach relative to corruption, particularly bribery of public oﬃcials. 
The OECD has developed a convention against bribery in which signatory countries 
(including all OECD countries and some non-OECD countries) are required to make 
bribery of foreign oﬃcials a criminal oﬀense. In addition, the OECD has encouraged 
member countries to disallow tax deductions for bribery of oﬃcials (OECD 2006b). 
5. Summary
Corruption cripples democracy. Perceptions of rampant corruption contribute to public 
disillusionment with democracy. Corruption undermines both the legitimacy and 
eﬀectiveness of new democracies. It undermines democratic values of citizenship, 
accountability, justice, and fairness. It undermines free speech and public accountability, 
particularly when it reaches into the media sector and limits freedom of information. 
It violates the social contract between citizens and their elected representatives, and 
elevates the interests of the few over the many (USAID 2005). 
Corruption in a tax administration is no less pervasive. The negative impact of corrup-
tion on voluntary compliance severely restricts the ability of the tax administration 
to deliver the revenue needed by the government to fund social and infrastructure 
commitments. 
Addressing corruption in a tax administration requires a multi-faceted approach. 
While this paper has discussed a variety of approaches to the question of corruption in 
a tax administration, it must be stressed that rarely will any one approach be suﬃcient 
to address corruption unless it is isolated in a particular unit or process. A number of 
actions will be necessary, the most important being commitment from top management 
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and government leaders. Whether justiﬁed or not, perceptions both inside and outside 
the tax administration, must be addressed in any successful eﬀort to eliminate corrup-
tion and gain the commitment and trust of the public and those tax administration 
employees who want to do the right thing. 
With a determined leadership, committed employees, and a selection of the 
approaches appropriate to the existing environment, overcoming corruption is possible. 
However, in most cases, the results will not be seen overnight, but will require a signiﬁ-
cant period of time to achieve. Once success is achieved, it is necessary to have proper 
systems and checks in place to ensure that the success is maintained. 
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Annex 1.
Deﬁnitions
Self-assessment: A process through which the taxpayer assumes responsibility for deter-
mining and reporting his/her tax liability based on the provisions of the law and regu-
lations. This is compared to a tax system in which the taxpayer submits income and 
expenses and the tax administration determines (assesses) the tax due.
Tax Avoidance: The application of tax laws in a manner that minimizes the amount of 
tax due.
Tax Evasion: Fraudulent or illegal means of underpaying or underreporting of tax due. 
Voluntary Compliance: Taxpayer assumption of responsibility for submitting correct tax 
returns, correct tax declarations, and correct information with respect to tax liabilities 
voluntarily and voluntarily making payment of tax liabilities on time and in accordance 
with prescribed rules and regulations. 
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Annex 2. 
US Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) Approaches
(All below information extracted from www.ustreas.gov/tigta)
 
TIGTA protects the Department of Treasury’s ability to collect revenue owed to the 
Federal Government. In order to achieve this, TIGTA’s Oﬃce of Investigations (OI) 
administers investigative programs that protect the integrity of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and detect and prevent fraud and other misconduct within IRS programs. 
This includes investigating allegations of criminal violations and administrative miscon-
duct by IRS employees, as well as protecting IRS against external attempts to corrupt 
or threaten its employees.
TIGTA’s oversight extends to the IRS, IRS Chief Counsel, and the IRS Oversight 
Board. TIGTA serves as an independent voice reporting directly to the Treasury Secretary 
and Congress.
TIGTA OI conducts a comprehensive investigative program. OI’s investigative 
program focuses on three main areas of concern:
 Employee Integrity
 IRS employee misconduct undermines the IRS’s ability to improve taxpayer customer 
service and eﬀectively enforce tax laws and collect taxes owed. TIGTA investigates 
employee misconduct allegations including extortion, bribery, theft, taxpayer abuses, 
false statements, and ﬁnancial fraud, as well as contractor misconduct and fraud.
 Employee and Infrastructure Security
 TIGTA is statutorily required to protect tax administration because of the critical 
role the IRS plays in collecting nearly two trillion dollars in revenue for the US 
government. This unique statutory mandate sets it apart from other federal Oﬃces 
of Inspector General. As such, TIGTA must help protect the IRS’s ability to collect 
tax revenue by ensuring IRS employee safety and infrastructure security.
 External Attempts to Corrupt Tax Administration
 TIGTA is dedicated to investigating external attempts to corrupt or interfere with 
the administration of Internal Revenue laws. External attempts to corrupt tax 
administration include bribes oﬀered by taxpayers to compromise IRS employees; 
the manipulation of IRS systems and programs through the use of bogus liens and 
IRS ﬁnancial reporting instruments; the use of fraudulent IRS documentation; 
and impersonation of IRS oﬃcials. External attempts to corrupt tax administra-
tion inhibit the Treasury’s ability to collect revenue and undermine the public’s 
conﬁdence in fair and eﬀective tax administration—the two key facets of the IRS 
Strategic Plan.
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Notes
1 “The objective of the global level playing ﬁeld is to achieve high standards of transparency 
and information exchange in a way that is fair, equitable and permits fair competition 
between all countries, large and small, OECD and non-OECD. All countries, regardless of 
their tax systems, should meet such standards so that competition takes place on the basis 
of legitimate commercial considerations rather than on the basis of lack of transparency and 
lack of eﬀective exchange of information. In particular, it is important to prevent the migra-
tion of business to economies that do not engage in transparency and eﬀective exchange of 
information for tax purposes” (OECD 2004).
 2 “Corruption undermines social cohesion and broad participation in economic and political 
life by distorting the allocation of resources and the delivery of public services, usually in 
ways that particularly damage the poor. It also damages prospects for economic growth 
by reducing foreign direct investment, skewing public investment, encouraging ﬁrms to 
operate in the informal sector, distorting the terms of trade, and weakening the rule of law 
and protection of property rights. In doing all this, corruption fundamentally weakens the 
legitimacy and eﬀectiveness of new democracies” (USAID 2005).
3 “Taxpayers suspect that a high proportion of taxpayers evade tax and regard this as appro-
priate behavior, while they personally disapprove of such behaviour. This constellation is 
problematic for two reasons. First, there is the risk that the misperceived social norm exerts 
pressure on people to disregard their personal beliefs and evade tax. Second, for those 
taxpayers who themselves would prefer to evade taxes, the high perceived prevalence of tax 
evasion provides them with a justiﬁcation for doing so. The concept of ‘pluralistic ignorance’ 
captures the ﬁrst of these two possible processes. It refers to the phenomenon that people 
misattribute other people’s behaviour through failing to realize that the same social pressure 
that determines their own behaviour may also determine the behaviour of others (Miller & 
McFarland, 1987). With regard to tax evasion, a perceived high prevalence of tax evasion 
would be attributed to other people’s conviction that tax evasion is acceptable, if not appro-
priate, behaviour. In turn, this social norm would exert some pressure to conform and evade 
tax as well. In doing so, one contributes to the general impression of widespread evasion 
which others, due to pluralistic ignorance, again attribute to moral conviction rather than 
to social pressure. There is thus a positive feedback loop of misattribution and conformity. 
An intervention to increase tax compliance could try to break the feedback loop and give 
taxpayers information about the true moral convictions in the taxpayer community (cf. 
Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). It could demonstrate the discrepancy between personal beliefs 
and beliefs attributed to the collective (pluralistic ignorance) and instigate a reappraisal of 
the situation”(Wenzel 2001).
4 “This demand for illegality may often be derived from the costs involved in legal registration 
and establishment, and the behaviour of the bureaucracy in their legal capacity. Legality 
represents considerable ﬁxed costs. De Soto (1989) describes this process for a number of 
enterprises in Lima, making it obvious that the relative size of the underground economy 
must be expected to be larger in poor countries. He also ﬁnds that illegal establishments 
have to pay a much larger fraction of their net income in bribes compared to legal ones. 
129
Ta x  P o l i c i e s  a n d  Ta x  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  f o r  M i n i m i z i n g  F r a u d
Nevertheless, corruption also causes ﬁrms to go underground. In an extensive empirical 
study of the size of the underground in 69 countries, Friedman et al. (2000) claim that 
corruption, rather than tax rates, is the main determinant of the size of the underground 
economic activities. In most of these observations the share of the underground economy 
varied between 10% and 70% of the total economy. Furthermore, with the partial excep-
tion of the group of transition countries, the incidence of perceived corruption appears to 
increase with the share of the underground economy” (Andvig et al. 2000).
5 “A major factor contributing to the failure of many tax administrative reforms, which is also 
the case for many other types of public sector reforms, has been the ‘technocratic’ approach 
taken by reformers and donors. Tax administrative reforms in poor countries have often been 
treated as an ‘engineering problem’—and as such a phenomenon to be addressed through 
‘blueprint’ or ‘textbook’ solutions. […] This accounts for the prescribed and mechanical 
approach usually favoured by donors, featuring quantitative performance targets, redrawing 
of organisational charts, rewriting job descriptions, training courses for tax oﬃcers, instal-
lation of new systems for human resources and ﬁnancial management systems, etc. Robert 
Klitgaard refers to this as the ‘more approach’ (or the supply side approach)—i.e. more 
training, more equipment, more technical assistance, etc. Such strategies may be necessary, 
but if the demand side of administrative reforms is being overlooked, this may lead to 
distorted incentives through technical assistance, and also to undermining the government’s 
commitment to civil service reforms. [...] The technocratic approach has often overlooked 
the fact that reforming a tax administration—though it has important technical aspects—is 
also a social and political phenomenon driven by human behaviour and local circumstances. 
It is a long and diﬃcult process that requires tax oﬃcers to change the way they regard their 
jobs, their tasks, and their interaction with taxpayers. The technocratic remedies supported 
by donors have underplayed the degree to which progress in [tax] administration depends 
upon thorough ‘culture change’ in the public service” (Fjeldstad 2005).
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A b s t r a c t
This chapter on fiscal transparency takes into consideration that national budget grants 
and shared revenues are significant sources of revenue for local governments. Thus fiscal 
transparency is strongly influenced by the scale, methods, and techniques of allocating 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Ideally, national budget transfers should be predict-
able and objectively defined in order to provide a stable revenue base for localities. They 
are set during the budgeting process, so local governments have to be informed about 
planning rules about how the total amount of grants and shared revenues are calculated. 
The chapter continues by looking at the way in which transfers and shared revenues are 
allocated to regional governments, municipalities, or deconcentrated units of government. 
It recommends that transparency and accountability can be increased by introducing 
preset formula based on objective indicators for fund allocation. This would require sound 
statistical information, which is not subject to government discretion. The chapter identi-
fies the success of objective formula-based grant allocation schemes to help identify the 
winners and losers of discretionary politicized decisions, so they will lead to greater equity 
and higher efficiency in using public funds. The chapter also suggests that transparency 
will also change the political discourse over public budgets, by making negotiations over 
municipal funding more focused.
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1. Introduction
Much of the money that is spent on vital public services at the local level comes from 
grants, transfers, and shared revenues from the national government.1 In Europe, the 
majority of municipal funds originate from central budgets and special, extra-budgetary 
funds (health insurance, environmental funds, etc.). In countries that belong to the 
European Union, funds are also transferred from the EU level to sub-national govern-
ments directly and via programs controlled by the national governments.
Even in countries of Western Europe, ﬁscal transfers are signiﬁcant parts of local 
budget revenues. Some countries with decentralized public services like the Netherlands 
or Germany heavily depend on ﬁscal transfers (Table 1). 
Table 1.
Fiscal Transfers in Percentage of Local Revenues2
Country [Percent] Country [Percent]
Italy 65 Belgium 46
Netherlands 62 Austria 39
Greece 60 Luxembourg 37
Spain 59 France 25
Germany 55 Finland 23
Portugal 49 Denmark 18
Ireland 47 Sweden 13
Source: Dexia. 2004. Local Finance in the 15 Countries of the EU. Paris: Dexia.
In other countries reallocation of shared revenues (primarily VAT and personal 
income tax) complement the transfers from higher levels of government. In some of the 
new EU member states—mostly in the Baltic countries—shared taxes are signiﬁcant 
sources of municipal budgets (Table 2). Especially in these countries, grant allocation 
schemes and tax-sharing arrangements are the critical conditions of local autonomy.
They are signiﬁcant revenue sources at the local level, so the scale, methods, and 
techniques of allocating intergovernmental ﬁscal transfers have a strong inﬂuence on 
ﬁscal transparency. These transfers must be kept transparent, because they deﬁne the 
openness that needs to be maintained on the national and local level. However, these 
regular grants, mostly allocated for current budget purposes, rarely attract the attention 
of the media or civic groups watching budgets. 
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Table 2.
Shared Tax Revenue and Grants in Percentage of Local Revenues3
Total of Shared Taxes 
and Grants
of this 
Shared Taxes Grants
Lithuania 88 78 10
Estonia 81 43 38
Czech Republic 76 41 35
Latvia 74 46 28
Poland 72 13 59
Slovenia 63 42 21
Hungary 60 16 44
Slovakia 52 33 19
Source: Dexia. 2003. Local Finance in the 10 Countries Joining the EU in 2004. Paris: Dexia.
As intergovernmental ﬁscal relations are dominated by centrally allocated funds in 
most countries, primarily the method of allocation but not the scope of grants is what 
really matters for local governments. The basic questions, which are important for 
municipalities are the following ones:
  How much money is transferred from national budget to the local level?
  In what way are these funds allocated to sub-national governments?
  How much autonomy is left for local governments in spending these transfers 
and shared revenues?
  How transparent is this entire process of grant allocation?
2. Fixing the Total
Municipalities need relatively stable revenue sources for ﬁnancing the services provided 
regularly at the local level. This stability can be achieved only if the amount of intergov-
ernmental transfers is predictable and objectively deﬁned during the budgeting process. 
Local governments should be informed about the planning rules on how the total amount 
of grants and shared revenues are calculated in the process setting the macroeconomic 
ﬁscal targets. By making transparent the regulations on planning the aggregate funds for 
local governments, the municipalities will be able to design their long-term spending 
priorities and projects more eﬀectively. 
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There are three ways to determine the total amount to be transferred to sub-national 
governments: (i) as part of the GDP or the annual national budget; (ii) as a ﬁxed share 
of national government revenues; (iii) as a proportion of approved speciﬁc local expen-
ditures to be reimbursed. 
The ﬁrst model—linking grants to overall economic indicators—is rarely used in 
transition countries, because in the period of economic recession local governments 
would suﬀer from a sudden decrease in transfers received. In other cases, like in Serbia 
in 2007, where the grant pool is deﬁned as 1.175 percent of GDP, economic growth 
and changes in the method of calculating GDP has brought about windfall revenues for 
the local government sector. As a response the national government tried to force local 
governments to spend these extra revenues on new services assigned to them. In other 
models, for example, in Poland, only a sub-set of intergovernmental transfers, the grant 
for public education, is determined as a speciﬁc share of the national budget.
The other method—when transfers are expressed in percentages of major national 
taxes—ensures both predictability and buoyancy of local government grants. Mostly  VAT 
or personal income taxes (PIT) are used for these purposes. The issue is whether the ratio 
is set by law for a longer period (e.g., four percent of VAT is allocated for equalization 
grants in Macedonia) or only for a shorter period (e.g., for at least one election cycle, 
like in Hungary, where 40 percent of PIT is always shared with local governments and 
80 percent of this fund is allocated as a general grant). 
Under the third method—when transfers are provided as matching grants—the total 
amount of transfers is usually based on the estimated local expenditures. In this case 
transfers are set in closed-ended funds, or the local needs are prioritized and spread over 
several years, if the demand exceeds the funds available in the annual budget. This form 
of fund allocation guarantees the lowest level of transparency.
However, intergovernmental transfers have to take into account various policy goals. 
So the total amount of grants also depends on the balance between these diﬀerent ﬁscal 
policy objectives. These aims are inﬂuenced by external factors, like the type of functions 
assigned to local governments (communal or human services) and the territorial-admin-
istrative structures. 
Education and social/welfare services would need a higher level of centrally allo-
cated funds than urban services partially ﬁnanced by user charges. In fragmented local 
government systems—like those in the Czech Republic or Hungary—there is a greater 
need for equalization, because many of the smaller municipalities lack a sound revenue 
base. In countries with larger municipal units and consequently having a more stable 
economic base (e.g., Poland), municipal governments have more diverse and established 
own revenues, so they would need less intergovernmental transfers.
The amount transferred to local governments is determined by a compromise among 
competing ﬁscal policy concerns. Grants, shared revenues, and subsidies to local govern-
ments follow three basic objectives:
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 a) providing incentives for eﬃcient spending and utilization of the municipal 
revenue base;
 b) guaranteeing suﬃcient funds for managing local functions according to an agreed 
(or minimum) level of services; and 
 c) supporting regional equalization of communities.
Decisions about ﬁscal policy must strike a balance between these three objectives, 
and priorities may change depending on the actual economic conditions. More restric-
tive ﬁscal policies focus on local incentives to increase municipal revenues and reduce 
expenditure. During leaner budget years, municipalities may call for ﬁscal guarantees 
to prevent any cutbacks in national grants. In a period of economic growth, more 
funds might be used for equalization between cities and villages, or among aﬄuent 
and depressed regions. All these factors inﬂuence the total amount of funds assigned 
to local governments.
3. Moving from Discretion towards Formulae
Determining the total amount of local government transfers is only the ﬁrst step in 
the budget planning process. The second basic issue is the way in which transfers and 
shared revenues are allocated to regional governments, municipalities, deconcentrated 
units of government, or even to service organizations. 
3.1 Rules for Gap-ﬁlling 
In the old communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, locally provided services were ﬁnanced through national funds, which were 
allocated in a highly discretionary way. The total budget appropriations were set during a 
multi-level bargaining process. The real allocation decisions during these negotiations were 
disguised by complex input indicators on labor, materials, and other costs of services. 
Current budget appropriations and capital investment programs were set by ministries. 
Even line ministries had limited inﬂuence on the allocation design led by the Ministry 
of Finance. So under this system—the Ministry of Finance being in a monopolistic 
position with highly discretionary powers and accountable only to centralized political 
power—allocation was not only ineﬀective, but the least transparent and prone to 
grand corruption. 
Since the end of the communist era, the situation has been changing—even in 
the governments of Central Asia, where decentralization is moving more slowly. As a 
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ﬁrst step in these countries, the various units of the executive, including ministries and 
regional governments, are trying to develop some agreed-upon principles to limit the 
discretion of national budget allocation. Central Asian governments ﬁnd examples in 
Russia, where a complex formula is used to divide revenue allocation among the 89 
entities at the federal level. Central Asian policymakers are also ready to imitate such 
practices as “the money follows the pupil,” wherein education is funded per capita.
These techniques are improved variants of the gap-ﬁlling model, widely used under 
the command economy. In this case the grant for the lower level of government (oblast, 
rayon, or city) is equal to the diﬀerence between estimated level of expenditure and the 
planned local revenues (E–R=G). However, the method of calculating the expenditure 
appropriations is more transparent; they are set by law and in principle cannot be 
manipulated by the executive. 
These ﬁrst steps can lead to more reﬁned models of fund allocation: In Macedonia, 
the most recent ﬁscal decentralization reforms have introduced simple formulas for 
funding public education services through local governments. Local governments 
running primary schools get a “basic amount per municipality,” plus funds calculated 
on a per-pupil basis, weighted by population density coeﬃcient. This is based on the 
assumption that unit costs of education are higher in sparsely populated areas with 
smaller schools. In order to keep the stability of school ﬁnancing, no municipalities can 
get lower than 85 percent, or higher than 112 percent, of the amount they received in 
the previous year.
Transparency is further improved when funding for more services are incorporated 
in the formula and the allocation techniques become more sophisticated. In Slovenia, 
for example, the level of all local government expenditures is calculated by a transparent 
and objective formula. When calculating the expenditure of speciﬁc municipalities, 
planners factor in population, length of local roads, area of the municipality, popula-
tion in school age, and the number of elderly. A formula is used to compare the per 
capita ratio with national averages, and each factor has a diﬀerent weight. For example, 
a Slovenian municipality’s population is given the highest multiplying coeﬃcient in the 
formula, with 70 percent.
3.2 Control over General Transfers and Equalization Funds
The above-mentioned grant formulas seek to ﬁll the gap between estimated expenditures 
and calculated municipal revenues in a transparent way. Another model focuses on the 
transfers only, leaving the level of local expenditures entirely under municipal control 
(E=G+R). This method is used in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In these 
Central European countries, general-purpose grants are allocated to local governments 
by complex formulas.
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In Hungary, allocations for local governments are determined according to approxi-
mately 90 diﬀerent basic indicators, each given diﬀerent weights resulting in a very 
complex, sometimes complicated allocation scheme. Local governments have to be 
informed about several hundred grant allocation criteria.
In Poland, the general grant consists of two basic components. One component takes 
a ﬁxed percentage of the national budget and divides it among local governments, based 
on the number of primary and secondary school pupils attending schools under their 
jurisdiction. The per-pupil amounts are weighted according to school type and pupil 
needs, to account for the diﬀering unit costs of providing education under diﬀerent 
jurisdictions. For example, rural schools may cost more to run than urban schools, and 
students with special needs or a foreign mother tongue may cost more to educate. All 
together, Poland uses 21 coeﬃcients for deciding the size of education funding. Other 
factors in the formula determining the size of local transfers in Poland include the desire 
to equalize the revenue-raising capacities of local governments.
In countries of South Eastern Europe municipal ﬁnances are predominantly based 
on shared revenues, consequently grant allocation schemes are built on revenue equal-
ization formulae. VAT is the best candidate for equalization (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia), despite the fact that local governments have no discretion over the tax rate 
and it cannot be measured at the local government level. Set percentages of national 
VAT is allocated to local government budget through various indicators showing the 
need for funding (e.g., population, number of young, or elderly population). In other 
countries like Albania, the four major local taxes (small business tax, simpliﬁed proﬁt 
tax, vehicle tax, and property transaction tax) are pooled and compared to the national 
average. Local governments with a per capita revenue pool below average receive 35 
percent of the missing part, while those with an above-average revenue pool subtract 
35 percent of the diﬀerence from their unconditional grants. 
3.3 Sound Information Base
All these complex formulas require proper statistical and ﬁscal information, otherwise 
there would be no way to ensure objectivity in grant allocation.4 Detailed data are needed 
on local government ﬁnances and on various performance or statistical indicators. 
Usually the latter ones are available from public databases; however, the measurement 
of outputs and the capacity of service organizations in a timely manner is not a simple 
task. Especially because this information is not always available at the early stages of 
annual budgeting, ﬁscal planning is often based on estimates and projections.
Local government expenditure and revenue data are usually provided by the ﬁscal 
information system. Even the most centralized public ﬁnance systems are able to produce 
some data by local governments. From the transparency point of view the questions are 
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whether this information is suﬃciently accurate and to what extent it shows the real 
ﬁnancial status and revenue capacity of a particular local government. 
Public sector ﬁnances usually follow cash-based accounting rules. This is suﬃcient 
for controlling local government expenditures and revenues in a given planning or 
reporting period (typically monthly, quarterly, or annually). However, there are obliga-
tions on local government budgets, which go beyond the actual ﬁscal year, like municipal 
debts or guarantees issued to service organizations. There are also revenues receivable, 
for example, when user charges are collected by local governments. These ﬁgures and 
the net position of local government assets are reﬂected only in the accrual accounting 
or modiﬁed accrual accounting systems. So without having some information on the 
longer-term commitments of municipalities, their real ﬁnancial position cannot be 
assessed and the transfers will not be able to take into account the real ﬁnancial status 
of a particular municipality.
On the revenue side modern techniques of transparent grant allocation methods are 
usually hindered by the lack of information on tax capacity. This would require a good 
indicator of tax base and also detailed information on tax rates by types of municipalities. 
Alternatively, some estimates for assessing the tax base might be helpful as well. All this 
information should be publicly available, so local governments will be in a position to 
compare their tax eﬀorts to other ones in a similar position. So transparency inﬂuences 
the eﬀectiveness and equity of the grant allocation schemes.
The availability of ﬁscal information is important not only for the local govern-
ments and for the ministries directly involved in grant allocation, but for policymaking 
in general. When only the national government has access to data needed for designing 
intergovernmental ﬁscal transfer schemes, then this “planning monopoly” will hamper 
innovation and reforms. Local government associations, independent policy institutes, 
and even opposition political parties should be able to develop new models and test 
their alternative proposals. For example, in Hungary data on municipal budgets are 
public at local governments, but the ﬁscal information systematically collected by 
the treasury and the Ministry of Finance is not published in a manageable way. This 
makes the policy research on grant design and the benchmarking of local governments 
more diﬃcult. 
3.4 Capital Investment Grants
Another type of transfer, the capital investment grants, are usually highly debated 
elements of intergovernmental ﬁscal transfers. Local capital investments are typically 
funded through various sources, including national, municipal, and private funding, but 
national grants always play an important role. Transfers are allocated by discretionary 
decisions or through matching grant schemes. Despite the national strategies, sectoral 
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development plans, and feasibility studies, capital investment grants are always at a 
higher risk of politically biased decisions than grants for current expenditures.
After the accession, the ﬁrst experiences with European Union funds were similar. 
Within the EU, an additional level of bureaucracy was created and new procedures for 
domestic planning, programming, and spending were introduced. These planning prac-
tices often overwrite the existing regulations on intergovernmental relations. Consequently, 
national development plans, operative programs, and EU grants should also be part of 
the ﬁscal transparency framework.
4. Importance of Transparency
Transparent budgeting procedures and open, legislated methods for distributing national 
transfers or shared revenues will have a positive impact on intergovernmental ﬁnances. 
The objectivity of grant allocation formulas limits the discretion and arbitrary character 
of central decisions. This will make the ﬁscal conditions of local governments more 
predictable and could increase the stability of fund allocation.
Beyond allocation methods, the scope of local spending autonomy in using the 
received transfers is also critical for accountability. The unconditional, general-purpose 
grants create incentives for eﬃcient forms of service delivery and an increase in own 
source revenues. These grant allocation techniques are accompanied by sectoral and ﬁscal 
regulations, which could limit local powers in spending the general grants. 
The proportion of various types of grants determines the level of local autonomy. 
Conditional grants are earmarked to tasks, groups of services (block grants), or speciﬁc 
types of expenditures (e.g., capital expenditures). In these cases local discretion over 
spending is limited. Transparency of these spending rules would make all the local stake-
holders better informed and ultimately will improve the eﬃciency of local decisions.
Transparent grant allocation formulas at the national level clearly show the prob-
lems of discretionary decisions by identifying the winners and the losers in ﬁnancing local 
public services. If equalization grant formulas are properly designed and general grants 
create local ﬁscal incentives, then they will lead to greater equity and higher eﬃciency 
in using public funds.
Transparency in municipal grant allocation would also change the political discourse 
over public budgets. Fiscal policy design will remain open, but negotiations over munic-
ipal funding will become more focused. As there are competing requirements towards 
intergovernmental ﬁscal relations, one transfer cannot meet all of them. Each method 
of grant allocation serves only a limited number of objectives, that is, the transfer system 
should have a singular focus.5 A good balance of the various techniques will support the 
mixed objectives. With transparent intergovernmental ﬁscal transfers, the policy options 
can be transformed into objective measures and their ﬁscal impact is easily measurable. 
This will make local government services more eﬃcient and equitable.
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Notes
1 This chapter is based on my reports written for the Local Governance Brief, Summer 
2006; “Intergovernmental Transfers” In: Robert D. Ebel and G. Péteri (eds). 2007. Kosovo 
Decentralization Brieﬁng Book. Prishtina: Forum 2015/KFOS/LGI; “Fiscal Equalization in 
South Eastern Europe.” FDI papers. Budapest: OSI/LGI. Available online: http://lgi.osi.
hu/publications_datasheet.php?id=346; and “Rationale and Models of Fiscal Equalisation 
in Europe.” Joint Initiative of EAR and CoE in Montenegro, 2007.
2 Excluding borrowing.
3 Excluding borrowing.
4 Yilmaz, S. et al. 2003. Subnational Data Requirements for Fiscal Decentralization. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Institute.
5 Shah, A. 2006. A Practitioners’ Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers. Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank [WPS4039].
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A b s t r a c t
Practical issues relating to effective public financial management ultimately govern whether 
or not there is good governance at the sub-national level—hence the success or failure 
of different policy options. Although there is a growing literature on decentralization, 
fiscal rules, and sub-national debt management, somewhat less attention has been paid 
to equally important and critical issues impacting public financial management—public 
sector accounting, internal management controls, public sector auditing, and directions 
for improving public sector information flows. This chapter focuses on effective public 
financial management and good governance via the instruments of accounting, internal 
control, and public sector auditing. Public sector accountability may not achieve its potential 
if not guided by coherent and universal principles: strengthening governance (account-
ability, transparency, predictability, and participation); reinforcing the foundation of civil 
society; and engaging in improvements in public expenditure management programs. In 
addition, programs to increase public sector accountability must carefully consider the 
country-specific context.
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1. Introduction
The goal of improving government accountability and reducing ineﬃciency should 
not be viewed in isolation, but as part of the broader issue of governance and public 
ﬁnancial management. The corrosive eﬀect of inadequate government accountability 
is a logical extension of the link between governance and development. Aside from 
moral and legal considerations, there is solid evidence that the lack of accountability, 
transparency, and operational ineﬀectiveness distorts resource allocation, and invariably 
hurts the poor the most.
Strengthening government accountability and improving ﬁscal transparency is vital. 
Strong ﬁnancial accountability means that people can aﬀect their government’s spending 
and taxation decisions. Citizens also need to take responsibility for the consequences 
of those decisions. Further, the ﬁnancial system for government must reﬂect both the 
importance of accountability and the interests of central government. For example, a 
general public sector reform trend has seen the governments of most developed countries, 
and many developing countries, adopt some aspects of accrual accounting as the basis 
for their budgeting and reporting. There is no evidence that this trend is reversing. 
Supporters of accrual accounting and budgeting argue that at the aggregate level, 
accrual-based ﬁscal indicators provide better information about the sustainability of 
ﬁscal policies, provide a stronger basis for government accountability, and provide a 
better measure of the eﬀects of government policies on aggregate economic demand.1 
At the budget organization level, accrual-based ﬁnancial statements generally provide 
better measures of organizational eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, and reduce opportunities 
for fraud and corruption. In addition, the auditing function (i.e., internal, external) can 
contribute in numerous ways to more eﬀective management of government ﬁnancial 
resources and ﬁscal transparency. In brief, auditing can detect irregularities and the 
misuse of government funds, determine the reliability of government information, and 
can provide reliable data regarding government program results as a basis for future 
budget adjustments and allocations.
Developing countries, however, confront obstacles that developed countries gener-
ally do not face including: human resource and other capacity constraints that can be 
overwhelming, corruption and vested interests that can undermine eﬀorts, there may 
be more urgent needs than reforming the accounting and general budgeting ﬁscal trans-
parency programs, and the various country-speciﬁc (Supreme) Audit Authorities may 
have limited capacity to undertake eﬃcient external audit assignments. Excluding this 
brief introductory and concluding sections, this chapter is organized into four primary 
sections, including: (i) Role of Accounting and Financial Reporting, (ii) Management 
Controls; (iii) Public Sector Auditing, and (iv) Mechanisms for Improving Information 
Flows: Directions for Reform.
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1.1 Role of Accounting and Financial Reporting
Accounting is the systematic gathering of ﬁnancial transactions and the compiling and 
reporting of these transactions in a meaningful and consistent manner so that government 
decision-makers can measure progress towards goals established in the budget; estimate 
resources required to accomplish these objectives; and eﬀectively allocate resources across 
competing goals and objectives. Accounting should be a relatively straightforward docu-
ment-recording procedure with cash coming in and cash going out. 
The Public Sector Committee (PSC) of the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) has identiﬁed seven objectives of governmental ﬁnancial reporting. These objec-
tives are as follows:
  Indicate whether resources were obtained and used in accordance with the legally 
adopted budget.
  Indicate whether resources were obtained and utilized in accordance with legal 
and contractual requirements, including ﬁnancial limits established by appro-
priate legislative authorities.
  Provide information about how the government or unit ﬁnanced its activities 
and met its cash requirements.2
  Provide information about the sources, allocation, and uses of ﬁnancial resources.
  Provide information that is useful in evaluating the government’s ability to 
ﬁnance its activities and to meet its liabilities and commitments.
  Provide information about the ﬁnancial condition of the government or unit 
and changes to it. 
  Provide aggregate information useful in evaluating the government’s or unit’s 
performance in terms of costs, eﬃciency, and accomplishments.3
Accounting is in fact a complex system of ﬁnancial interactions that must be prop-
erly designed in order to function well and to provide decision-makers with eﬀective 
management reporting information.4 The following sections provide a basic overview of 
some necessary features of an eﬀective government accounting system, such as a chart 
of account and the basic principals of cash and accrual accounting are reviewed.
1.2 Uniﬁed Chart of Account
Accounting detail is important, but the sheer volume of transactions that may occur at 
the national and sub-national government level means that information regarding indi-
vidual transactions must be collected and systematically classiﬁed. The chart of account 
represents the basic structure of ﬁnancial accounting and must include all categories of 
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assets, liabilities, revenue and expenditures, and equity accounts of the public sector. 
A well-designed chart of accounts provides a logical structure for classifying ﬁnancial 
transactions so that ﬁnancial data can be viewed from a number of perspectives.5 
In general, a single uniform chart of account accompanied by budget classiﬁers is 
necessary for a truly integrated accounting, budgeting, and local government ﬁnancial 
management and accounting system. To facilitate consolidation and inter-regional 
comparisons, a central government will provide a standard chart of account6 to which 
all public sector budgeting units must adhere. 
As the backbone of public sector ﬁnance, the chart of accounts is often ill-deﬁned. 
In Croatia, for example, the Ministry of Finance, in its initial attempts at developing 
a chart of account, did not prescribe the classiﬁcation of the budget by cost type or by 
function. Instead, expenditures were classiﬁed only according to administrative catego-
ries (i.e., budgetary beneﬁciaries and purposes) and no classiﬁcation of expenditures 
in terms of programs, sub-programs, or categories or activities is provided.7 Obviously, 
in the Croatian example, the system initially allowed for only the most rudimentary 
analysis of the budget.
1.3 Why Are Strong Public Sector Accounting Systems Important?
The wide use of public sector accounting standards may be more diﬃcult to gain accept-
ance than those for the private sector for a number of reasons, including: (i) the size and 
complexity of government activities has tended to engender a simplicity of approach to 
accounting; and (ii) governments have traditionally engendered a “we have always done 
it this way, why change?” approach to many administrative and managerial techniques. 
Accounting has been no exception. 
National (and sub-national) governments are increasingly competing for interna-
tional ﬁnancial resources (capital). Strong accounting and public expenditure manage-
ment systems provide a competitive advantage for governments that install and eﬀectively 
utilize these systems. Without a strong accounting system based on International Public 
Sector Accounting standards (IPSAS) (or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
[GAAP]), information provided to private sector institutions (investors) will not be 
timely, relevant, complete, or comparable. 
1.4 Cash Versus Accrual Accounting
One of the most fundamental decisions in designing an accounting system is the basis 
on which the transactions will be recorded. Several accounting methods are recognized 
by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC): cash, modiﬁed cash, modiﬁed 
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accrual, and accrual. Basic elements of cash and accrual accounting are described in 
the sections below.8 
1.5 Cash Accounting9
The simplest of all accounting procedures is to record cash transactions: how much 
is received; how much is paid out; and how much is on hand at the bank. In eﬀect, 
revenues and transfers are not recorded in accounts until cash is received, and expen-
ditures (or expenses in proprietary funds) and transfers out are recorded only when 
cash is disbursed. The beneﬁt of cash-basis accounting is that it is relatively simple to 
implement, but where there exists a strong parallel encumbrance system, cash-basis 
accounting fails to adequately control local government transactions. The cash basis is 
not recommended by IPSAS because it usually gives a misleading picture of municipal 
accounts.10 For example: 
  Cash received as a loan would be illustrated as revenue on the operating statement 
but not as a liability on the balance sheet.11 To correct for this kind of transac-
tion, most cash accounting systems recognize not only cash, but also other assets 
and liabilities arising through prior cash transactions. The accounting correction, 
however, does not alter the fact that at any point in time, outstanding obliga-
tions, in the form of contracts or purchase orders issued, are not reﬂected in the 
accounting records. Consequently, the available balance is overstated. This can lead 
to unwise local (municipal) expenditures and potential budget overspending.12 
  Governments operating strictly on a cash basis by way of example may ignore 
obligations to vendors for services and goods received but not yet paid. This 
type of action eﬀectively creates a ﬂoating debt outside the normal ﬁnancial 
management system.
  The treatment of costs that may have a multi-year beneﬁt under a cash-basis 
accounting system may also be somewhat questionable. For example, charging 
the full cost of an item against the budget in the ﬁrst year of its use may overstate 
the expense in the ﬁrst year, but understates the expense in subsequent years. 
This may lead to government decision-making that in the near term may appear 
good, but in the long term may be more costly. 
Cash accounting typically makes no provision for transactions and adjustments that 
do not emanate from direct receipts and payments. Cash-based accounting systems do 
not present information regarding the value of stocks that are consumed during the ﬁscal 
year, or the stocks which still exist at the end of the year. This is because the accounts 
are not concerned with recording usage. Cash-based accounting systems are concerned 
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with cash outﬂow that has been paid for purchases. There are no stock adjustments, 
stock valuation, and stock measurements under a cash-based system. As a result, the real 
value of these stocks is not known, thereby giving rise to a number of issues including 
problems associated with carrying costs. In addition, these stocks can be lost by deliberate 
manipulations during day-to-day addition or deduction operations. 
Important omissions are adjustments relating to changes in ﬁxed asset values and 
changes in the value(s) of long-term debt. As a result, cash-basis accounting does not 
permit the preparation of a balance sheet illustrating the assets and liabilities of the 
public sector. This inability to present a balance sheet implies that the net worth of the 
public sector cannot be presented. Even such short-term assets and liabilities such as 
inventories, receivables, and payables will not typically appear in “cash-basis accounting” 
balance sheets because they are not accrued.13 
 Box 1 illustrates the potential diﬃculty of determining ﬁscal strategy solely based 
on cash information.14 In the Croatian case, relying on cash information might lead 
Croatian policymakers to tighten ﬁscal policy through reductions in sectoral (i.e., 
education, health) spending. Contrast this with the same situation in the US under 
accrual-based accounting. These two similar examples demonstrate that countries should 
be careful in taking decisions based on incomplete (i.e., cash information) only.
Box 1.
Accrual and Cash Information Are Complementary
A Comparatively Higher Cash Deﬁcit (Croatia)
Some of the data published by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) may give a false impression of 
ﬁscal developments. Since the ﬁscal accounts continue to be presented on a cash basis, the ﬁgures 
suggest that the deﬁcit rose in 2000 and continued to rise in 2001. But this increase actually 
reﬂects the repayment of arrears (i.e., payment of obligations accrued in earlier years). In accrual 
terms, the ﬁscal deﬁcit has in fact been decreasing. In 2002, the cash presentation should not 
diﬀer substantially from the accrual presentation since the bulk of arrears have been repaid.
—Croatian National Bank 2002
A Comparatively Higher Accrual Deﬁcit (US)
Accrual-based ﬁnancial reporting is critical for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the 
US Government’s operations. For ﬁscal year 2001, our results were an accrual-based deﬁcit of 
$515 billion in contrast to a $127 billion (cash) surplus reported last fall. The primary diﬀerence 
between the accrual deﬁcit and the (cash) surplus is the recognition of expanded military retiree 
health beneﬁt costs provided by the National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed 
into law on October 30, 2000, and other actuarial expenses. In fact, these expenses caused the 
government’s future obligations to its military and civilian retires to exceed the federal debt held 
by the public. As with other future obligations of the federal government, only accrual-based 
ﬁnancial reporting provides this information in context to the public.
—US Secretary of the Treasury 2002
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1.6 Cash-based Accounting Is Inadequate for Control Purposes
Cash accounting is not a complete accounting system and its internal control is very 
weak. In eﬀect, it is not possible to control the usage of inventories during the year or 
to what extent the ﬁxed assets have been used. However, this system assists public sector 
entities in fulﬁlling the budgetary control function. The budgetary control is concerned 
with ensuring that actual expenditures are in line with budgeted amounts and that the 
objectives and levels of activities envisaged in the budget are achieved. A government 
cash accounting system without the budget and ﬁnancial regulation restriction(s) is 
inadequate for control purposes. 
1.7 Accrual Accounting
To resolve many of the problems associated with cash accounting, accrual accounting15 
has been advocated at various government levels. In order to understand what is actu-
ally happening in public sector ﬁnancial accounts, there must also be records that 
relate revenues and expenditures not to the time in which the cash is received or the 
disbursement made, but to the period for whose beneﬁt the transaction occurs. Financial 
recording according to the beneﬁt period, instead of the period in which cash moves, is 
known as accruing (accrual accounting). Under an accrual system, revenues are recorded 
when the charge is eﬀective, not when the cash is received.16 Expenditures are recorded 
when the obligation is incurred, irrespective of when the disbursement is made.
The accrual basis is applied somewhat diﬀerently in proprietary funds (full accrual) 
than in governmental funds (modiﬁed accrual) because expenses are being measured 
in proprietary funds while expenditures are the focus in government funds. In brief, an 
expense is an amount of resources used up during the accounting period. Speciﬁcally, 
expenditure is an amount of cash spent, or to be spent, during an accounting period. 
Since governmental funds do not account for capital and debt (they are accounted 
for in ﬁxed asset and long-term debt account groups), expenditures, not expenses, are 
measured. In contrast to government funds, the concern in proprietary funds is with 
net income. Full accrual accounting records revenues when earned and expenses when 
incurred. In other words, expenses are recorded when a liability is incurred regardless 
of when an actual payment is made.
Accrued revenues are usually expended on the assumption that the cash owing will 
be received. In fact, there may be losses. Taxpayers may dispute the amount owed, and 
the terms of grants and other transfer payments may be changed after the local govern-
ment has already budgeted and spent the money. Likewise, expenditures when originally 
recorded may be over or under the amounts ﬁnally determined to be due. Contingencies 
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should be provided for by means of reserves (contingency) accounts against ultimate 
losses and unrecorded liabilities.17 Accrual accounting involves changing three existing 
ﬁnancial features of current government ﬁnancial operations including:
  Shifting the recording basis from cash to commitment;
  Separation of ﬁnancial activities into current and capital, with full depreciation 
allowances that permit the allocation of costs over the life of the asset rather 
than recording the expenses when they are incurred; and
  Preparation of ﬁnancial statements that are in conformity with International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) (or Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles [GAAP]).
Preparation of ﬁnancial statements according to IPSAS (or GAAP) implies that 
governments must prepare a balance sheet, operating statement, statement of cash ﬂows, 
and a statement of commitments and contingent liabilities. These statements will enable 
the public sector to understand its net worth and provide the basis for making future 
investment decisions.18 Figure 1 presents the basic dynamics of the cash, modiﬁed, and 
accrual accounting dynamics. Under the accrual system, incomes are reported in the 
ﬁscal year that they are earned, regardless of when payment is received, and expenses 
are recognized in the ﬁscal year that they are incurred, regardless of when payment is 
made. Under cash-basis accounting, incomes are reported in the ﬁscal year that they 
are received and expenses are deducted in the ﬁscal year that they are paid. All budget 
organizations must choose one or the other accounting methods. 
 It is important to understand the basics of the two principal methods of keeping 
track of an organization’s income and expenses: the cash method and accrual method. In 
brief, these methods diﬀer only in the timing of when transactions, including when sales 
and purchases are credited or debited to the accounts. The cash basis is much simpler, 
but its ﬁnancial statement results can be somewhat misleading in the short term. The 
accrual method is the more commonly used method of accounting in the private sector, 
whereas the public sector has traditionally used the cash method.
 Some organizations use a modiﬁed cash basis of accounting which is a hybrid 
method that combines features of both the cash basis and accrual basis. Modiﬁcations 
to the cash-basis accounting include the capitalization of assets. The resulting balance 
sheet would include long-term assets and accumulated depreciation. The income state-
ment under a modiﬁed accrual system would include depreciation expense. Modiﬁed 
cash-basis ﬁnancial statements are intended to provide more information to users than 
cash-basis statements, while attempting to avoid the complexities of full application of 
accrual accounting under IPSAS. 
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1.8 Few Countries Have Implemented Full Accrual Accounting
To a varying degree, many countries have implemented accrual accounting in the past 
decade. But to date, only four OECD countries appropriate resources on an accrual 
basis.19 Others, including Canada and the UK, have rapidly moved towards appropri-
ating resources on an accrued basis. Implementing accrual basis accounting requires 
fundamental legal changes. As a result, widespread adoption will take signiﬁcantly 
longer to achieve. 
Matheson (2002) indicates, 
… that extending accruals to budget is controversial. Much of the controversy arises 
from the government administration itself and Parliaments. Before this change is 
contemplated, a signiﬁcant amount of time needs to be invested in educating and 
consulting with government managers and other interest groups, like Parliamentarians. 
In those countries that have adopted accruals, the change has been linked to other 
public management reforms. Accrual accounting policies places a premium on conﬁ-
dence audits and a willingness to accept ﬂuctuations in valuations. Practice in Australia 
and New Zealand has shown that the use of accruals in the budget has led to a better 
realization of future unfunded liabilities, better infrastructure management and more 
eﬃcient budget reallocation process.20
1.9 Implementation Is Diﬃcult and Costly
Some aspects of accrual accounting and implementation are more diﬃcult than cash 
implementations. For example, a government budget organization is unlikely to know 
the full amount of tax revenue that it is likely to receive at any given time. Furthermore, 
operating an accrual accounting system can be expensive. Many countries have developed 
their own “organic” computer systems to support cash accounting rather than rely on 
commercial accounting systems (with accrual accounting capability). The development 
of organic systems may prove over time to be more costly to develop and implement.
2. Management Controls21 
The International Organization of Supreme Audit Organizations (INTOSAI) deﬁnes 
public sector management controls as all the policies and procedures needed by an 
organization to ensure:
  Economical, eﬃcient, and eﬀective achievement of the entity’s objectives;
  Adherance to external rules (i.e., laws, regulations, procedures) and to internal 
management polices;
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  The safeguarding of assets and information;
  The prevention and detection of fraud and error; and
  The quality of accounting records and the timely production of reliable ﬁnancial 
information.22 
Management controls are essential to eﬀective management of budget organizations. 
Every country must determine the nature and extent of the management controls that 
it wishes to implement. Management control systems must not conﬂict with the overal 
management philosopy of the budget organization. Over the past decade, a new public 
management (NPM) paradigm has evolved where emphasis is now given to allowing 
discretion to line-managers for making decisions, and hold them accountable for results, 
rather than adhering to a system of strict rules and procedures. Havens (1999) indi-
cates that the new public management philosophy can be easilty vitiated by systems of 
management control that put undue reliance on detailed procedural safeguards or on 
multiple levels of supervisory review of decisions.23
Box 2 presents detailed INTOSAI management control standards that should be 
the foundation of any public sector management system. Management controls are the 
responsiblity of the management (leadership) of the organization to design and imple-
ment. If the leadership of an organization is committed to eﬀective management, the 
next requirement is an assessment of the risks that aﬀect that organization.
Box 2. 
INTOSAI Management Control Standards
General Standards
 Management control structures exist to provide assurance that the general objectives of the 
 organization will be accomplished.
 Speciﬁc control objectives are to be identiﬁed for each ministry/department/organization.
 Managers are to monitor their operations on a continuous basis.
Detailed Standards
 Management control structure of all transactions should be clearly documented.
 Transactions are signiﬁcant events are to be recorded properly and promptly.
 The same person should not hold key duties and responsibilities in more than one of these 
 areas: authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing transactions.
 Access to resources and records is to be limited to authorized persons who are accountable 
 for their custody and use.
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2.1 Enterprise-wide Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment may be deﬁned as “an enterprise-wide approach to identify and analyze 
issues that aﬀect the organization’s ability to meet its goals and objectives. Issues that 
may impact the organization’s ability to meet its goals and objectives are divided into 
several categories: strategic, ﬁnancial, operational, compliance, and reputational.”24 In 
general, risk management must be integrated into every facet of an organization’s opera-
tions as a routine operation. 
The most important task confronting the leadership of a national (sub-national) 
government and its management team is to establish a risk management strategy and 
promote its use (beneﬁts) through the organization. Figure 2 presents the basic risk 
management and management control process. The primary entity objectives in analyzing 
and managing risks that might impact the community include:
  Identifying and managing existing and new risks in a planned and coordinated 
manner with a minimum of disruption and cost.
  Develop a risk-aware culture that encourages the leadership (and employees) 
of the national (or sub-national) government to identify risks an associated 
opportunities, and to respond to them with cost eﬀective actions.
  Be perceived by stakeholders to be adopting the best risk management and 
legally compliant practices.
Each department, or directorate, should examine its own operations to identify 
the risks that they currently face or expect to confront in the near, medium, and long 
term. This risk proﬁling exercise should enable departments, or directorates, to rank 
each risk in order of probability and severity, thereby enabling them to devise an action 
to tackle each risk based on its signiﬁcance to the operation of the service. A budget 
organization (department, directorate) has a number of ways in which it can eﬀectively 
manage risk, including:
 1. Accept the risk and make a conscious decision not to take any action.
 2. Accept the risk but take some actions to lessen or minimize the likelihood or impact.
 3. Transfer the risk to another organization, for example, by outsourcing the activity.
 4. Finance (or insure) against the risk. 
 5. Eliminate the risk by ceasing to perform the activity causing the adverse risk 
situation.
How a budget organization (department, directorate) decides to manage individual 
risks is determined by following a risk assessment based on a systematic analysis of how 
a number of likelihood and consequence25 ratings apply to each risk.
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Figure 2. 
Establishing a Risk Management Strategy
Source: Author.
Establish the Context
Internal/External Context
Risk Management Context
C
O
M
M
U
N
IC
A
T
E
 A
N
D
 C
O
N
S
U
LT
M
O
N
IT
O
R
 A
N
D
 R
E
V
IE
W
Identify Risks
What can happen?
When? Where? How? Why?
Evaluate Risks
Compare against criteria/Set priorities
Treat Risks
Identify options
Assess options
Prepare and implement treatment plans
Analyze and evaluate residual risk
Develop Criteria
Define the structure
Analyze Risks
Identify existing controls
Determine likelihood and consequences
Determine level of risk
Treat Risks
YES
NO
158
F I N D I N G  T H E  M O N E Y
2.2 Developing and Maintaining an Eﬀective Financial Control 
 Environment 
No accounting (and budgeting) framework is satisfactory from the point of view of 
fool-proof ﬁnancial control. Pure cash accounting is unsatisfactory because it covers 
only those operating transactions that involve actual cash payments. This means that 
to set budgetary authorization limits in pure cash terms would be to give departments 
the scope for short-run evasion of ﬁnancial controls by incurring expenses that involve 
future cash payments. Developing eﬀective management controls in this area requires 
redesigning the management control structures and modifying the cash (and accrual) 
accounting system to increase the potency of ﬁnancial controls.
2.3 Financial Control Versus Departmental Managerial Autonomy 
As countries decentralize, a chasm may develop between maintaining tight ﬁnancial 
controls versus more autonomy in (departmental) management control. The touchstone 
of new (decentralized) public management (NPM) includes devolution, decontrol, and 
a focus upon accountability for results. The intention is that departmental management 
should focus strongly upon the bottom-line operating results. Yet under the NPM 
decentralized control environment, departments continue to be subject to treasury 
administrative controls whenever they seek their newfound autonomy.26 
  In Australia, despite having decentralized managerial autonomy, departmental 
managers are unable to use own source funding, be it from depreciation, asset 
sales, or accumulated proﬁts, as they deem ﬁt. Departmental managers must 
obtain Treasury approval for dealing with these transactions. If an Australian 
government department builds up signiﬁcant accumulated proﬁts, it may be 
forced by the Treasury to apply those funds to ordinary operating expenses that 
ought to be met from the payment for outputs appropriation. 
  In Kosovo, ﬁnancial control is exercised by the Treasury so as to achieve speciﬁc 
ﬁscal targets. Under the current cash accounting and budgeting regime, the 
Government of Kosovo’s Ministry of Finance and Economics is focused on the 
cash budget balance. However, as Kosovo moves forward in its development, 
a gulf may be created between devolution (new public management) rhetoric 
and the reality of continued ﬁrm central treasury ﬁnancial control. Reorienting 
internal management controls within the new public management (i.e., ﬁnancial 
control versus departmental autonomy) will be an ongoing challenge. 
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3. Public Sector Auditing 
The instruments of ﬁscal transparency, including medium-term ﬁscal strategies, annual 
accounts, budgets, and audits, are utilized in conjunction with other means to render 
greater accountabilty. Speciﬁcally, accountability rests upon two primary pillars: (i) 
the role of the legislative body in the approval of polices, budgets, and annual audited 
reports; and (ii) the role of the audit in aiding the representative bodies to carry out 
the veriﬁcation exercise.27 
The form of audit varies from one country to another. In some countries, audi-
tors carry out an a priori audit. Some are engaged in ex post or performance audits. 
Although practices vary, the primary issue relates to the extent to which transparency 
and accountability are eﬀective in fulﬁlling the tasks for which they are designed. This 
section reviews the nature and form of audit in increasing access to ﬁscal information 
and increasing transparency. 
3.1 The Framework
The underlying framework for public auditing is derived from the following two 
organizations:
  The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)28 deﬁnes auditing “as a 
veriﬁcation or examination of the documents executed by an auditor with the 
objective of providing him the ability to express an opinion of those documents 
in such a way as to provide them with greater credibility.”
  International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI)29 deﬁnes 
“Auditing as an examination of operations, activities, and systems of a speciﬁc 
entity, to verify that they are executied or function in conformity with certain 
objectives, budgets, rules, and requirements.” 
The IFAC and INTOSAI deﬁnitions of auditing have overlapping features. However, 
in brief, auditing is merely a techique in the service of necessary institutional and ﬁnancial 
control, but should not be considered as an end unto itself.
3.2 Types of Audits
Allen and Tommasi (2001) detail ﬁve broad categories of public sector audit 
(Figure 3), as follows:
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  Ex-ante audit: examines the transactions for propriety before they are completed. 
A payment may not be made until the auditor has approved the related voucher 
after examing the supporting documents. Havens (1999) indicates that central-
ized ex-ante auditing is still practiced by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) 
in many countries. However, over the last decade, such audits are increasingly 
being viewed as being an element of the management control structure and as 
such should be the responsibility of the public sector manager rather than the 
SAI. As a result, ex-ante auditing by SAIs has been largely eliminated. Most SAIs 
focus primarily on the reliability of the measures taken by each public sector 
organization to avoid improper payments and other transactions.
  Ex-post audit (ﬁnancial audit): examines the transations after they have occurred. 
Ex-post audit includes regularity audit that contents attestation of ﬁnancial 
accountability. This involves examining the ﬁnancial records, statements, audit 
of ﬁnancial systems, and transactions including compliance with applicable 
statutes and regulations, audit of internal controls, and internal audit functions. 
The objective of such audits is to determine the reliability of ﬁnancial data.
  Compliance audit (regularity audit): involves checking individual transactions 
after the fact to ensure that the appropriate authorizations and documentations 
are present. The focus is on determining the legal propriety of the transactions. 
The purpose of compliance auditing is to strengthen the systems to prevent 
irregularities, not just to detect past errors. Havens (1999) points out that few 
SAIs have suﬃcient staﬀ resources to examine every transaction for every unit 
of government. As a result, it is essential that the SAI use available auditing 
capacity to strengthen the management controls of the public sector organiza-
tion, such that ﬁnancial irregularities are minimized.30 
  Attestation audit: Many supreme audit agencies are required to perform annual 
audits of the national budget or other government ﬁnancial reports. The audit 
report may be required before the legislation can close the accounts on the 
budget year. An attestation audit is primarily a compliance audit, aimed at 
detecting irregularities such as overspending or the use of budget resources for 
activities not authorized by the parliament. The purpose of an attestation audit 
is to render an opinion as to whether the reader of the statement of the report 
can be reasonably sure that the information contained in the report is correct.
  Value for money/performance audit: A value for money (VFM) audit examines 
an entire entity, activity, or program to suggest ways that the entity can improve 
the eﬃciency of its operations.31 In eﬀect, the auditor searches for areas of waste 
and mismanagement.32 The boundary between value for money and performance 
audits is not substantial. Where VFM audits focus on eﬃciency (cost per unit 
of output), program evaluations focus on outputs (amounts accomplished) or 
outcomes.
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The number and nature of audit functions implies that any SAI must determine what 
type of audit role is strategically advantageous for it to perform.33 For a variety of reasons, 
SAIs do not have the capacity, skills, and time to perform all of the above-mentioned 
audit functions. Most SAIs rarely perform the most advanced types of program evalu-
ations (or even in many instances, value for money analysis). Because of the potential 
diversity of tasks that any SAI may undertake, it is essential that careful consideration 
be given to focusing on the institution’s and the public sector’s highest priorities. 
In most instances, the highest priority of an government’s public ﬁnancial auditing 
capabilities should be dedicated to maintaining the integrity of the public ﬁnancial 
systems in order to minimize corruption. In order to maintain this external audit integ-
rity, SAI’s must be independent from the government, have a legal mandate to audit 
budget organizations, and report their ﬁndings directly to the legislature (i.e., parlia-
ment). Crucial to the independent oversight is that audit information must be released 
for general public review and inspection.
Figure 3.
Types of Audits
3.3 Internal Control and Audit34
INTOSAI standards deﬁne internal control and audit as: the organization, policies, 
and procedures used to ensure that government programs achieve their intended risks, 
that the resources used to deliver these programs are consistent with the stated aims 
and objections of the organization’s concerned, and that the programs are protected 
from waste, fraud, and mismanagement, and that reliable and timely information is 
obtained. In brief:
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Ex-ante audit
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 Internal controls include:
 – Physical controls: security procedures intended to control assets.
  – Accounting controls: procedures by which transactions are required to be 
recorded in the accounting system.
  – Process controls: procedures designed to ensure that actions are taken only 
with proper authorization.
  – Procurement controls: procedures that monitor the procurement cycle to 
ensure that procurement procedures are implemented appropriately.
  – Separation of duties: procedures that ensure that at least two people should 
be involved in transactions to minimize the risk of improper actions.35
  Internal audits check and assess the organization’s systems and procedures to 
minimize errors, fraud, and ineﬃcient procedures. Internal audit is generally 
carried out by a department(s) within a government entity.
Independence is a necessary condition for any internal audit function. This means 
that the internal audit department must not be a part of the budget or treasury function 
of the spending unit, but must report directly to the minister.36 
3.4 Reporting Audit Results37
Requirements for the distribution of audit reports is usually speciﬁced in the laws 
concerning supreme audit institutions (and their various implementing rules, authority, 
and responsibilities). The general rule for distributing audit reports should be to provide 
copies to those with an interest in the topic and especially those who should act on the 
ﬁndings and recommendations contained in the report. The audited entity and the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) should always be provided information on the results of an audit. 
 In addition, the general public has an interest in the results of audits of public 
entities and the use of public funds. In many countries, all audit reports completed 
by a Supreme Audit Institution are made available to the public unless they must be 
restricted for national security reasons. SAIs may be empowed to order corrective actions 
of certain kinds when irregularities are found during an audit. However, this authority 
is usually available only with respect to matters of (ir)regularity. Many SAIs may lack 
such authority even when substantial irregularities exist. For the most part, auditors are 
authorized only to report what they have found, and must rely on others to correct the 
reported problems.
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3.5 Auditing and Local Governments
In general a local government’s audit report should: (i) analyze the ﬁnancial position of 
the local government, including trends, quality of receipts (revenues), and expenditures; 
(ii) evaluate the performance of the government on various ﬁnancial management and 
accounting issues; and (iii) include audit observations on aspects such as irregularities 
and non-observance of rules and regulations, unnecessary (or wasteful) expenditures, 
and ineﬃciency, delays, and non-achievement of objectives with respect to budget 
implementation.
What exactly is audited when a local government is audited? Is it just the ﬁnancial 
statement of the local government (i.e., municipality, urban local body) that is audited? 
Or are the aﬃliated entities (i.e., the water utility, etc.) of the local government also 
audited? Often what is audited at the local government level diﬀers by locality or country. 
In some countries various oﬀ-budget units (i.e., water utility, solid waste management 
departments) are viewed as separate legal entities incorporated under the relevant 
commercial law. In this case, the audit function depends almost solely on the decision 
of the board of directors with no direct state (or local self-government) involvement 
other than that of an ordinary shareholder participating in the board elections. Even 
if these oﬀ-balance sheet entities are incorporated under commercial law, they still can 
(and should) be viewed as part of the local government’s assets and therefore should be 
subject to outside audit by a government oﬃce.
3.6 Audit Limitations
The funciton of an independent audit system generally reinfoces the trust that the 
public has with respect to the public sector. During the past decade, eﬀorts have been 
made to establish comprehensive audit systems in a number of countries. While the 
creation of audit systems in many countries has been a remarkable achievement, the 
overall performance of the audit systems in these countries leaves a lot to be desired. 
For example:
  Audits may not be permitted to review government policies;
  Financial audits may yield limited results;39
  Audit evaluations may be unable to follow the full trail of government expen-
ditures; and
  Transfers to local governments, non-governmental organizations, and the books 
of contractors that perform many tasks for the government may be beyond the 
scope of the auditor.39
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In many cases, audit continues to be of a conventional accountancy type with little 
reliance on the performance or investigative audit. Further, the purview of the audit 
maybe constrained by the enabling country-speciﬁc laws. As a result, the nature of 
country-speciﬁc audits may be outdated or ineﬀectual. In auditing ﬁnancial statements, 
an auditor can only provide reasonable assurance that the statements are reliable. Neither 
the auditor nor the reader of the audited report should be under the assumption that such 
an opinion is a guarantee that there are no material errors in the ﬁnancial statements. 
With respect to local government auditing, several shortcomings with respect to local 
government audit practices generally emerge. 
  The audit appears to be principally oriented towards reviewing transactions 
rather than performance or systems. Audit observations on individual transac-
tions or programs are useful. However, it may be diﬃcult for local government 
oﬃcials to easily evaluate the nature or severity of the issues being highlighted 
based on these individual observations alone. 
  In general, developing country audit practices do not focus on a systematic review 
of the eﬀectiveness of the internal control system(s) and its various components 
within which individual transactions are recorded.
  In some cases an appropriate certiﬁcation of the ﬁnancial reports (annual 
accounts) is not provided. Further, in many cases, the audit report inadequately 
highlights distortions in the annual account. 
Even when the audit report highlights some distortions in local government ﬁnancial 
practices, there may be a general lack of responsiveness and actions undertaken to audit 
observations. Some of these shortcomings can be overcome by building local govern-
ment and staﬀ capacity, establishing uniform and transparent ﬁnancial management and 
accounting (auditing) procedural norms, and standardizing local government ﬁnancial 
information systems, thereby enabling more eﬀective internal (and external) auditing. 
4. Mechanisms for Improving Information Flows: 
 Directions for Reform
The preceding sections presented a number of fundamental issues that may adversely 
aﬀect public sector transparency and accountability. The following sections outline 
some basic policy considerations/ideals for improving transparency and accountability. 
However, due to various factors, these ideals are often compromised. 
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4.1 Simplicity of the Accountability Mechanism 
Russel-Einhorn (2004) suggests that there are three useful criteria for evaluating trans-
parency and accountability mechanisms relevant to local circumstances in developing 
countries, including:
 1. Degree of visibility of the mechanism in question. 
 2. The simplicity of the mechanism. 
 3. The degree to which use of the mechanism can have a direct rather than indirect 
impact on government policies and programs.
 The rationale for these criteria encompasses a number of practical factors, including 
placing a premium on high-visibility accountability mechanisms in order to cultivate 
a sense of community empowerment and collective action. In general, governments 
whose policies are put in question in a very public forum often ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to 
obfuscate their intentions.40 
High costs can signiﬁcantly retard the utility of any accountability tool. Accountability 
tools where the costs and legal sophistication are manageable may achieve better results, 
than those where relatively greater resources and expenditures are required. The third 
criterion is important given the need for demonstrable civic action.41 While building 
enhanced government accountability in developing countries is a long-term process, 
reform momentum critically depends on the ability to inﬂuence policy relatively 
quickly. 
4.2 Reporting Basis Should Be Consistent
The budget is a key management document in the public sector and accountability is 
based on implementing the budget as approved by the legislature. If the budget is on 
a cash basis, then the cash method of ﬁnancial reporting will be the dominant basis on 
which politicians and budget organizations will work. Financial reporting on a diﬀerent 
basis, or accrual basis, risks becoming a technical accounting exercise. As a result, to 
maximize beneﬁts, countries must fully implement accrual budgeting and accounting. 
The problem with applying accruals only to ﬁnancial reporting and not to the budget 
is that the accrual information will not be taken seriously.
 In addition, diﬀerent accrual accounting frameworks may often be applied in 
preparing budgets and reports. This may cause unnecessary confusion. For example, 
budgets for the Australian budget sector are prepared on the IMF Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS) basis.42 Financial reports are prepared in accordance with Australian 
accounting standards. The operating balance measure produced by these two accounting 
166
F I N D I N G  T H E  M O N E Y
framework can be substantially diﬀerent, with non-trivial implications for ﬁscal 
policy.43
4.3 No System of Controls Is Foolproof
No system of accounting, budgeting, or managerial (ﬁnancial) controls can provide an 
absolute guarantee against the occurrence of ineﬃciency, abuse, human error, or fraud. 
Notwithstanding, a well-designed system of internal and external controls and audit 
functions can give reasonable assurance that signiﬁcant irregularities will be detected.
  Internal audit, for example, should be integrated into normal operational systems 
to assist management in assessing risks and developing more cost-eﬀective 
controls. 
  External audit is typically performed by a separate organization. The credibility 
of external audits requires that the Supreme Audit Institution be independent 
of the public sector entities being audited and have unfettered access to the 
required information. 
However, no audit can provide absolute assurance of detecting every human or 
management system error. No audit can provide absolute assurance that every ﬁnancial 
irregularity will be detected. An audit can give only reasonable assurance that any mate-
rial errors will be found and reported.
4.4 Improving Communications Is Essential
According to a number of World Bank and Asian Development Bank surveys, the 
countries that moved to a well-deﬁned accrual accounting system and a more modern 
audit and monitoring environment generally cite the need for more and better commu-
nications as the single biggest factor that was underestimated during implementation.44 
Further, close communication with the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) is cited as being 
the most important feature in any movement towards improved ﬁnancial reporting 
and accountability. The SAI should reinforce the reform process and assist entities in 
implementation.
 Experience also reveals that a substantial communications gap may exist with the 
media and, by extension, with the general public with respect to reporting of ﬁnancial 
(accrual) budgets and ﬁnancial statements. In particular, the public may have limited 
understanding of the ﬁgures and the underlying concepts. Many countries have combated 
this lack of ﬁnancial reporting education by developing “media ﬁnancial reporting” 
training sessions.
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4.5 Transparency of Rules, Regulations, Laws, and Processes
The lack of transparency in rules, laws, and process in many countries lessens government 
accountability. Rules dealing with government ﬁnancial management and accounting 
are often confusing. Even if an individual exercises some initiative and tries to under-
stand the rules, the documents specifying these rules may not be publicly available. 
Furthermore, many organizational rules may be changed without public announcements 
to that eﬀect. In many instances, regulations and laws are written so that only trained 
lawyers can understand their true impact. 
Many laws are often conceptually opaque, thus leaving grounds for diﬀerent inter-
pretation. One of the ways to increase accountability in opaque regulations and laws 
is to establish more eﬃcient regulation processes. The establishment of independent 
audit agencies can be eﬀective in promoting eﬃciency and limiting opportunities for 
corruption. These regulatory institutions however, must operate with transparency (hold 
public meetings), simplicity (rules-based principles), and accountability (election of 
regulators or term-based regulators).
5. Conclusion
Good governance and eﬀective national (or sub-national) government accountability 
are the single most important vehicles for establishing a country’s economic and social 
priorities within the scarce resources that are available to government. Good govern-
ance (national [sub-national] government accountability) is an essential feature of a 
framework for economic and ﬁnancial management including: ﬁnancial and economic 
stability, promotion of eﬃcient institutions, and social and economic equity. Public sector 
accountability may not achieve its potential if not guided by coherent and universal 
principles: strengthening governance (accountability, transparency, predictability, and 
participation); reinforcing the foundation of civil society; and engaging in improvements 
in public expenditure management programs. In addition, programs to increase public 
sector accountability must carefully consider the country-speciﬁc context. 
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Annex 1
Overview of Cash Basis IPSAS45
The purpose of this section is to give a summary review of the mandatory and volun-
tary reporting requirements under the IPSAS cash basis of accounting, as outlined in 
the speciﬁc international accounting standard.46 This section should not be viewed as 
replacing the cash-based IPSAS standard. However, it summarizes the most relevant 
points for easier reference and gives additional commentary. 
 Objective of Cash-basis Reporting Standard
Information about cash receipts, cash payments, and cash balances is necessary for 
accountability purposes and provides useful input for assessing the ability of the 
government to generate adequate cash in the future and the likely sources and uses of 
cash. In making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of cash resources and 
the sustainability of the government’s activities, users of the government’s ﬁnancial 
statements require an understanding of the timing and certainty of cash receipts and 
cash payments. 
Compliance with the mandatory and encouraged adherence to the voluntary require-
ments of the cash-based standard will enhance comprehensive and transparent ﬁnancial 
reporting of the cash receipts, cash payments, and cash balances of the government. 
It will also enhance comparability with the government’s own ﬁnancial statements of 
previous periods and with the ﬁnancial statements of other entities within the govern-
ment or across governments that adopt the cash basis of accounting.
The Cash-basis IPSAS is focused on reporting cash balances, movement in those 
balances over a reporting period, and who controls those balances. The concept of 
control, especially control over cash, is a fundamental concept that runs throughout the 
standard and signiﬁcantly aﬀects how individual budget entity statements are presented 
(especially important when a Single Treasury Account system is used, as is the case for 
Kosovo). In addition, the control concept determines which entities are to be consoli-
dated in the whole of government accounts.
 Structure of Cash-basis IPSAS
In order for a government to state that its ﬁnancial statements are in compliance with 
the IPSAS standard “Financial Reporting under the Cash Basis of Accounting,” it 
must adhere to all relevant requirements of the standard illustrated below. The ﬁnan-
cial reporting under the cash basis of accounting deﬁnes the cash basis of accounting, 
establishes the mandatory general purpose statements and the requirements for the 
disclosure of information in the ﬁnancial statements and supporting notes, and deals 
with a number of speciﬁc reporting issues, such as correction of noted errors, consoli-
dated ﬁnancial statements, foreign currency transactions, restrictions on cash balances, 
access to borrowings, and other budget entity identiﬁcation disclosures.
169
A c c e s s  t o  F i s c a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  A u d i t :  C h a l l e n g e s  a n d  S t r a t e g i e s
Ta
bl
e A
.1
Ta
bu
la
r R
ev
ie
w
 o
f M
an
da
to
ry
 IP
SA
S 
Re
qu
ire
m
en
ts,
 w
ith
 C
om
m
en
ta
ry
PA
R
T
 I
, 
M
A
N
D
A
T
O
R
Y
Sc
op
e 
of
 th
e 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
1.
1.
4
An
 e
nt
ity
 w
ho
se
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
co
m
pl
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts 
of
 P
ar
t 1
 o
f t
hi
s S
ta
nd
ar
d 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 th
at
 fa
ct
. F
in
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
de
sc
rib
ed
 a
s c
om
pl
yi
ng
 w
ith
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
 u
nl
es
s t
he
y 
co
m
pl
y 
w
ith
 a
ll 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts 
in
 P
ar
t 1
 o
f t
he
 S
ta
nd
ar
d.
1.
1.
5
T
hi
s S
ta
nd
ar
d 
ap
pl
ie
s t
o 
al
l p
ub
lic
 se
ct
or
 e
nt
iti
es
 o
th
er
 th
an
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t B
us
in
es
s E
nt
er
pr
ise
s.
Pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
ta
te
m
en
ts
1.
3.
4
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 p
re
pa
re
 a
nd
 p
re
se
nt
 g
en
er
al
 p
ur
po
se
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
e 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s:
(a
) 
a 
sta
te
m
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
w
hi
ch
:
 
(i)
 
re
co
gn
ize
s a
ll 
ca
sh
 re
ce
ip
ts,
 c
as
h 
pa
ym
en
ts,
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
ba
la
nc
es
 co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 th
e 
en
tit
y;
 a
nd
 
(ii
) 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 id
en
tif
ie
s p
ay
m
en
ts 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
ird
 p
ar
tie
s o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
.3
.2
4 
of
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
;
(b
) 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 e
xp
la
na
to
ry
 n
ot
es
; a
nd
(c
) 
w
he
n 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
m
ak
es
 p
ub
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
its
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
bu
dg
et
, a
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f b
ud
ge
t a
nd
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s e
ith
er
 a
s a
 se
pa
ra
te
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 
 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
t o
r a
s a
 b
ud
ge
t c
ol
um
n 
in
 th
e 
sta
te
m
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
.9
.8
 o
f t
hi
s 
 
St
an
da
rd
.
1.
3.
5
W
he
n 
an
 e
nt
ity
 e
le
ct
s t
o 
di
sc
lo
se
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 o
n 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 b
as
is 
fro
m
 th
e 
ca
sh
 b
as
is 
of
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
 o
r 
ot
he
rw
ise
 re
qu
ire
d 
by
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 1
.3
.4
(a
) o
r 1
.3
.4
(c
), 
su
ch
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 th
e 
no
te
s t
o 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts.
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In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
To
 B
e 
Pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 S
ta
te
m
en
t o
f C
as
h 
R
ec
ei
pt
s 
an
d 
Pa
ym
en
ts
1.
3.
12
T
he
 st
at
em
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 p
re
se
nt
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
am
ou
nt
s f
or
 th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
pe
rio
d:
(a
) 
to
ta
l c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
of
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
sh
ow
in
g 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 a
 su
b-
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 to
ta
l c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
us
in
g 
a 
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
ba
sis
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 to
 th
e 
en
tit
y’s
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
;
(b
) 
to
ta
l c
as
h 
pa
ym
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
sh
ow
in
g 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 a
 su
b-
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 to
ta
l c
as
h 
pa
ym
en
ts 
us
in
g 
a 
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
ba
sis
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 to
 
th
e 
en
tit
y’s
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
; a
nd
(c
) 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
an
d 
cl
os
in
g 
ca
sh
 b
al
an
ce
s o
f t
he
 e
nt
ity
1.
3.
13
To
ta
l c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
to
ta
l c
as
h 
pa
ym
en
ts,
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
ca
sh
 p
ay
m
en
ts 
fo
r e
ac
h 
su
b-
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
t a
nd
 p
ay
m
en
t, 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 o
n 
a 
gr
os
s b
as
is,
 e
xc
ep
t t
ha
t c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
m
ay
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 o
n 
a 
ne
t b
as
is 
w
he
n:
(a
) 
th
ey
 a
ris
e 
fro
m
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
ad
m
in
ist
er
s o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 o
th
er
 p
ar
tie
s a
nd
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 re
co
gn
ize
d 
in
 th
e 
sta
te
m
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts;
 o
r
(b
) 
th
ey
 a
re
 fo
r i
te
m
s i
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
tu
rn
ov
er
 is
 q
ui
ck
, t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
s a
re
 la
rg
e,
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
at
ur
iti
es
 a
re
 sh
or
t.
1.
3.
24
W
he
re
, d
ur
in
g 
a 
re
po
rt
in
g 
pe
rio
d,
 a
 th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 d
ire
ct
ly
 se
ttl
es
 th
e 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 o
f a
n 
en
tit
y 
or
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 g
oo
ds
 a
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 fo
r t
he
 b
en
ef
it 
of
 
th
e 
en
tit
y, 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 in
 se
pa
ra
te
 c
ol
um
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
fa
ce
 o
f t
he
 st
at
em
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts:
(a
) 
to
ta
l p
ay
m
en
ts 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
ird
 p
ar
tie
s w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
 e
nt
ity
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
en
tit
y 
be
lo
ng
s, 
sh
ow
in
g 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 a
 
 
su
b-
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 u
se
s o
f t
ot
al
 p
ay
m
en
ts 
us
in
g 
a 
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
ba
sis
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 to
 th
e 
en
tit
y’s
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
; a
nd
(b
) 
to
ta
l p
ay
m
en
ts 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
ird
 p
ar
tie
s w
hi
ch
 a
re
 n
ot
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
 e
nt
ity
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
en
tit
y 
be
lo
ng
s, 
sh
ow
in
g 
 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 a
 su
b-
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 u
se
s o
f t
ot
al
 p
ay
m
en
ts 
us
in
g 
a 
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
ba
sis
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 to
 th
e 
en
tit
y’s
 o
pe
ra
tio
n.
Su
ch
 d
isc
lo
su
re
 sh
ou
ld
 o
nl
y 
be
 m
ad
e 
w
he
n 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
pe
rio
d 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
ha
s b
ee
n 
fo
rm
al
ly
 a
dv
ise
d 
by
 th
e 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 o
r t
he
 
re
ci
pi
en
t t
ha
t s
uc
h 
pa
ym
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
m
ad
e 
or
 h
as
 o
th
er
w
ise
 v
er
ifi
ed
 th
e 
pa
ym
en
t.
171
A c c e s s  t o  F i s c a l  I n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  A u d i t :  C h a l l e n g e s  a n d  S t r a t e g i e s
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
N
ot
es
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
N
ot
es
1.
3.
30
T
he
 n
ot
es
 to
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
of
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
:
(a
) 
pr
es
en
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 b
as
is 
of
 p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
an
d 
th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
ie
s s
el
ec
te
d 
an
d 
ap
pl
ie
d 
fo
r s
ig
ni
fic
an
t t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 e
ve
nt
s; 
an
d
(b
) 
pr
ov
id
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
ot
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
fa
ce
 o
f t
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
bu
t i
s n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r a
 fa
ir 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
en
tit
y’s
 c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts,
 c
as
h 
pa
ym
en
ts,
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
ba
la
nc
es
.
1.
3.
31
N
ot
es
 to
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 a
 sy
ste
m
at
ic
 m
an
ne
r. 
Ea
ch
 it
em
 o
n 
th
e 
fa
ce
 o
f t
he
 st
at
em
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
an
d 
ot
he
r f
in
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cr
os
s-
re
fe
re
nc
ed
 to
 a
ny
 re
la
te
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
no
te
s.
Se
le
ct
io
n 
an
d 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s
1.
3.
34
T
he
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s s
ec
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
no
te
s t
o 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 d
es
cr
ib
e 
ea
ch
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
y 
th
at
 is
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 fo
r 
a 
pr
op
er
 u
nd
er
sta
nd
in
g 
of
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
ha
s a
pp
lie
d 
an
y 
tr
an
sit
io
na
l p
ro
vi
sio
ns
 in
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
.
G
en
er
al
 C
on
si
de
ra
ti
on
s
A
ut
ho
ri
za
ti
on
 D
at
e
1.
4.
5
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 th
e 
da
te
 w
he
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
w
er
e 
au
th
or
ize
d 
fo
r i
ss
ue
 a
nd
 w
ho
 g
av
e 
th
at
 a
ut
ho
riz
at
io
n.
 If
 a
no
th
er
 b
od
y 
ha
s t
he
 p
ow
er
 to
 a
m
en
d 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
af
te
r i
ss
ua
nc
e,
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 th
at
 fa
ct
.
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In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 E
nt
it
y
1.
4.
7
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
if 
no
t d
isc
lo
se
d 
el
se
w
he
re
 in
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pu
bl
ish
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts:
(a
) 
th
e 
do
m
ic
ile
 a
nd
 le
ga
l f
or
m
 o
f t
he
 e
nt
ity
, a
nd
 th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
w
ith
in
 w
hi
ch
 it
 o
pe
ra
te
s;
(b
) 
a 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 e
nt
ity
’s 
op
er
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 p
rin
ci
pa
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
;
(c
) 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 le
gi
sla
tio
n 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
th
e 
en
tit
y’s
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
, i
f a
ny
; a
nd
(d
) 
th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 a
nd
 th
e 
ul
tim
at
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 o
f t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
 e
nt
ity
 (w
he
re
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
, i
f a
ny
).
R
es
tr
ic
ti
on
s 
on
 C
as
h 
B
al
an
ce
s 
an
d 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 B
or
ro
w
in
gs
1.
4.
9
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 in
 th
e 
no
te
s t
o 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 a
 c
om
m
en
ta
ry
, t
he
 n
at
ur
e 
an
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
f:
(a
) 
sig
ni
fic
an
t c
as
h 
ba
la
nc
es
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fo
r u
se
 b
y 
th
e 
en
tit
y;
(b
) 
sig
ni
fic
an
t c
as
h 
ba
la
nc
es
 th
at
 a
re
 su
bj
ec
t t
o 
ex
te
rn
al
 re
str
ic
tio
ns
; a
nd
(c
) 
un
dr
aw
n 
bo
rr
ow
in
g 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s t
ha
t m
ay
 b
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
fo
r f
ut
ur
e 
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
nd
 to
 se
ttl
e 
ca
pi
ta
l c
om
m
itm
en
ts,
 in
di
ca
tin
g 
an
y 
re
str
ic
tio
ns
 o
n 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 th
es
e 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s.
C
on
si
st
en
cy
 o
f P
re
se
nt
at
io
n
1.
4.
13
T
he
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 it
em
s i
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
ta
in
ed
 fr
om
 o
ne
 p
er
io
d 
to
 th
e 
ne
xt
 u
nl
es
s:
(a
) 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t c
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 e
nt
ity
 o
r a
 re
vi
ew
 o
f i
ts 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
de
m
on
str
at
es
 th
at
 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 w
ill
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 m
or
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 e
ve
nt
s o
r t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
; o
r
(b
) 
a 
ch
an
ge
 in
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
is 
re
qu
ire
d 
by
 a
 fu
tu
re
 a
m
en
dm
en
t t
o 
th
is 
St
an
da
rd
.
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C
om
pa
ra
ti
ve
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
1.
4.
16
U
nl
es
s a
 p
ro
vi
sio
n 
of
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
 p
er
m
its
 o
r r
eq
ui
re
s o
th
er
w
ise
, c
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 re
sp
ec
t o
f t
he
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
pe
rio
d 
fo
r a
ll 
nu
m
er
ic
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
qu
ire
d 
by
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
 to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts,
 e
xc
ep
t i
n 
re
sp
ec
t o
f t
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
sta
te
m
en
ts 
fo
r t
he
 re
po
rt
in
g 
pe
rio
d 
to
 w
hi
ch
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
 is
 fi
rs
t a
pp
lie
d.
 C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 n
ar
ra
tiv
e 
an
d 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
he
n 
it 
is 
re
le
va
nt
 to
 a
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 th
e 
cu
rr
en
t p
er
io
d’
s f
in
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts.
1.
4.
19
W
he
n 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
or
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 it
em
s r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
is 
am
en
de
d,
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
am
ou
nt
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 re
cl
as
sif
ie
d,
 u
nl
es
s i
t i
s i
m
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 to
 d
o 
so
, t
o 
en
su
re
 c
om
pa
ra
bi
lit
y 
w
ith
 th
e 
cu
rr
en
t p
er
io
d,
 a
nd
 th
e 
na
tu
re
, a
m
ou
nt
 o
f, 
an
d 
re
as
on
 fo
r 
an
y 
re
cl
as
sif
ic
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d.
 W
he
n 
it 
is 
im
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 to
 re
cl
as
sif
y 
co
m
pa
ra
tiv
e 
am
ou
nt
s, 
an
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 th
e 
re
as
on
 fo
r 
no
t r
ec
la
ss
ify
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 c
ha
ng
es
 th
at
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 m
ad
e 
if 
am
ou
nt
s w
er
e 
re
cl
as
sif
ie
d.
Id
en
ti
fic
at
io
n 
of
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts
1.
4.
21
T
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
ea
rly
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
an
d 
di
sti
ng
ui
sh
ed
 fr
om
 o
th
er
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
pu
bl
ish
ed
 d
oc
um
en
t.
1.
4.
23
Ea
ch
 c
om
po
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
cl
ea
rly
 id
en
tif
ie
d.
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
om
in
en
tly
 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
an
d 
re
pe
at
ed
 w
he
n 
it 
is 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r a
 p
ro
pe
r u
nd
er
sta
nd
in
g 
of
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
es
en
te
d:
(a
) 
th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
en
tit
y 
or
 o
th
er
 m
ea
ns
 o
f i
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n;
(b
) 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
co
ve
r t
he
 in
di
vi
du
al
 e
nt
ity
 o
r t
he
 e
co
no
m
ic
 e
nt
ity
;
(c
) 
th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
da
te
 o
r t
he
 p
er
io
d 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts,
 w
hi
ch
ev
er
 is
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 to
 th
e 
re
la
te
d 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f t
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
sta
te
m
en
ts;
(d
) 
th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
; a
nd
(e
) 
th
e 
le
ve
l o
f p
re
ci
sio
n 
us
ed
 in
 th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 fi
gu
re
s i
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts.
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C
or
re
ct
io
n 
of
 E
rr
or
s
1.
5.
1
W
he
n 
an
 e
rr
or
 a
ris
es
 in
 re
la
tio
n 
to
 a
 c
as
h 
ba
la
nc
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 in
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts,
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f t
he
 e
rr
or
 th
at
 re
la
te
s t
o 
pr
io
r 
pe
rio
ds
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 b
y 
ad
ju
sti
ng
 th
e 
ca
sh
 a
t t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f t
he
 p
er
io
d.
 C
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
sta
te
d,
 u
nl
es
s i
t i
s 
im
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 to
 d
o 
so
.
1.
5.
2
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 in
 th
e 
no
te
s t
o 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g:
(a
) 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 e
rr
or
;
(b
) 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f t
he
 c
or
re
ct
io
n;
 a
nd
(c
) 
th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ha
s b
ee
n 
re
sta
te
d 
or
 th
at
 it
 is
 im
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 to
 d
o 
so
.
C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts
1.
6.
5
A 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
, o
th
er
 th
an
 a
 c
on
tro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
s 1
.6
.7
 a
nd
 1
.6
.8
, s
ho
ul
d 
iss
ue
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
w
hi
ch
 c
on
so
lid
at
es
 a
ll 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
ie
s, 
fo
re
ig
n 
an
d 
do
m
es
tic
, o
th
er
 th
an
 th
os
e 
re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 in
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
.6
.6
.
1.
6.
6
A 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 fr
om
 c
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
w
he
n 
it 
op
er
at
es
 u
nd
er
 se
ve
re
 e
xt
er
na
l l
on
g-
te
rm
 re
str
ic
tio
ns
 th
at
 p
re
ve
nt
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 fr
om
 b
en
ef
iti
ng
 fr
om
 it
s a
ct
iv
iti
es
.
1.
6.
7
A 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 th
at
 is
 a
 w
ho
lly
 o
w
ne
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
ne
ed
 n
ot
 p
re
se
nt
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
pr
ov
id
ed
 u
se
rs
 o
f s
uc
h 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
ar
e 
un
lik
el
y 
to
 e
xi
st 
or
 th
ei
r i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ne
ed
s a
re
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
’s 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts.
1.
6.
8
A 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 th
at
 is
 v
irt
ua
lly
 w
ho
lly
 o
w
ne
d 
ne
ed
 n
ot
 p
re
se
nt
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
pr
ov
id
ed
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
 o
bt
ai
ns
 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f t
he
 o
w
ne
rs
 o
f t
he
 m
in
or
ity
 in
te
re
st.
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C
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
Pr
oc
ed
ur
es
1.
6.
16
T
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
pp
ly
:
(a
) 
ca
sh
 b
al
an
ce
s a
nd
 c
as
h 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
en
tit
ie
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
el
im
in
at
ed
 in
 fu
ll;
(b
) 
w
he
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
us
ed
 in
 a
 c
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
ar
e 
dr
aw
n 
up
 to
 d
iff
er
en
t r
ep
or
tin
g 
da
te
s, 
ad
ju
stm
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
s o
f s
ig
ni
fic
an
t c
as
h 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 th
at
 h
av
e 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
os
e 
da
te
s a
nd
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f t
he
 c
on
tro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
’s 
fin
an
ci
al
 
sta
te
m
en
ts.
 In
 a
ny
 ca
se,
 th
e d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e r
ep
or
tin
g 
da
te
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 n
o 
m
or
e t
ha
n 
th
re
e m
on
th
s; 
an
d
(c
) 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 u
sin
g 
un
ifo
rm
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s f
or
 li
ke
 c
as
h 
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
. I
f i
t i
s n
ot
 p
ra
ct
ic
ab
le
 
to
 u
se
 u
ni
fo
rm
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s i
n 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts,
 th
at
 fa
ct
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 it
em
s i
n 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
to
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s h
av
e 
be
en
 a
pp
lie
d.
C
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
D
is
cl
os
ur
es
1.
6.
20
T
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 m
ad
e 
in
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts:
(a
) 
lis
tin
g 
of
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
en
tit
ie
s i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
na
m
e,
 th
e 
ju
ris
di
ct
io
n 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
op
er
at
es
 (w
he
n 
it 
is 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
fro
m
 th
at
 o
f t
he
 c
on
tro
lli
ng
 e
nt
ity
); 
an
d
(b
) 
th
e 
re
as
on
s f
or
 n
ot
 c
on
so
lid
at
in
g 
a 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y.
Tr
ea
tm
en
t o
f F
or
ei
gn
 C
ur
re
nc
y 
C
as
h 
R
ec
ei
pt
s,
 P
ay
m
en
ts
, a
nd
 B
al
an
ce
s
1.
7.
2
C
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
ar
isi
ng
 fr
om
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 in
 a
 fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
rd
ed
 in
 a
n 
en
tit
y’s
 re
po
rt
in
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
 b
y 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 
to
 th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 a
m
ou
nt
 th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
 a
nd
 th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 a
t t
he
 d
at
e o
f t
he
 re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts.
1.
7.
3
C
as
h 
ba
la
nc
es
 h
el
d 
in
 a
 fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
po
rt
ed
 u
sin
g 
th
e 
clo
sin
g 
ra
te
.
1.
7.
4
T
he
 c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
ca
sh
 p
ay
m
en
ts 
of
 a
 fo
re
ig
n-
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
tr
an
sla
te
d 
at
 th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
s b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
an
d 
th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 a
t t
he
 d
at
es 
of
 th
e r
ec
eip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts.
1.
7.
5
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
ou
ld
 d
isc
lo
se
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f e
xc
ha
ng
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
cl
ud
ed
 a
s r
ec
on
ci
lin
g 
ite
m
s b
et
w
ee
n 
op
en
in
g 
an
d 
cl
os
in
g 
ca
sh
 b
al
an
ce
s f
or
 
th
e 
pe
rio
d.
1.
7.
6
W
he
n 
th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
 is
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
cu
rr
en
cy
 o
f t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
is 
do
m
ic
ile
d,
 th
e 
re
as
on
 fo
r u
sin
g 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d.
 T
he
 re
as
on
 fo
r a
ny
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
e 
re
po
rt
in
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
 sh
ou
ld
 a
lso
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d.
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Pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f B
ud
ge
t I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts
Pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f a
 C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
of
 B
ud
ge
t a
nd
 A
ct
ua
l A
m
ou
nt
s
1.
9.
8
Su
bj
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts 
of
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
.9
.1
7,
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
th
at
 m
ak
es
 p
ub
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
its
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
bu
dg
et
(s
) s
ha
ll 
pr
es
en
t a
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 
of
 th
e 
bu
dg
et
 a
m
ou
nt
s f
or
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 h
el
d 
pu
bl
ic
ly
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
 a
nd
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s e
ith
er
 a
s a
 se
pa
ra
te
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
t o
r 
as
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 b
ud
ge
t c
ol
um
ns
 in
 th
e 
sta
te
m
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
cu
rr
en
tly
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 th
is 
St
an
da
rd
. T
he
 
co
m
pa
ris
on
 o
f b
ud
ge
t a
nd
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s s
ha
ll 
pr
es
en
t s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
fo
r e
ac
h 
le
ve
l o
f l
eg
isl
at
iv
e 
ov
er
sig
ht
:
(a
) 
T
he
 o
rig
in
al
 a
nd
 fi
na
l b
ud
ge
t a
m
ou
nt
s;
(b
) 
T
he
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s o
n 
a 
co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
ba
sis
; a
nd
(c
) 
By
 w
ay
 o
f n
ot
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
, a
n 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
of
 m
at
er
ia
l d
iff
er
en
ce
s b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
 fo
r w
hi
ch
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
is 
he
ld
 p
ub
lic
ly
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
 
an
d 
ac
tu
al
 a
m
ou
nt
s, 
un
le
ss
 su
ch
 e
xp
la
na
tio
n 
is 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 o
th
er
 p
ub
lic
 d
oc
um
en
ts 
iss
ue
d 
in
 c
on
ju
nc
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts,
 
an
d 
a 
cr
os
s-
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 th
os
e 
do
cu
m
en
ts 
is 
m
ad
e 
in
 th
e 
no
te
s.
Pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
1.
9.
17
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
al
l p
re
se
nt
 a
 c
om
pa
ris
on
 o
f b
ud
ge
t a
nd
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s a
s a
dd
iti
on
al
 b
ud
ge
t c
ol
um
ns
 in
 th
e 
sta
te
m
en
t o
f c
as
h 
re
ce
ip
ts 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts 
on
ly
 w
he
re
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
an
d 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
 a
re
 p
re
pa
re
d 
on
 a
 c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
ba
sis
.
C
ha
ng
es
 fr
om
 O
ri
gi
na
l t
o 
Fi
na
l B
ud
ge
t
1.
9.
23
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
al
l p
re
se
nt
 a
n 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
of
 w
he
th
er
 c
ha
ng
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 a
nd
 fi
na
l b
ud
ge
t a
re
 a
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f r
ea
llo
ca
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
bu
dg
et
, o
r o
f o
th
er
 fa
ct
or
s, 
ei
th
er
:
(a
) 
by
 w
ay
 o
f n
ot
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 in
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts;
 o
r
(b
) 
in
 a
 re
po
rt
 is
su
ed
 b
ef
or
e,
 a
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e 
as
, o
r i
n 
co
nj
un
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts,
 a
nd
 sh
al
l i
nc
lu
de
 a
 c
ro
ss
-r
ef
er
en
ce
 to
 th
e 
 
re
po
rt
 in
 th
e 
no
te
s t
o 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts.
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C
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
B
as
is
1.
9.
25
Al
l c
om
pa
ris
on
s o
f b
ud
ge
t a
nd
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s s
ha
ll 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 o
n 
a 
co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
ba
sis
 to
 th
e 
bu
dg
et
.
N
ot
e 
D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 o
f B
ud
ge
ta
ry
 B
as
is
, P
er
io
d,
 a
nd
 S
co
pe
1.
9.
33
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
al
l e
xp
la
in
 in
 n
ot
es
 to
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
ar
y 
ba
sis
 a
nd
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
ba
sis
 a
do
pt
ed
 in
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
ud
ge
t.
1.
9.
37
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
al
l d
isc
lo
se
 in
 n
ot
es
 to
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
of
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
ud
ge
t.
1.
9.
3
An
 e
nt
ity
 sh
al
l i
de
nt
ify
 in
 n
ot
es
 to
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
th
e 
en
tit
ie
s i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 th
e 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
ud
ge
t.
R
ec
on
ci
lia
ti
on
 o
f A
ct
ua
l A
m
ou
nt
s 
on
 a
 C
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
B
as
is
 a
nd
 A
ct
ua
l A
m
ou
nt
s 
in
 th
e 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
ta
te
m
en
ts
1.
9.
41
T
he
 a
ct
ua
l a
m
ou
nt
s p
re
se
nt
ed
 o
n 
a 
co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
ba
sis
 to
 th
e 
bu
dg
et
 in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
w
ith
 p
ar
ag
ra
ph
 1
.9
.2
5 
sh
al
l, 
w
he
re
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
an
d 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
 a
re
 n
ot
 p
re
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Annex 2
Fiduciary Risks and Potential Safeguards
Table A.2
Fiduciary Risks and Potential Safeguards
BUDGET EXECUTION
Process Weaknesses Likely Impact Potential 
Safeguards
Long-term 
Solutions
Expenditure 
with year is 
controlled
In-year financial 
reporting is late/
or inaccurate
Mismanagement 
risks; failure 
to meet 
performance 
objectives
Strengthen 
government 
accounting and 
reporting
Develop and 
apply appropriate 
accounting 
procedures
Failure to adhere 
to budget 
discipline 
through 
overspending or 
viring of funds
Unfunded 
liabilities which 
have to be met 
from the next 
year’s budget 
or by reducing 
service delivery; 
failure to meet 
policy objectives
Control and 
monitoring of 
commitments 
and arrears; 
centralize control 
over payments
Strengthen 
internal audit 
functions; 
monitor 
and enforce 
compliance 
with financial 
instructions
Release of funds 
from treasury to 
spending units is 
unpredictable
Adverse 
impact on the 
availability 
and quality of 
public services; 
credibility of 
the budget is 
undermined
Modify 
disbursements 
to help smooth 
out uneven 
government cash 
flow
Improve/
introduce cash 
flow forecasting
Idle cash balances Reduction 
in resources 
available for 
service delivery
Monitor cash 
balances and 
reduce rate of 
disbursement 
if funds are not 
being used
Rationalize bank 
account structure
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Process Weaknesses Likely Impact Potential 
Safeguards
Long-term 
Solutions
Reporting of 
expenditure 
is timely and 
accurate
Failure to 
reconcile fiscal 
and bank records
Risk of 
overspending 
being 
uncontrolled 
leading to 
unplanned 
and arbitrary 
cuts in public 
expenditues
Introduce 
improved 
manual reporting 
procedures 
Automate 
government 
accounting 
systems
Final audited 
accounts late
Uncertainty 
whether or not 
funds have been 
used effectively
External 
assistance to 
help prepare 
government 
accounts to 
clear backlogs 
in key budget 
departments
Monitor 
and enforce 
compliance 
with financial 
instructions
Basic accounting 
records are 
not accurately 
maintained
Late or non-
existent in-year 
financial 
reporting; 
uncertainty 
whether funds 
have been used 
for intended 
purposes; 
increased 
risk that 
mismanagement 
and fraud remain 
undetected
External 
assistance to 
help prepare 
government 
accounts to 
clear backlogs 
in key budget 
departments
Develop and 
apply accounting 
procedures
Expenditure 
reporting does 
not provide 
information 
about outputs/
outcomes
Problems 
assessing 
impact of 
expenditures and 
targeting future 
expenditures on 
sectoral programs
Expenditure 
tracking surveys
Revise account 
code structures 
to support 
programmatic 
approach to 
budgeting and 
reporting
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INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
Process Weaknesses Likely Impact Potential 
Safeguards
Long-term 
Solutions
Effective 
Independent 
Scrutiny of 
Government 
Expenditure
Supreme audit 
institution 
is either not 
resourced or not 
empowered to 
conduct effective 
scrutiny
Government 
not held to 
account for its 
stewardship of 
public funds; 
increased riks of 
mismanagement 
and fraud
Increased 
independent 
auditing of 
government 
spending
Strengthening 
capacity and 
independence of 
Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAI)
Source: Department for International Development (DFID). 2002. “Managing Fiduciary Risk When 
Providing Direct Budget Support.” London: DFID.
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Annex 3
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency:
Integrity, Control, and Accountability47
Accounting Policies
 A summary of relevant account polices should accompany all reports. These should describe 
the basis of accounting applied (e.g., cash, accrual) in preparing the reports and disclose any 
deviations from generally accepted accounting practices.
 The same accounting practices should be used for all ﬁscal reports.
 If a change in accounting is required, then the nature of the change and the reasons for the 
change should be fully disclosed. 
 Information for previous reporting period should be adjusted, as practicable, to allow 
comparisons to be made between reporting periods.
Systems and Responsibilities
 A dynamic system or internal ﬁnancial controls, including internal audit, should be in place 
to assure the integrity provided in the reports.
 Each report should contain a statement of responsibility by the Finance Minister and the 
Senior Oﬃcial responsible for producing the report.
 The Minister certiﬁes that all government decisions with a ﬁscal impact have been included 
in the report.
 The Senior Oﬃcial certiﬁes that the Finance Minister has used his/her best professional 
judgment in producing the report.
Audit
 The year-end report should be audited by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing practices.
 Audit reports prepared by the SAI should be scrutinized by the Parliament.
Public and Parliamentary Scrutiny
 Parliament should have the opportunity and the resources to examine eﬀectively any ﬁscal 
report that it deems necessary.
 The Finance Ministry should actively promote an understanding of the process by individual 
citizens and non-governmental organizations.
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Notes
1 The deﬁnition of accrual basis accounting according to International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSAS) is: A basis of accounting under which transactions and other 
events are recognized when they occur (and not only when cash or its equivalent is paid). Therefore, 
the transactions and events are recorded in the accounting record and recognized in the ﬁnancial 
statements of the periods to which they relate. The elements recognized under accrual accounting 
are assets, liabilities, net assets/equity, revenue, and expenses.
2 Only the ﬁrst three objectives are met by cash-based government accounting systems.
3 See International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), Financial Reporting by National 
Governments, March 1991.
4 The International Federation of Accountants issues accounting standards for the public 
sector. These standards are referred to as International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
(IPSAS). 
5 The Chart of Accounts must be designed in a collaborative manner between the budget and 
accounting departments. 
6 A chart of accounts is a listing of all accounts in the general ledger, each account accompa-
nied by a speciﬁc reference number. To establish a chart of account, one needs to deﬁne the 
various accounts to be used by the local government. Each account should have a number to 
identify it. For small local self-governments three (3) digit level account numbers may suﬃce 
as an account identiﬁer. With more digits, new accounts may be added while maintaining 
the logical order. 
7 See Hogye, Mihaly and Charles McFerren. 2002. “Local Government Budgeting: The CEE 
Experience.” In: Mihaly Hogye (ed.). Local Government Budgeting. Budapest: Open Society 
Institute. p. 51.
8 Regardless of the accounting system used (accrual or cash basis), it is essential that local 
government ﬁnancial accounts be timely and accurate.
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9 For a more detailed discussion, see Michael Schaeﬀer. 2000. “Municipal Budgeting Toolkit.” 
World Bank. 
10 See Annex 1: Overview of Cash-basis IPSAS.
11 Cash-basis accounting has serious limitations because it does not adequately record liabilities, 
either to provide future services or in recognition of services or goods received for which the 
bill has not been paid.
12 All accounting systems must include such cash records, but cash journals and ledgers by 
themselves do not constitute accounting or budgeting systems. This is because cash records 
do not indicate the time period to which a given transaction relates. The cash from receipt 
of a prior year receivable cannot be distinguished from receipt of revenues due for the ﬁrst 
time, nor can disbursement on an expenditure account incurred this year be distinguished 
from a liability held over unpaid from the prior year.
13 Accrued means appropriately accounted for assets and liabilities. For example, in cash 
accounting, if there is an unpaid invoice at the end of an accounting period in which a 
credit transaction occurred, and no accrual is made, the transaction is not recognized for 
accounting purposes until the invoiced amount is paid, in a subsequent period to that when 
the transaction event occurred.
14 Sources of quotation: For Croatia: Kraft, Evan and Tihomir Strucka. 2002. Fiscal 
Consolidation, External Competitiveness and Monetary Policy: A Reply to the WIIW. May. 
Zagreb: Croatian National Bank. pg. 1.; For United States: US Government. 2002. 2001 
Financial Report of the United States Government. Washington, D.C., p. 1.
15 Accrual reporting recognizes expenses incurred during the year, even if the expenses were 
not paid for, and links the annual ﬁnancial statement directly with changes in assets and 
liabilities in the local government’s ﬁnancial position.
16 Obviously, there are relatively few revenues that can be accrued in the technical sense—prop-
erty taxes, some franchise taxes, and ﬁscal aid. Revenues not susceptible to accrual are in 
practice booked as cash received. It is important that accurate distinction be made between 
current year, prior year, and future year transactions.
17 There are two means of establishing reserve accounts. One is to establish these accounts 
at the beginning of the ﬁscal year, when the budget anticipations and appropriations are 
entered as controls for the budgetary accounts. The other is to establish or adjust reserves 
during, at the end, or after the close of the ﬁscal year.
18 Accrual accounting remains a distant goal for many national, state, and local govern-
ments.
19 The OECD countries that appropriate resources on an accrual basis include Australia, 
Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand.
20 Matheson, Alex. 2002. “Better Public Sector Governance: The Rationale for Budgeting and 
Accounting Reform in Western Nations.” OECD Journal on Budgeting Vol 2(1), December. 
pp. 44–45.
21 See Haven, Harry. 1999. “Management Controls, Audit and Evaluation.” In: Shiavo-Caompo 
and Daniel Tommasi. Managing Government Expenditure. Manila: ADB.
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22 European Court of Auditors. 1998. European Implementing Guidelines for the INTOSAI 
Auditing Standards.
23 Conversely, where public integrity (or ﬁscal discipline) is a major concern, then manage-
ment control systems that allow discretion without suﬃcient accountability can also be 
problematic.
24 See Russell-Einhorn, Malcolm. 2004. “Creating and Implementing a Local Transparency 
Initiative” Local Government Brief. p. 24.
25 In this case, impact and consequence can be used interchangeably.
26 It is far too simplistic to attribute the problem to a general unwillingness on the part of 
government treasuries to relinquish control. The real problem is that there are fundamental 
limitations upon the application of a business template to tax-ﬁnanced government depart-
ments. 
27 Premchand, A. 2001. “Fiscal Transparency and Accountability: Idea and Reality” Paper 
prepared for the workshop on Financial Management and Accountability, Rome. p. 10.
28 IFAC is an organization of national professional accountancy organizations. IFAC issues 
international standards and guidance in six areas: auditing and related services, education, 
ethics, ﬁnancial and management accounting, information technology, and public sector 
accounting. It has also issued an international code of ethics.
29 INTOSAI is the professional organization of 185 Supreme Audit Institutions. INTOSAI 
has adopted “Guidelines on Auditing Precepts,” the so-called “Lima Declaration,” which 
provides institutional principles for SAIs. These principles address inter alia: the importance 
of audit to sound management of public funds; the audit objectives of legality, economy, 
eﬃciency, and eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial management; and the requirement for independence 
of the SAI and staﬀ.
30 By using strategic audits, the SAI can identify and remedy internal control weaknesses.
31 Some SAIs have gone beyond the traditional performance (value for money) audit focus.
32 For a more thorough review please see Haven, Harry. 1999. “Management Controls, Audit 
and Evaluation.” In: Shiavo-Caompo, S. and Daniel Tommasi. Managing Government 
Expenditure. Manila: ADB.
33 See Annex 2: Fiduciary Risks and Potential Safeguards for improved understanding with 
respect to how ﬁnancial reporting and auditing systems can be improved.
34 Shiavo-Caompo and Tommasi. Op. cit. 
35 Separation of duties is an essential element in almost every ﬁnancial control system.
36 The internal auditor should not be involved in the internal control process that he is required 
to assess. 
37 This section is largely derived from Haven, Harry. Op. cit.
38 Auditors can only audit that which they can observe. If the auditor is allowed to review only 
limited entity records, the audit itself may be rendered meaningless.
39 Ibid. p. 14
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40 See Annex 3: OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency: Integrity, Control, and 
Accountability for list of best practice measures.
41 Ibid. p. 35.
42 The IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) is a specialized system of public sector 
ﬁnancial reporting designed to support public sector analysis. The IMF designed GFS so 
that government ﬁnancial information could be compared across countries.
43 Robinson, Marc. 2001. “The Treatment of Revaluations in Accrual-Based Government 
Accounts.” Journal of Accounting, Accountability, and Performance. Vol. 7(2)
44 OECD. 2002 Accrual Accounting and Budgeting: Key Issues and Recent Developments. Paris: 
OECD.
45 Please see World Bank. 2007. “Kosovo: Preparation of Accounting Manual for KCB.” 
Prepared by PDP Australian Consultancy. Volumes I, II, II. This annexure represents an 
abridged version of the information presented in this very detailed manual. 
46 Based on the International Public Sector Accounting Standard, “Financial Reporting Under 
the Cash Basis of Accounting,” issued January 2003 and updated 2006.
47 OECD. 2001.
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A b s t r a c t
One of the most obvious areas of corruption is where national and local governments 
directly interact with businesses. Within the expanding market environment public actors 
meet the private sector through the promotion of economic development and by purchasing 
goods and services. Within the overall framework of accountability, both grand and petty 
corruption can be controlled by improvement of the overall regulatory framework (the “long 
route”) and by increasing the direct influence of service users (“short route”).
In local economic development the risk of corruption is higher when the procedure for 
getting various permits, mostly for starting businesses, is longer. Governments also provide 
support for businesses; however, the direct intervention to market mechanisms is going 
through a transformation. Indirect means of economic development have proved to be 
more efficient and at the same time they lower the opportunities for corruption.
Public entities purchase goods and services in various forms: buying supplies and equip-
ment, contracting for public service provision under simple arrangements, or through more 
complex models, like concessions or build-operate-transfer schemes. The risk of corruption 
is higher with large, unique projects. Lessons on the various techniques of service provision 
within New Public Management schemes are that anti-corruption policies should focus on 
the early, planning, and project-design stages of tendering. This chapter summarizes how 
various combined techniques and actions will enhance the general accountability in public 
and private sector cooperation in sector cooperation.
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1. Introduction
One of the most obvious areas of corruption is where governments meet businesses 
directly. Both national and local governments manage public functions in a market 
environment that can oﬀer opportunities for fraudulent actions. For ﬁnding the systemic 
causes of corruption in this area, ﬁrst the basic characteristics of this relationship have 
to be identiﬁed. 
There are two typical areas, where public actors directly cooperate with the private 
sector. 
 1. Governments are involved in economic development. Despite the reduced direct 
inﬂuence of national and local budgets on privatized companies, governments 
remain responsible for economic development. In transition countries where the 
legacy of the command economy still prevails, mayors, councilors, and ministers 
are usually interested in promoting inward investment: they support small- and 
medium-size enterprises that are intended to improve local employment.
 2. Secondly and more importantly, governments cooperate with the private sector 
by acquiring goods and services and by ordering public services. Governments 
purchase goods and services from the private sector directly. In general, public 
procurement rules apply for buying basic products, but some services (e.g., 
in some countries, ﬁnancial services) are not the subjects of these regulations. 
More complex forms of contracts or partnership agreements might be also left 
out from the standard public procurement procedures, especially when govern-
ment-owned business entities are involved in service provision. 
Since the 1980s, contracting out practices and various forms of public-private partner-
ship (PPP) have been used widely in Europe. The economic rationale behind the develop-
ment of New Public Management techniques was the utilization of market incentives 
and private capital for public beneﬁt. Alternative service delivery arrangements of various 
kinds aimed at improving service eﬃciency and access to public services. Beyond the 
sophisticated schemes in communal, utility, infrastructure, and human services, speciﬁc 
forms of public private partnerships have been designed in urban development as well. 
These complicated methods are used extensively by the public sector, and as a result the 
need for ﬁscal transparency is greater than before.
2. Routes of Accountability
All these forms of cooperation between public and private actors have been signiﬁcantly 
transformed during the past two decades. From a ﬁscal transparency point of view, there 
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are two types of challenges: how to deal with grand corruption and what to do with petty 
bribery. Grand corruption originates from a shortfall in government policymaking and 
in the priority-setting process. As the demand for public services is ever increasing, the 
basic question is, whether the planned project or service is really needed or not. 
Both politicians and private contractors are interested in large capital investment 
programs, highly visible improvements in service provision. But if these projects go 
beyond the means of the government, then they create excess or unused capacities and 
consequently may cause ﬁnancial losses. Petty corruption might occur throughout the 
entire contracting process and it is about the everyday meaning of the terms bribery 
and corruption. 
Risks of these two types of losses can be minimized by better understanding the rela-
tionship between the various actors involved in these service delivery arrangements and 
by creating strong control mechanisms. There are three basic actors in service provision: 
the state, the clients as service beneﬁciaries, and the service organizations (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. 
Actors and Routes of Accountability in Service Provision
Source: World Development Report 2004.
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Starting with the government as a key actor within this framework of service 
provision, there are two critical lines of relationships from an accountability perspec-
tive. Firstly, national and local governments are accountable towards citizens, as voters 
and constituents. Citizens are able to control public actors through various political 
mechanisms and by expressing their opinion in other ways. Through accountable govern-
ments, they might inﬂuence the relationship between the governments and the service 
organizations. This “long route of accountability” is completed by the compact between 
local governments and their service providers.
The compact includes not only the speciﬁc contract with the service organization, 
but the regulatory system as well. Under the New Public Management model the public 
sector’s role has been transformed: bearing responsibility for service provision does not 
necessarily mean that public entities have to produce these services themselves. The split 
between the client government and the contractor created an environment with new 
roles and responsibilities. The separation of these two functions increases the need for 
transparency and for new accountability mechanisms. (This will be discussed later.)
Within this triangle the relationship between the service beneﬁciaries and the service 
producers also has been transformed. Parallel to the extended use of market-based 
ﬁnancing mechanisms—e.g., user charges—the customers became more important 
actors in service provision. The “short route of accountability” between the client and 
the service provider creates new opportunities for direct control and transparency. 
Customers’ diverse demands have to be met by those service organizations that earlier 
served only the average, typical users. A higher dependence on the clients’ payment 
raised the need for better information ﬂow. From a transparency point of view, the direct 
relationship between the service organization and customers created new opportunities 
for corruption. 
In this complex relationship of public and private actors the goal of ﬁscal transpar-
ency remained the same: decrease monopoly power, control the discretionary power of 
the authorities, and improve the accountability mechanisms. All these institutions and 
procedures have to be adjusted to the local culture and ethics of a given country and a 
speciﬁc municipality. 
3. Economic Development
Businesses of various types—private entrepreneurs, small-size enterprises, large compa-
nies—meet public authorities for various reasons. There are legal, administrative, and 
ﬁnancial connections toward local administration and national government agencies. 
These contacts oﬀer various options for corruption and bribes. According to business 
surveys, corruption frequently happens with entrepreneurs, who consider this additional 
payment as a way to “oil the machinery” of the administration (Table 1).
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 Table 1. 
“Oiling the Machine”: Additional Payments in Transition Countries [Percent]
How Frequently Is the 
Following Statement True?
Always Mostly Frequently Sometimes Seldom Never 
Firms in my line of business 
usually know in advance how much 
the “additional payment” is.
10.0 24.0 13.8 22.7 16.2 13.3
If a firm makes an “additional 
payment,” the service is delivered 
as agreed.
21.7 39.6 14.9 14.7 6.0 3.1
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/.
Bribes are paid frequently and for a number of reasons. Most of the unoﬃcial 
payments are made for obtaining licenses and business permits. Tax collectors and 
customs oﬃcers also beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from these payments. Government contracts 
are also among the signiﬁcant illegal expenditure items for businesses (Table 2).
Table 2.
Purposes of Unoﬃcial Payments in Transition Countries
Of the Total Unofficial Payments per Annum, 
What Percentage Would Be Spent for the Following Purpose? 
Respondents Who Pay 
More Than 0–10 Percent1 
To get licenses and permits 49.2%
To deal with taxes and tax collection 55.2%
To gain government contracts 68.5%
To deal with customs and imports 69.2%
To get connection to public services 76.3%
To deal with the courts 78.6%
To deal with health/fire inspectors 81.1%
Other important unofficial payments 92.9%
To influence the content of new laws, decrees, and regulations 93.3%
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps/.
The largest share of unoﬃcial payments (bribes) is made to obtain various licenses, 
typically for starting businesses. The risk of corruption is higher, when the procedure for 
getting these permits is longer. Table 3 illustrates that in OECD countries various govern-
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ment licenses are coordinated (i.e., one-stop shopping), so the number of steps to be 
taken by the businesses are only six, unlike, for example, in poor Sub-Saharan African 
countries, where it is almost double. Consequently, the time required for starting a new 
business is much longer, three to four times more, than in leading OECD countries 
(the longest in Latin America). 
Table 3. 
Starting a Business
Regions Procedures [Number] Duration [Days]
OECD countries 6.2 16.6
South Asia 7.9 32.5
East Asia & Pacific 8.2 46.3
Europe & Central Asia 9.4 32
Latin America & Caribbean 10.2 73.3
Middle East & North Africa 10.3 40.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.1 61.8
Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org.
The more discretion that is given to authorities, the higher the chances of corrup-
tion. Recently, government reforms promote the establishment of one-stop-shops for 
dealing with businesses as customers. One-stop-shops are primarily directed at making 
administrative procedures more eﬃcient by coordinating back oﬃce activities and 
providing one access point. However, this internal reorganization of the administration 
has positive side eﬀects, in that one-stop-shops decrease the opportunity for personal 
meetings between bureaucrats and applicants, and thereby reduce the opportunity for 
corruption. Even in countries like Kazakhstan, which is ranked high on the pay of 
unoﬃcial payments, this was one of the aims of introducing one-stop-shops in city 
administration (Serban 2006).
3.1 Changing Techniques of LED
The methods and focus of local economic development are also going through a gradual 
change. Traditional means of the public sector for promoting economic development 
were primarily the provision of direct beneﬁts to investors. They are speciﬁc tax exemp-
tions, tax breaks, government subsidies, provision of land, etc. These instruments 
proved to be least eﬃcient from an economic point of view, as they distorted the general 
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economic conditions and created wrong incentives for businesses. As they were about 
speciﬁc support to selected companies and entrepreneurs, they tended to increase the 
risks of corruption.
However, the current emphasis with respect to economic development is on 
improving the overall conditions of economic development and establishing an open 
relationship with all businesses. When all economic actors enjoy the beneﬁts of infra-
structure services, only then will the local economy develop. In addition, this shift in 
government policies towards businesses results in greater transparency.
The main objectives of economic development policies are as follows:
 a) Local governments should play an integrative role in local business development. 
Working in a market environment, municipalities have to harmonize the interest 
of the business community, the goals of non-governmental and civic organiza-
tions, and the general public. Local businesses should be supported through 
indirect means, by establishing better infrastructure, high quality education, 
good living conditions, and eﬀective city marketing.
 b) Local governments’ conﬁdence towards local businesses and entrepreneurs should 
be achieved. Small- and medium-size enterprises are important actors in the 
locality as service providers, employers, and tax payers, and they have signiﬁcant 
inﬂuence on public opinion. Local governments, with their administrative func-
tions, public services, and budgets, might have an impact on local businesses. 
Techniques and methods of this strategic partnership are crucial for establishing 
a business friendly environment.
 c) Public and private functions should be separated. Local government is a public 
entity, so it must not be involved directly in proﬁt-making activities. Often 
lacking suﬃcient public revenues for funding public services, local governments 
are attempting to launch proﬁt-making activities. However, public bodies are 
not risk-taking entities; they usually have no decision-making and management 
capacity required for running proﬁt-making businesses. 
These policy objectives cannot be implemented without inputs from the private 
sector. As a result, opportunities for corruption will be lower, but only when governments 
set the general conditions and regulate the rules for connecting to businesses. Generally 
used methods of incorporating private resources for public sector development are the 
impact fee and the special assessment or betterment tax (Bland 1989).
 1. An impact fee is paid by the users of urban infrastructure and public services. 
The economic rationale behind the impact fee is that capital improvements are 
needed for servicing additional users. The collection of these revenues should 
be accumulated in separate funds, ensuring their targeted use. 
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 2. A special assessment on property, betterment tax, or a planning gain supplement 
is aimed to collect revenues from beneﬁciaries of infrastructure development, 
changes in urban plan or zoning. 
In countries with underdeveloped property taxation and urban planning systems, 
impact fees are more widely used. They are paid in return for getting building permits 
or special business licenses. They are in the form of “voluntary contributions” paid by 
businesses and they often are negotiated between governments and the companies. If 
these payments are designed in a non-transparent way and the administration enjoys 
high discretion in levying or renegotiating the impact fees, then there are greater risks 
for corruption. 
In summary, economic development is an important task of national and local 
governments. However, the rules of supporting businesses are changing. The former 
techniques, which directly intervened to market mechanisms, have been transformed. 
Indirect means of economic development have proved to be more eﬃcient and at the 
same time they lower the opportunities for corruption.
4. Procurement, Contracting Out, and Public-private Partnerships
The other area of private sector involvement in public service production has several 
forms. Governments and public entities purchase goods and services of various types, 
ranging from oﬃce supplies to military equipment. In this section public procurement 
will be discussed together with other forms of obtaining public services from the private 
sector, as the actors and the procedures are similar. 
Contracts for public service provision are often called alternative service delivery 
arrangements. They might vary from simple contracting out practices to more complex 
models, like concessions or build-operate-transfer schemes. The main reasons for using 
the private entities are various. Generally, these types of service arrangements are devel-
oped on the grounds of New Public Management. Within this framework:
  Private sector incentives are targeted to ensure more eﬃcient use of the available 
resources in the public sector. 
  A lack of resources and budget restrictions also urge the governments to involve 
private funds in the capital-intensive public services; consequently, the use of 
private service organizations is sector speciﬁc. 
  Labor intensive services (e.g., cleaning, park maintenance) are typically 
contracted out, while in water management, energy provision, and municipal 
solid waste collection and deposition, where huge capital investments are needed, 
the more sophisticated PPP (public-private partnership) methods are used. 
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This model of public service provision is a lucrative business for the private sector. 
It provides stable revenue ﬂow either directly from public funds, or through user 
charges. Service organizations will be in a monopolistic position for the duration of 
the contract. All these advantages of working with governments may increase the risk 
of corruption. 
On the government’s side, cooperation with the private sector is not always easily 
justiﬁed. Beyond the ﬁscal advantages of private production of services, there are 
several limitations to working with the private sector. Elected politicians working 
under ﬁscal pressure urge improvements in public services by using private funds. The 
danger is that governments can be captured by private sector contracts, as they enjoy 
short-term gains, but might suﬀer long-term losses. Also, politicians might be biased 
towards new large investments, deferring maintenance and rehabilitation of existing 
facilities and equipment. The public sector might be caught by a signed contract, 
when the tasks or the service performance have to be modiﬁed. Long-term contracts 
risk optimistic projections on the level of future inﬂation or on the estimated discount 
rates as well. 
An accidental consequence of private sector involvement in public service provision 
is corruption. According to the World Bank estimates, 20 to 40 percent of water sector 
ﬁnances are lost to dishonest and corrupt practices.2 But corruption does not happen only 
between the public and private actors.3 It might occur also within the public sector, when 
permits are issued, the locations of water facilities are selected, and accusations about 
pollution are silenced. In some countries with centralized communal services provision, 
utility company management positions are part of the political spoil system.
So contracting out practices and public-private partnership schemes are exposed 
to various types of corruption. It is not always an exchange of cash, but other social 
advantages (which can be later transformed to ﬁnancial beneﬁts). Active and passive 
forms of corruption happen in the public sector, both on a large scale and as petty but 
frequent corruption. Prevention of frauds and bribes requires better understanding of 
these forms of service delivery and the procedures of contract award.
4.1 Alternative Service Delivery Arrangements
Cooperation between the public sector and private entities takes various forms. Starting 
with the simplest one, contracting out happens when a public service is implemented 
by a non-state actor. Depending on the characteristics of the service, either business 
entities or non-proﬁt organizations can be contracted usually for medium or longer 
periods. In more complicated cases not only the operation and management tasks are 
contracted out, but capital investments are also part of the agreement (see examples 
below). That is, private investors make improvements in the service conditions and they 
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are compensated by the revenue ﬂow from the client or through the charges collected 
directly from the users. 
During the past two decades “build-operate-transfer” (BOT) schemes have been 
developed in various forms, transferring back to government the assets after an agreed 
period. These BOT and leasing agreements in utility, communal, and human services were 
further developed as public-private partnership schemes. PPPs involve various actors and 
they are usually used for more complex forms of cooperation with the private sector. 
The classic PPP model is organized around a project company with diverse owner-
ship forms—but primarily initiated by the government or a public agency. As capital 
investments are also subjects of the partnership, banks and construction companies 
are involved in the PPP schemes. The other actors are the operator of the facility and 
obviously the users themselves. Some of the actors presented in Figure 2 might be the 
same in speciﬁc deals (e.g., the contractor and the operator) or these schemes could be 
further reﬁned (e.g., there are several sources of ﬁnancing, not just the banks). 
Figure 2. 
Actors and Financial Flow in PPP Schemes
The introduction of public-private partnership schemes of various types require 
legal conditions. First of all, the regulations should authorize the client government to 
provide services of general public interest by non-state actors. For establishing a market 
for these contracted services, they have to be made compulsory (e.g., no other methods 
of waste management are allowed). As the users are the primary sources of ﬁnancing, 
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the level of user charges and methods of revenue administration have to be legislated. 
As there are public contracts with the private sector, regulations on procurement and 
contracting should be known as well. All these tasks require improved administrative 
and management capacity at the client governments. 
These complicated forms of service delivery oﬀer various opportunities for corrup-
tion. Not only the direct relationship with the private sector during the implementa-
tion and operation, but at the project planning and design stage, too. Simpler forms of 
contracting out, for example, with NGOs, have some risks on the government’s side, 
when selective partnerships and individual deals are made with politically supported 
organizations, which is also a form of corruption. 
However, large projects are more open to corruption for several reasons (see Cavil 
and Sohail 2007):
 1. Large and unique projects inﬂate the claims and make comparison of oﬀers 
more diﬃcult. 
 2. Complex projects increase the number of contractual links, number of phases 
of project implementation, and hide the responsibilities. All of these factors 
lead to a higher risks of bribes.
 3. In large-scale projects, where contactors from various industries are involved, 
several professional self-regulatory mechanisms and rules have to be followed, 
which makes their application harder.
So in the case of alternative service delivery arrangements, the most critical compo-
nents of the contracting process have to be designed in a way that minimizes the 
corruption risks. 
4.2 Stages of Tendering and Contracting
Large-scale infrastructure projects, like in water provision, sanitation, or municipal solid 
waste management can be divided into several steps (USAID 2006; Shordt et al. 2006). 
From a transparency point of view, six stages of tendering and contracting were identiﬁed 
below. They are adaptable to simple public procurement actions as well. Governments 
and contractors, going through these critical steps, might limit corruption risks, if they 
are aware of these factors.
4.2.1 Project Planning 
Basic public services, like water or energy supply, are high on the national and local 
governments’ agenda. But an investment project supporting priority services does not 
necessarily mean that it should be large and technically complicated. So the ﬁrst task 
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to avoid grand corruption is to minimize the chances of unnecessary investments, the so-
called “white elephant projects.” Service contracts should avoid creaming oﬀ, that is 
letting the most proﬁtable parts of the service to private entities and leaving the most 
expensive ones in the hands of the government (e.g., dividing the city by population 
density for municipal solid waste collection contracts).
The selection of appropriate and low-cost technologies also would require careful 
ﬁnancial planning and cost-beneﬁt analysis. In the case of infrastructure projects partially 
ﬁnanced by user charges, aﬀordability of the service delivery arrangements and the 
necessary subsidies for the poor have to assessed, too. Otherwise, technical designers 
and politicians, who are also interested in highly visible, large-scale projects might easily 
make deals at the users’ expenses. 
When capital investments are part of the partnership agreements, ownership of 
assets should be clariﬁed in the planning stage. This includes separation of rights and 
obligations on using buildings, equipment, machinery, and vehicles. It should go 
with the regulation on maintenance standards, accounting for amortization, and any 
damages and repairs. Setting these rules in advance will prevent future discussions and 
consequently will lower the risk of corruption.
For keeping technologies simple and ﬁnancially feasible, ﬁrst the planning process 
has to be open to the general public. All groups of the community should be included, 
especially the poor and other disadvantaged groups. 
The planning of complex service management projects should also incorporate 
the design of the approval processes in tendering and implementation. Environmental 
licenses are critical conditions of new projects, so getting these preliminary or ﬁnal 
permits is another point where bribery may take place. Here, corruption perceptions 
surveys of the general public and technical experts might help to identify the overall 
risks and the speciﬁc points of corruption. 
4.2.2 Project Design and Task Identiﬁcation 
The formulation of project speciﬁcations is usually preceded by a feasibility study, which 
will limit the options for the detailed technical and ﬁnancial planning. Consultants 
working on the feasibility study should not be connected in any way to companies later 
intending to take part in tendering. An improper selection of consultants and designers 
will increase the danger of biased speciﬁcations or over-design. 
The tasks of the future tender might be speciﬁed in two basic ways. In the case of 
simple services, when the required inputs are clearly identiﬁable, they are speciﬁed by the 
tender document. Here, their oﬀer sets only the prices of the items speciﬁed by the bill of 
quantities. This makes the comparison of the bids easier and will lower corruption risks. 
The other basic strategy is when the performance (outputs) is set by the tender docu-
ment. In this case, the entity submitting the tender has greater autonomy in oﬀering the 
input combination, technology, and price. This speciﬁcation of tasks can be used either 
203
M a k i n g  D e a l s :  T h e  R e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  P u b l i c  a n d  P r i v a t e  S e c t o r s
for simple service contracts (e.g., park maintenance) or for more complex projects (e.g., 
building a solid waste landﬁll). In this case the comparison of bids is more complicated 
as the proposed solutions and the applied technologies have to be compared. The risk 
of corruption is transferred to later steps: inspection, monitoring, and possible contract 
modiﬁcation.
The preparation of the request for tender should specify all the conditions for 
submitting proposals. Information on infrastructure projects should go beyond the 
technical speciﬁcations; the bidders should be allowed to visit the sites and to receive 
clariﬁcations. It is important to regulate the publicity of all this information to ensure 
an equal position for bidders. 
4.2.3 Submitting Proposals and Awarding Contracts 
Before bidders are able to respond to the request for tender, several other conditions of 
contract awarding have to be deﬁned: the deadlines, the forms of preparing proposals, 
the period of validity, any modiﬁcation, withdrawal, and notiﬁcation. On the requestor’s 
side of the tender opening and evaluation process, the evaluation criteria and the selec-
tion should be set in advance. An independent assessor monitoring the entire process of 
tendering and contract awarding might be appointed as well. Usually a draft standard 
contract is also provided as part of the tender documentation.
Even the most perfectly regulated procedures cannot entirely eliminate corruption. 
One potential cause of risk is on the client’s (the government’s) side. A conﬂict of interest 
might occur, when government oﬃcials, councilors, the mayor, or the administrative 
staﬀ have a personal business interest. Here only internal codes of conduct might lower 
the risk. National regulations on post-public employment could also make the rules of 
tender clear. On the bidder’s side there are the dangers of market division and creating 
cartels, which cannot be easily prevented. Declarations on not using bribes and putting 
no-corruption clauses in contracts might strengthen the legal base of using proper 
tendering techniques.
The tender evaluation should not only be based on transparent, preset criteria, but the 
process has to be open too. Here, the tender evaluation committee plays a critical role, 
for example, by opening the oﬀers publicly. The documents submitted by tenderers are 
not always public and they might contain conﬁdential business information. However, 
a decision on contract awarding has to be publicized and the contracts are public docu-
ments. As with any other government action, they should be under the regulation on 
access to public information, which overwrites the business conﬁdentiality rules.
4.2.4 Customer Relations: Pricing Policy and Managing Complaints 
As customers are in direct contact with service organizations, the relationship between 
the users and the service provider has to be regulated. Here, the main sources of corrup-
tion are the user charges or other payments (connection fee, repair work). 
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Metering should be the basis of pricing, because any proxies of water consumption 
might be subject to disputes. 
Two component tariﬀs (ﬂat and volume-based) are usually used, and block tariﬀs 
(by quantity of consumption) might minimize the corruption. All these methods of 
sophisticated user charges will work well if the revenue administration (billing and collec-
tion) is organized in a transparent way. 
Channels for customer complaints have to be set up by the service organizations 
and by the government. They are about reporting on service quality, the need for repair 
work, disconnections, and problems with billing. They might serve as indicators of 
service quality on the client’s side. At the companies they will prevent illegal payments 
for connections and repair work.
4.2.5 Contract Monitoring 
Complex, large-scale construction and service delivery projects require professional 
inspection and monitoring capacity on the client’s side. Savings achieved through 
contracting out and private sector incentives should be used partially for establishing 
strong control and audit mechanisms on the client’s side. Otherwise the beneﬁts of 
working with the private sector cannot be realized. The task of the service contract 
monitoring unit is to detect any substandard work or delays in contract implemen-
tation. Their job is to prepare the technical conditions of any contract variation or 
amendment and the possible agreement on the contract extension. Obviously, a direct 
and frequent connection with the contractor makes this position exposed to corrup-
tion risk.
5. What to Do against Corruption in Procurement?
Procurement in a wider sense includes various forms of the relationship between the 
public and the private sector, as they were discussed in the section above. Public procure-
ment is used for acquiring goods, supplies, for contracting out, and complex forms 
of public-private partnerships. In this broader sense, the value of public procurement 
reaches 15 percent of GDP in the average of OECD countries (OECD 2007). This 
is a huge amount, so any anti-corruption program might bring signiﬁcant results in 
ﬁnancial terms and also in increased trust in governments. 
The methods of ﬁghting against bribery and proposed techniques of curing corrup-
tion are the focus of international organizations, multinational development banks, 
non-governmental organizations, and obviously national governments. During the 
past decade several guidelines, recommendations, good practice databases, and pieces 
of legislation have been prepared. (For examples, see the relevant websites among the 
sources cited.) These counter-measures follow a similar logic, so by now there is a 
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consensus among analysts and practitioners on the main areas of anti-corruption actions 
in procurement. 
The starting point of these proposed methods is that only coordinated actions will 
result in a decline in corruption. There is a general shift from procedural aspects of 
procurement towards focusing on improved knowledge and greater professionalism. 
Improved understanding of the nature of their businesses will make the public authori-
ties and their civil servants better managers of the entire procurement and contract 
process. 
As the infrastructure and other public service contracts depend on the external insti-
tutional environment, remedies for corruption should target the following reforms (Cavil 
and Sohail 2006). Macroeconomic reforms through the opening of domestic markets, 
de-monopolization, and deregulation might create favorable conditions for competition 
and consequently for lower corruption risks. In the public sector civil service reforms 
and decentralization will improve accountability. External public pressure on both actors 
(businesses and governments), exercised by better informed citizens and civil society 
organizations, will contribute to decrease in corruption. Finally, increased chances of 
being punished for corruption and judicial reforms are also needed for comprehensive 
anti-corruption policies.
However, there is no general solution for all the problems related to corruption. 
Countries are diﬀerent by the level of corruption, the quality of governance, and the local 
culture towards partnering between the public and the private sector (Stalgren 2006). 
So in countries with a low level of corruption and a relatively developed governance, 
the new anti-corruption agencies, better diagnostic measures, greater public awareness, 
and initiating high proﬁle legal steps might work. However, in countries where corrup-
tion is high and the quality of governance is low, the decentralization of government, 
training, awareness raising on the costs of corruption, citizens’ charters, and stronger 
ﬁnancial control will bring results.
Anti-bribery actions in procurement focus on the following areas:4
  Prevention measures might target: the competition rules by opening up the 
market for service; the civil servants by providing training for them, introducing 
ethical codes, and post-employment standards; and the regulatory institutions by 
developing independent agencies. Simpliﬁed procurement procedures, together 
with improved transparency and use of diagnostic surveys, will decrease the 
corruption risks.
  Control mechanisms, both internal and external, should be made more eﬀec-
tive. Here, the protection of whistle-blowers, independent audits, the use of 
third-party information sources, and horizontal control mechanisms (cham-
bers, professional associations) will improve the eﬃciency of monitoring and 
control. 
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  Detection mechanisms on corruption are needed to do the ﬁling and reporting 
on bribes and to launch legal cases. Competitors, independent auditors, NGOs, 
and international organizations should be able to draw the attention of the 
governments or the general public to any irregularities.  
  Investigations and sanctions might be initiated by the agency responsible for 
procurement or any parties involved in the tender. In general, overregulated 
procedures might be counterproductive and will not lower signiﬁcantly the level 
of corruption. However, independent investigations from other professional 
areas, international organizations, and strong domestic enforcement mechanisms 
will improve the impact of legal actions. 
Combined eﬀorts of various types will enhance the general accountability in the public 
sector. Consequently they will have an impact on corruption in procurement, contracting 
out, and other forms of public-private partnership. A better understanding the nature of 
the public-private partnerships and more informed public oﬃcials on the rules and incen-
tives of the private sector will help to decrease the risk of corruption. As a general rule 
for working with the private sector, it can be stated that the transparency of government 
actions is insuﬃcient, but public decisions should be also seen as open ones.
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A b s t r a c t
This chapter discusses a relatively new area of public management: how management of 
government-owed property assets can be made more transparent and efficient, under a 
larger umbrella of fiscal transparency and anti-corruption within public management. The 
chapter starts by demonstrating that government property assets constitute a lion’s share of 
public wealth, which has been substantially overlooked by traditional financial management 
and also traditionally subject to conflict of interest and corruption. Then it reviews specific 
channels that typically lead to forgoing public benefits, from honest incompetence to influ-
ence of politics to corruption and favoritism. Further, the article presents the conceptual 
frameworks for reforming asset management at the central and local governments, with 
both being drawn from experiences of advanced reformers, such as Australia, Canada, and 
others. It illustrates how the framework for local governments has been applied in prac-
tice in Croatia. The chapter then reviews the systematic transparency and anti-corruption 
safeguards that can and should be introduced in municipal asset management, such as 
transparency of information on municipal assets, competitive procedures, better financial 
management, and attention to the governance of municipal enterprises. It concludes with 
a discussion of the issues that require further public debate: pros and cons of property 
devolution to local governments, a special legal regime for public property, leasing of 
surplus public property, balancing the regulatory regime between the central and local 
governments, and the “de-politization” of asset management.
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1. Introduction 
Governments own an impressive range of property: real estate (land, public housing, 
water distribution systems, roads, oﬃce buildings, etc.); movable property (vehicles, 
equipment); and even whole enterprises. While thinking about governmental property, 
it is useful to keep in mind two important aspects—legal and ﬁnancial. The legal side 
is related to how governmental ownership of property is deﬁned, documented, and 
protected. It also deﬁnes whether and how governmental property can be alienated 
(sold, leased, mortgaged), and what kind of limitations exist on uses of governmental 
property, etc. The ﬁnancial side is related to a very broad area of how governmental 
property is (or is not) incorporated into ﬁnancial reporting (accounting) and ﬁnancial 
planning (budgeting). In accounting terms, from the balance sheet viewpoint, real estate 
and movable property constitute ﬁxed (or capital) assets that are, as a rule, the main part 
of non-ﬁnancial assets on governmental balance sheets. Such particular types of capital 
assets like land, buildings, infrastructure, and equipment are usually distinguished as 
separate lines on the balance sheet, while other types are often added, depending on local 
speciﬁcs (for example, a speciﬁc asset type can be “art work” or “municipal housing”).
Asset management of public property is understood as the process of making and 
implementing decisions about property acquisition, use/management, and disposition. 
Until very recently, public property asset management had been very untransparent, 
ineﬃcient, and insuﬃciently integrated in public ﬁnancial management even in the most 
developed countries and their cities. Over the last decade, however, new approaches to 
public property have emerged that apply standards of economic eﬃciency and eﬀective 
organizational management. 
This chapter discusses a speciﬁc range of issues related to integration of public 
property asset management into ﬁscal transparency and anti-corruption eﬀorts. The 
chapter considers issues related to property owned by all levels of government (central, 
local), but also focuses on some speciﬁcs associated with municipal property (property 
of local governments). 
2. Why Is Integration Important?
Fiscal reasons. To appreciate importance of government-owned property, it is useful to 
look at governmental balance sheets. This would immediately demonstrate a fundamental 
fact: public property represents the largest portion of public wealth even in countries 
that slimmed down their property holdings. For example, the federal government of 
Australia, which is among the world’s few advanced reformers of public asset manage-
ment and privatized very large portfolios of governmental property (Conway 2006), 
by mid-2003 still had 48.3 percent of the value of its assets held in non-ﬁnancial assets, 
mainly infrastructure, equipment, land, and buildings. At the level of local governments, 
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at least urban, the share of non-ﬁnancial assets among all assets is normally even higher. 
It varies from 50 percent to 99 percent of the total balance sheet, as examples below 
demonstrate:
Table 1.
Value of Capital Assets, as Percent of Total Assets on City’s Balance Sheet
City Value of Capital Assets, as Percent of Total Assets 
on City’s Balance Sheet
Dallas, Texas, USA (2003)1 81.4%
Varazdin, Croatia (2000)2 60% (plus 8.3% in shares in companies)
Ostrava, Czech Republic (1996)3 93.3% (plus 6.2% in shares in companies)
In post-socialist countries, there are additional speciﬁcs that magnify the importance 
of public property, especially for local governments. First, the value of public property 
compared to an annual public budget can be substantially higher than in developed 
market economies. Second, the authority of local governments over their municipal 
property is often higher than their authority over their budgets. This happens because 
ﬁscal decentralization is not completed yet in many countries. Local governments do 
not have truly independent local budgets and taxes, but they can acquire and dispose 
of municipal property quite independently. 
Unfortunately, there are endless examples illustrating that governments of all 
levels in all types of economies often underuse the ﬁscal potential of their property. 
A common systemic problem is that the principles of good ﬁnancial management are 
not applied to public property assets, except in a few of the most advanced countries 
(Australia, New Zealand). As a result, the following weaknesses are typical for property 
asset management: 
  Property-related expenses are neither monitored nor managed in any systematic 
way. High administrative costs are usually not recognized, not monitored, and 
not managed (for example, administrative duplication and fragmentation of 
asset and property management and low productivity of public employees).
  The revenue potential of public properties is substantially underused. This is a 
problem worldwide, and not just in former socialist economies (for example: 
obsolete properties are retained in governmental ownership instead of being 
privatized; public property is leased out to private tenants at prices below market; 
etc.) 
  The true market value of assets is not recognized and not maintained (there is 
huge deferred maintenance and repair associated with public property every-
where, which leads to loss of public wealth concentrated in real estate). 
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On the other hand, some local governments (for example, in some Chinese cities) 
have been very entrepreneurial and managed to unlock the market value of their lands 
and leveraged this value for raising capital investment in urban infrastructure, some-
times using their monopolistic position in land supply for going further than would be 
prudent (Peterson 2006). 
Corruption and conﬂict-of-interest related reasons. Another fundamental reason for 
integrating management of public property assets into systematic anti-corruption eﬀorts 
is that this area or public management has been traditionally known as prone to corrup-
tion, abuse, and conﬂict of interest. Cases vary widely—from legal but bad practices (for 
example, political parties that won local elections providing free-of-charge municipal 
premises for themselves in Serbia), to direct corruption associated with allocation of 
municipal vacant land, built-up properties, and contracts to private sector actors. 
Moreover, this traditional reality turns to be reinforced by the existing regulatory 
environment. A recent study by Barbara Kudrycka (2004) in six countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia) revealed that the use of municipal 
property is among the least protected from conﬂict-of-interest abuses, comparing to 
other areas under the jurisdiction of local governments. 
3. Causes and Channels of Forgoing Public Benefits
It is important to recognize that ineﬃciencies in public property asset management take 
place for many reasons, and not necessarily because of corruption. At the same time, 
ineﬃciencies of all types unavoidably translate into forgone public beneﬁts, regardless of 
whether or not this loss is evaluated in ﬁnancial terms. Therefore, measures for mitigating 
ineﬃciencies should aim for removal or reduction of all types of ineﬃciencies, and not 
only the criminal part of the “ineﬃciency spectrum.” The following classiﬁcation covers 
most causes and channels of forgone public beneﬁts: 
  Honest incompetence. Managing highly diversiﬁed portfolios of public real 
estate requires quite sophisticated professional qualiﬁcations, while governmental 
employees tasked with property asset management usually do not have even a 
basic background in property and portfolio management.4 
  Lack of proper incentives for public sector agencies and staﬀ. One of the most 
common examples is a direct disincentive for governmental agencies or levels of 
government to privatize surplus real estate: proceeds from property sales go fully 
or by a substantial part into budgets of other agencies or levels of government. 
This situation has been typical for both developed countries and transitional 
economies. In addition, local governments in countries in transition often have 
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another disincentive for property privatization: they do not have much control 
over the property tax imposed on privatized properties, but may deﬁne lease 
rates if they retain properties in municipal ownership and lease them out. 
Another universal disincentive is that compensation of governmental employees in 
most countries does not depend on their performance. In particular, it does not depend 
on whether they manage their properties and property portfolios eﬃciently or not. 
  Inadequate legal and regulatory environment. As a rule, until eﬃciency-oriented 
reforms of public asset management are introduced, historically-developed laws 
and regulations are simply not relevant for eﬃcient asset management. This is 
true for most developed countries, including the USA and Roman Law countries 
(France, Switzerland, etc.), where the body of law has been developing histori-
cally based on social values and principles that are diﬀerent from economic 
eﬃciency in the public sector. In other words, from the eﬃciency viewpoint, 
this area of public management is either overregulated or underregulated, or 
both at the same time. Only recent, consciously-designed reforms (for example, 
in Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and, to some extent, France) started intro-
ducing economic and ﬁnancial eﬃciency as a basis for the regulatory regimes 
related to public property. In transitional and post-transitional5 countries, the 
regulatory regimes are far from being balanced as well. 
  Inﬂuence of politics. Politics are very much at the heart of government deci-
sion-making when it comes to managing real property assets. Politics set this 
area apart from the private sector and make it diﬃcult to apply asset manage-
ment models from the private sector. As Hentschel and Utter (2006) acutely 
noted, eliminating political inﬂuence from governmental decisions “is like 
removing sand from the beach.” Politicians often have legitimate and appropriate 
concerns about the management of public property, from promoting economic 
development to responding to concerns of their constituents. As a result, policy 
priorities may lead to solutions regarding governmental real estate or investment 
not optimal from purely ﬁnancial and real estate viewpoints. At the same time, 
there are numerous examples all over the world when politics lead to decisions 
that do not represent—in any sound way—public interests or public policy. In 
addition, there is an obvious timing gap between a relatively short political cycle 
and the substantially longer time needed for strategic asset management.
So, what should emerge as a subject of public debate is whether it is feasible and 
desirable to introduce binding policies, rules, and regulations related to asset management 
that would reasonably protect public property from decisions stemming from partisan or 
biased politics. It seems that regulations regarding federal property in Australia provide 
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a promising illustration that evolution in this direction is feasible (Conway 2006). It 
is also useful to note that countries and cities in Eastern Europe can become a major 
world laboratory in this area, because their asset management practices are less loaded 
with historically-rooted approaches. 
  Legitimized conﬂicts of interest. Quite often, the legal actions of governments 
or governmental oﬃcials constitute what certainly can and should be recog-
nized—from the public interest and eﬃciency viewpoints—as bad practices or 
direct conﬂict of interest. For example, in Serbia, political parties that win at 
local elections then headquarter themselves in business premises in municipal 
buildings (usually, at prime downtown locations), as free-of-charge tenants. In 
Croatia (at least, until recently), local oﬃcials could legally own up to 25 percent 
of shares in municipal companies. 
  Corruption and favoritism. Corruption and favoritism in the area of public 
property is such an old story that it has made its way into literature classics.6 No 
doubt, societies across the world are trying to curb this area of corruption, in 
particular by introducing laws on competitive and transparent public procure-
ment. However, corruption associated with public property, and, in particular, 
with sales, leases, and other forms of allocating rights in public property to 
private economic actors is still alive in many countries. It remains a major 
problem in most post-Soviet countries, some transitional countries in Europe, 
and China. 
4. Approaches to Protecting Public Interests, 
 Increasing Efficiency, and Reducing Corruption 
Obviously, increasing eﬃciency in such a complex area as property asset management 
and curbing corruption requires actions along many lines. Furthermore, there are speciﬁc 
tasks associated with diﬀerent levels of government. Finally, a focus on protecting public 
interests brings to the forefront the public debate on speciﬁc issues. 
4.1 Reform Framework for Central Governments 
The issue of increasing overall eﬃciency of asset management has been the focus of 
asset management reforms undertaken in several countries. The generalization of their 
experiences allows the creation of a “composite image” of the reform framework appli-
cable to property assets of both central and local governments (in the latter case—with 
some modiﬁcations):7
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4.1.1 Explicit Public Policy 
Reform measures must be driven at the highest level of government by a clear, explicit 
policy framework applicable to all public real assets under control of a particular level 
of government (central, local).
4.1.2 Recognition of the Cost of Fixed Asset Ownership and Use 
It is no longer acceptable to view public property as a “free good”; there is a cost asso-
ciated with its use and this cost must be recognized and managed explicitly. There is 
broad consensus that the cost of operating and maintaining ﬁxed assets—especially 
oﬃce accommodation, infrastructure, vehicles, and oﬃce equipment—should be 
recognized and addressed explicitly. Occupancy costs—implied or actual rent—also 
tend to be recognized, but some countries do not apply this to all publicly-owned oﬃce 
space. There is more variation in the approach to recognizing and managing the costs 
associated with the ownership of ﬁxed assets. This includes three separate issues: the 
valuation of the asset, depreciation, and the cost of capital. Consistent with the focus 
on the opportunity cost of holding a ﬁxed asset, most of the country-reformers have 
instituted a continuing process of identifying assets that are no longer needed or where 
ownership is no longer justiﬁed on economic grounds. In these cases, there is a process 
for disposing of the assets, usually at or near market prices. Finally, life-cycle costing 
is used as a practical and eﬀective way to manage the costs of asset ownership and use. 
This technique looks at all phases of ownership of an asset, encompassing acquisition, 
ownership, and disposal, and includes not just the production or acquisition costs, but 
also costs to operate and maintain the asset. 
4.1.3 Information Systems
The lack of data or incomplete data is a major impediment to launching any reforms. 
Not knowing exactly what government owns, the occupancy levels associated with each 
property, property characteristics, operating costs, and maintenance requirements is 
an immense barrier to progress. Information should be relevant to overall approaches 
to reformed asset management and has to be eﬀectively managed. However, speciﬁc 
approaches to asset management information (in particular, its centralization or decen-
tralization) vary across the breadth of countries- and cities-reformers.
4.1.4 Accountability Mechanisms
Accountability involves overall stewardship of assets, and this means eﬀective mechanisms 
to measure results and an accounting system that will drive eﬀective decision-making at 
the level of the custodian. Government must be able to hold asset managers accountable 
for the assets in their custody and be assured that these assets are serving their intended 
purposes and achieving targeted results.
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4.1.5 Decentralization of Management Responsibilities/Strengthening 
 Central Leadership Role/Incentives 
In general, countries-reformers have delegated a lot of authority to individual institutions 
and agencies. However, this decentralization is carefully paired with various incentives 
and penalties (or performance benchmarks) built into the system along the whole chain 
to stir decision-making at and performance of asset-managing entities toward eﬀective 
implementation of policies and principles established centrally. 
Concurrently with the decentralization of management responsibilities, these 
countries have moved to strengthen the role of the central policy and monitoring and 
evaluation functions. As much of the policy oversight is accomplished through an overall 
budget process, it is often a central institution that assumes the policy function, such 
as the Ministry of Finance in Australia or Treasury Board in Canada. Audit agencies, 
such as the Auditor General in Canada or the National Audit Oﬃce in Australia, have 
an important role in advocating the need for the reforms and program monitoring, 
although the audit function has no decision-making or policy formulation responsibili-
ties. Both the budget and audit processes maintain a continuing process of evaluation, 
as all countries recognize that their reforms are breaking new ground where there are 
no sure and proven performance benchmarks.
Another important instrument for leading reform, especially on technical issues, is 
the involvement of professional organizations that often help the central government 
entity that leads the reform to identify technical issues that should be addressed and to 
develop related guidance and standards.
In new systems of decentralized management, the central institutions with broad 
functions of asset management do not necessarily disappear, but their procedures 
have been modiﬁed and adjusted to be more consistent with a system of decentralized 
management. For example, in Australia, the Property Management Branch within the 
Department of Finance and Administration also works in a competitive market since 
the governmental tenants are not forced to use the services oﬀered by the Branch’s asset 
manager, United. 
4.1.6 Privatization Initiatives
“Privatization” involves two separate initiatives: asset disposition and private asset 
management. Asset disposition is the identiﬁcation and disposal of assets not required 
for government programs and functions (surplus property), and private asset manage-
ment is the engagement of the private sector in managing government-owned assets, 
where cost savings and eﬃciency in the delivery of services by the private sector are 
demonstrated clearly. 
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Asset Disposition. For varying reasons, governments are prone to retain control over 
economically or functionally obsolete assets (such as military bases that date back to 
the Second World War or, in transitional countries, assets from social and commercial 
activities that are no longer under government control) or engage in acquisition/invest-
ment projects not needed for their core activities and programs. These surplus assets are 
an important case, and the experiences of the countries-reformers have common threads 
that provide examples of possible approaches to the issue: 
  Clear policy guidance to help identify what assets fall into the surplus category. 
Identiﬁcation can be according to a broad statement of principles as in the case 
of Canada, or more speciﬁc quantitative or detailed guidance as in the case of 
Australia. The point is that a government must explicitly declare that it will not 
retain ownership of assets that are not required for its programs. Typically, these 
policies will also apply to the acquisition of new assets so that the government 
does not continue to accumulate surplus or unproductive assets. 
  Clear, written rules for the disposal of surplus assets. These rules can be a special-
ized law that assigns responsibilities and deﬁnes procedures for asset disposal. 
In the four Western countries studied, the disposal must be at market prices, 
except in the case of explicit circumstances that require special authorization. 
  Some countries have established a special agency that is responsible for putting the assets 
on the market. In some cases, this agency may take some preliminary steps to prepare 
the asset for the market in the expectation that this will enhance its value.
Private Asset Management. Reform governments have sought not just to import best 
practices for management of real property assets from the private sector, but to actually 
turn over management responsibilities to private sector ﬁrms and to sometimes remove 
themselves from these tasks completely. This removal ranges from the outsourcing of 
selected services, such as property management or brokerage, to the wholesale transfer 
of asset management and property management responsibilities like in Australia. 
4.1.7 New Accounting Practices 
Traditional cash accounting may have served the central requirements of public budg-
eting but it did not enable sound decision-making among asset managers. The move to 
accrual accounting and the requirements for asset valuations began to address a number 
of weaknesses typical for cash accounting.
The experiences of advanced reformers demonstrate that implementation of compre-
hensive asset management reform at the central government level takes substantial time 
(years, if not dozens of years) even in countries with a strong and consistent political will 
to proceed. The biggest challenge—and perhaps biggest diﬀerences among countries—is 
related to sequencing the elements of reform.8 
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4.2 Municipal Asset Management Framework
Guidance on municipal asset management is an urgent necessity because in former 
socialist countries, public property has been decentralized on a grand scale as a part of 
government decentralization. Among 26 countries in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, about three-quarters have legally established a separate form of 
property—municipal property (Kaganova 2006). There is no comprehensive statistical 
or ﬁscal information on property transferred into municipal ownership (Peteri 2003), 
but all empirical evidence shows that local governments in most countries became 
owners of huge property portfolios—directly and through ownership of communal and 
utility companies. A useful framework for municipal asset management was suggested 
in some Urban Institute publications (for example, Kaganova, Undeland 2006) and is 
reproduced below (Box 1). 
Box 1.
Framework for Municipal Asset Management
Inventory Component
 Develop and maintain comprehensive records of properties owned by the local government 
(including properties managed and used by various municipal departments and enterprises)
Property Management and Accounting Component
 Develop and maintain a property management and accounting system on a property-by-
property basis (including all revenues, costs, and occupancy / tenants’ records)
 Include the value of each property in the accounting database, and include financial liens 
against each property
 Formalize in writing the relationships regarding property with all tenants/users of municipal 
property
 Use private-sector property management approaches for improving public property 
management
Asset (Portfolio) Management Component
 Formulate a strategic role of real estate in attaining municipal goals
 Develop classification of property by its role in performing governmental functions and apply 
this classification while conducting an inventory
 Develop and use class-specific financial tools and performance standards 
 Monitor property and portfolio financial performance 
 Implement a portfolio management approach, including proactive manage-ment of social 
use and surplus portfolios 
 Make transparent rules on how municipal property (including land) is allocated to third-party 
(private, non-governmental) users 
 Develop and implement policies aimed at rationing property demands and consumption by 
governmental departments and social users
 Make asset management accountable through regular reporting
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Box 1. (continued)
Framework for Municipal Asset Management
Strategy Implementation Component
 Establish a centralized real estate authority with overview or direct control over asset 
management
 Devise written policies and decision-making roles for the acquisition/holding/disposition of 
assets
 Develop in-house real estate expertise and use outside real estate professionals as needed 
 Set up incentives for more efficient use and management of municipal property assets
It is important to emphasize that eﬀective use of this framework implies that 
municipal property has a reasonable autonomy and a legal and regulatory base established 
by central government. It is also useful to notice that the frameworks in the previous 
section and in Table 2 overlap conceptually to a very large extent (for example, both 
recognize the need to have explicit policies, incentives for asset managers, inventory 
records, etc.).
Again, as in the case of the central government reform, the framework in Box 1 is 
quite ambitious and requires time to implement. However, any local government can 
select items from this “menu” that have the highest priority in local circumstances and 
are politically and administratively feasible to start with. This “tailored to local realities” 
approach proved to work well in a number of transitional countries (Croatia, Kyrgyzstan). 
For example, a sub-set of activities from the above list was implemented, in various 
degrees, by several cities in Croatia (Varazdin, Split, Rijeka, Karlovac, and others) as the 
“Initial Asset Management Model” that included 11 elements (Box 2).
Box 2. 
Croatian Cities: “Initial Asset Management Model”
1. Introduction of an information system on a property-by-property level 
2. Transitional issues 
3. Property classiﬁcation 
4. Real estate and business appraisal 
5. Operating statements for income-generating properties or portfolios
6. Intensive ﬁnancial analysis of portfolios, properties, and projects
7. Deregulation of business rentals and improvement of rental practices 
8. Quantiﬁcation and monitoring of direct and indirect property-related subsidies obtained 
by tenants and users of local government’s real estate
9. Reporting on property
10. Management consolidation
11. Comprehensive asset management plan
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4.3 Focus on Transparency, Anti-Corruption, and Overall Eﬃciency
Even for countries with established democracies and developed economies, improving 
management of public property assets represents multiple challenges. Is the task 
daunting and impossible for countries with emerging democracies and transitional or 
developing economies, and in particular, for their local governments? Not really—there 
are approaches, instruments, and techniques (some of them relatively simple) that can 
truly improve the anti-corruption climate and overall eﬃciency. 
Box 3.
Power of Information Transparency
An inventory of municipal land in one of Kyrgyzstan’s cities revealed that 86 hectares of municipal 
land were allocated to 178 various private land tenants (legal entities and physical persons) free-
of-charge, which was against the law and also represented a substantial portion of land, given 
that land leases made up only 11.5 hectares. When this information was presented to the mayor, 
he paled, literally, because he immediately recognized negative legal and public relations implica-
tions—in addition to forgone revenues for the city budget.
Many violations of public interests on the corruption and conﬂict-of-interest end of 
the “ineﬃciency spectrum” take place at speciﬁc moments in the property life cycle: (i) 
property acquisition (or other capital investment, such as reconstruction), (ii) property 
disposition, and (iii) allocation of partial rights in property to third parties (use, lease, 
transfer to municipal enterprises). This is where anti-corruption mechanisms should be 
built into the asset management process (Peteri, Schaeﬀer 2007). 
Some of main anti-corruption and eﬃciency-oriented approaches are suggested and 
discussed below, with a focus on applying them to municipal property.9 However, similar 
approaches are applicable to property owned by other levels of government as well. 
4.3.1 Introduction of Systematic Transparency into Municipal Property 
This, in turn, should proceed along a number of directions:
  Transparency of Information
  Pure facts about municipal property, if properly disclosed, constitute a very 
powerful instrument to make local governments accountable (Box 2). 
  Speciﬁcally, for the transparency of information, we recommend: 
  – An inventory municipal property assets (buildings, land) directly controlled 
by local governments and budgetary organizations. Open the inventory 
records to the public and mass media 
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  – Establish, maintain, and open to the public and mass media:
   • A directory of all tenants (users, lessees) of public property (including 
land), with key characteristics of tenancy (for how long, at what price/
payment)10
   • A directory of all acquisition and disposition transactions with public 
property (from whom acquired, for which price, and through which 
procedure; similar for dispositions)
   • Quantitative, project-by-project information on municipal capital 
investment and borrowing 
  – Introduce at least annual reports on municipal property, which would be 
presented to local elected councils, published, and made available to the 
public; they should be quantitative and speciﬁc and summarize information 
on property portfolios, transactions, and investment.
  Transparency of Procedures and Decisions 
  All rules regarding allocating public property to non-governmental users should 
be in writing and made available to the public. Further, the public should have 
access to key events related to public property, such as meetings of city govern-
ment and auctions or opening of sealed bids. 
   It is impossible to overestimate the leading role that mass media and 
watchdog groups can play in building public demand and expectations regarding 
transparency. At the same time, a requirement of public disclosure of informa-
tion and opening procedures to the public should not be left to journalists alone 
and should be codiﬁed in law, as discussed further. 
   Further, broad awareness and education campaigns are needed: even for 
formulating requests for information or disclosures or asset management reports, 
some technical knowledge is needed that is lacking in most countries in general. 
Hence, there is a strong need to educate governments, the public, watchdog 
groups, and mass media.
4.3.2 Use of Competitive Procedures 
All real property purchases, sales, and leases to non-budgetary tenants should go through 
competitive procedures and at market prices. It is important to notice that here lies 
one of the important diﬀerences between countries with low corruption (such as New 
Zealand or Australia) and countries more prone to corruption. In non-corrupt countries, 
it is suﬃcient to require that public property is disposed at market prices estimated by 
independent appraisers, but not necessarily through open competitive procedures. In 
countries with high corruption, use of independent appraisers does not work well, and 
open auctions or sealed bids are an absolute necessity. 11 
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4.3.3 Adherence and Enforcement of Existing Laws 
A common problem is that even laws that already exist and should protect public 
interests are often not followed in local government practices. Speciﬁcs vary broadly, 
but here are some examples: 
  Competitive procedures of leasing and selling properties are required but not 
applied.
  Income from property sales (capital income) has to be used for capital invest-
ment, but instead is used to cover deﬁcits of operating budgets.
  The public is not informed and not admitted to local government meetings 
approving property decisions. 
4.3.4 Attention and Spotlight on Municipal Enterprises
Municipal enterprises are the least monitored and supervised part of local government 
asset management (Hegedus 2004; Kasso and Pergerne-Szabo 2004). This has led to 
massive loss of potential revenues for public budgets and loss of assets, as reviewed by 
Olga Kaganova (2006). Improving governance of public enterprises and ﬁnding alter-
natives to them (such as outsourcing service provision to the private sector) is one of 
central challenges of asset management. Discussing this topic would go well beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, some general directions are: inventorying assets, improving 
ﬁnancial management and reporting (in this case, to a founder, local government), and 
fully disclosing to the public the assets and ﬁnancial performance of the enterprises.
4.3.5 Improving Financial Management of Public Property
This is a broad technical issue. The core idea, however, is that a large portion of honest 
ineﬃciencies in asset management originates from the fact that ﬁnancial management 
of property assets does not exist in local governments. For example, as indicated in the 
beginning of this chapter, local governments do not know and even do not try to know 
the full operating and maintenance costs associated with each property (building, facility). 
Rational and eﬃciency-oriented decisions are impossible in such a situation. 
4.3.6 Creating Competitive Pressure, Deregulating Property Use and Prices,
 Attracting Professionals and the Private Sector 
These elements are all important for increasing eﬃciency. Given the enormity of work 
that should be done to improve eﬃciency of asset management, it is important to start 
some key eﬀorts—such as monitoring operating expenses on a property-by-property 
basis or outsourcing municipal services to private providers—from properties and services 
where most ﬁscal beneﬁts can be expected, without high risks involved. 
 
225
I n t e g r a t i n g  P u b l i c  P r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  R e a l m  o f  F i s c a l  T r a n s p a r e n c y  a n d  A n t i - c o r r u p t i o n  E f f o r t s 
5. Issues for Further Public Debate 
Reforming management of governmental property assets is a clearly growing area within 
public sector reforms. It has a broad span, from policy and technical debates to experi-
mentation with various instruments and techniques, including such advanced instru-
ments as public-private partnerships and private ﬁnance for public infrastructure. Some 
issues have been revisited over time, due to the evolution of broader views on the public 
sector’s role and accumulation of new evidence. Furthermore, reforming public property 
asset management is an ongoing process that brings new challenges as it proceeds. 
1. Should devolution of property from central to local governments take place, especially 
given multiple evidence that local governments often do not do a good job of managing 
property assets? Regarding real estate, the answer seems to be “yes,” from both view-
points: eﬃciency and anti-corruption. Real estate is always a local matter, and it is 
impossible to manage properties eﬃciently from the capital. Besides, holding local 
oﬃcials accountable for property mismanagement is easier than a faceless somebody 
in the capital. A couple of recent examples can illustrate this point (Box 4). 
Box 4.
Is Central Government a Better Owner than Local Government?
Serbia. Municipal governments have to request permission from the central government agency 
to terminate any lease agreement, even if it is just for 15 square meters in a basement, and tenants 
chronically do not pay rent. Such requests go unanswered for months, if not years. This nulliﬁes 
any economic eﬃciency of surplus rental property. 
Kyrgyzstan. One city government was asking the central government to transfer a movie theater 
into municipal ownership, which had been non-operational for several years. The local govern-
ment was going to convert the building into a multi-functional public center. However, the 
central government continued to retain the property, without providing any maintenance or 
security. When the city mayor took the author of this paper to the site, the building had been 
deconstructed and stolen brick-by-brick down to its foundation.
  An important caveat, however, is that governments (at any level) should not be 
encouraged to retain surplus properties and should be de-incentivized to do so. 
  Regarding municipal services, such as water supply, the answer is not obvious, and 
the issue is a subject of hot international debates. In many low-income countries, 
local governments do not have the expertise or capacity to govern and operate water 
companies, and other models can be more eﬃcient. 
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2. Is a special legal regime for public property justiﬁed? Many Western European coun-
tries have a special legal regime applicable to property used for public purposes—
property in “public patrimony” in France or “administrative” property (“patrimoine 
administratif ”) in Switzerland. Property of this type is, in general, not alienable, 
i.e., it cannot be disposed of or used as collateral and also may have limitations on 
use and management arrangements. However, there are special procedures that 
allow removal of property from public patrimony. For example, in France, this can 
be done by either enactment of special legislation or through a two-step process of 
declassiﬁcation from the public domain (Bizet 2006). Governments in most such 
countries may also own properties subject to a private sector law (i.e., regarding 
these properties, rules are the same as for private property owners). Which particular 
properties are included in the public patrimony varies by country. For example, in 
France, marketplaces are in public patrimony, while in Switzerland they are not. 
  In the beginning of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe, some experts from 
Western Europe strongly discouraged the use of the “public patrimony” concept in 
transitional countries as highly ineﬃcient economically. Their reasoning was that 
economic realities require regular changes in property use (for example, due to 
changing demographics, a school building might be not needed anymore), while 
the declassiﬁcation from public patrimony is a long and expensive process, largely 
reducing economic eﬃciency associated with governmental property. 
  Nevertheless, some countries in Central and Eastern Europe (at least, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia) reproduced this concept, in one 
form or another, while introducing laws on municipal property. Some researchers 
later discussed that in Hungary this concept did not seem to add to the security of 
public property, because declassiﬁcation can be easily performed by local govern-
ments (Kasso, Pergerne-Szabo 2004). 
  
Box 5.
Ineﬃcient Portfolios of Municipal Rental Properties
One Croatian city, when its government decided to improve its asset management, made an 
eﬀort to ﬁgure out the full costs of leasing each of its 59 business rentals, estimated market values 
of these premises, and estimated capitalization rates for each premises. The result was shocking for 
the managers: it turned out, that 19 out of 59 premises had a negative net income (the city was 
just losing money by leasing them!), and only nine premises had a capitalization rate higher than 
ﬁve percent. In other words, only nine out of 59 premises maybe made some sense as rentals, in 
the rational world! This city ﬁgured it out and, hopefully, will act upon this knowledge.
 
  The question for further debate is: Given intrinsic economic ineﬃciencies associ-
ated with asset management decisions regarding properties in “public patrimony,” 
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is the use of this legal form justiﬁed by gains in property protection? Can suﬃcient 
protection of public interests be achieved under more ﬂexible legal arrangements? 
For example, should the law require that any disposition or mortgaging of public 
property be pre-approved by an elected local council? 
3. Lease of public property as a potential source of losses for both public and private 
sector. Many local governments in transitional countries tend to retain surplus 
properties (commercial space, housing) and use these properties for income genera-
tion through short-term leasing. Furthermore, some governments prefer retaining 
urban land in public ownership. It is important to recognize that public ownership 
of land, with only partial rights (such as lease rights) allocated to private actors, is 
still dictated by law in some countries (China, Ethiopia). However, in most tran-
sitional countries private land ownership is recognized by law, and urban land is 
already substantially privatized. Nevertheless, retaining land in public ownership 
and allocating to investors long-term lease rights only continues to be a policy of 
choice for many local governments, with the City of Moscow being the most famous 
case. Though proponents of privatization are trying to argue about ineﬃciencies and 
other negative implications associated with the broad use of this leasing model, many 
local governments continue to grip onto surplus built-up properties and land. 
  No doubt, further education of local governments and the public is needed to 
demonstrate the types and scale of losses associated with this leasing model. The 
subject of splitting “legal rights” (retained by government) and “economic rights“ 
(held by leases or investors) has been discussed internationally by real estate analysts, 
both conceptually (Barzel 1997) and practically (for example, Jieming Zhu 2002). 
They have demonstrated how the leasing model creates negative implications, 
including non-productive costs, reduced property values, and ineﬃcient land 
usage. Examples of ineﬃciencies are astonishing (Box 4), but often not quantiﬁed. 
Governments—as mentioned in the beginning of the chapter—do not know the 
full ﬁnancial results related to their rental portfolios. Hundreds of former socialist 
cities do not know how much it costs for them to operate portfolios of dozens or 
hundreds or even thousands of business rentals, many of which produce either direct 
losses or insuﬃcient returns on investment. Cities also do not monitor how wealth 
accumulated in this real estate is dissipating (lessees, with their short-term leases, 
do not have any economic reasons to invest in maintenance and repair). 
  Long-term land leases have their own speciﬁcs for transitional and developing 
economies, which makes their broad use a questionable public policy (Kaganova, 
McKellar 2006):
  The land leasing model is more expensive and complicated to administer. First, it 
separates rights in land from rights in improvements on the land (i.e., buildings), 
which requires establishing and maintaining separate systems for registering 
leasehold rights of land tenants and their ownership rights in improvements. 
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Second, governments become holders of large portfolios of lease contracts, and 
these portfolios must be monitored and managed, which adds to the cost of 
land management. Third, a single property tax is not applicable because taxa-
tion of buildings and payments for land must be administrated separately. For 
transitional and developing countries just establishing their property registration 
systems and reforming taxation, this model imposes a double burden on both 
governments and property holders.
  The land leasing model requires sophisticated legal knowledge on the part of partici-
pants. The lease agreement is a binding contract, and parties entering in this 
contractual arrangement must be fully aware of their legal obligations under the 
terms of the lease. This is not something that relatively unsophisticated and small 
landholders will understand. The quality of the lease itself is crucial. Omission 
of key provisions—for example, who owns what at the date of termination, or 
renewal provisions—can lead to multiple cases of litigation or mass protests 
(there are examples of both). This model is heavily weighted in favor of lessees 
with good lawyers and shrewd negotiators at their disposal. As a result, the land 
lease system in less developed countries often unintentionally discriminates 
against small domestic lessees and acts in favor of experienced foreign interests, 
quite the opposite of intended goals.
  The land leasing model assumes a well-established institutional framework. The 
success of contractual arrangements depends upon respect for the legal system 
and an institutional framework that can enforce compliance. However, contrac-
tual law is relatively new for many transitional and developing countries and 
property-related contracts are often violated by all parties including local govern-
ments, especially in large cities. Private investors are inclined to distrust lease 
rights granted by local governments and opt for ownership rights established by 
law, except where there are incentives attached to the leasing option. Corruption 
is also a threat to this model, as experiences in many countries, including China 
and Russia demonstrate. 
  The land leasing model is associated with higher transaction costs. Trading and 
mortgaging land leases, where permitted, typically incur higher transaction costs 
than do trading and mortgaging owned land. Leasing also appears to limit liquidity, 
because governmental approval—in one form or another—is often needed. 
  For transitional and developing countries, the accumulated experience of the past 
10 to 15 years poses this public policy question: Are there enough clear beneﬁts 
with the land lease model to justify its use compared with the ownership model? 
What goals and objectives cannot be achieved with the relatively simpler, cheaper, 
and more corruption-resistant land ownership model? 
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4. Balance the regulatory regime for municipal property between the central government 
laws and local regulations. Does an optimum exist? This is a real challenge because 
tiny but wrongly placed provisions can cause ineﬃciency. For example, a law on 
municipal property in Bulgaria required city mayors to sign all lease agreements on 
municipal premises. Do not mayors have more serious work to do? Would it not 
be more appropriate to require local councils to develop and approve leasing proce-
dures, which would specify who signs these leases? This area certainly needs more 
work, and it would be useful to try to develop a prototype of a “rightly balanced” 
regulatory system. In the author’s view such a system would include three main 
components:
  Central government law(s), establishing basic principles and requirements about 
municipal property and local governments’ rights and obligations as owners. 
This includes a requirement to have a local (municipal) Ordinance on Asset 
Management adopted by local elected body (council);
  A set of prototype documents to be adopted by local governments, including a 
prototype Ordinance. This set of documents should be developed by a central 
government or non-government entity and be oﬀered to local governments as 
not mandatory to use;
  Local Ordinance on Asset Management and other local regulations—all adopted 
as documents obligatory for mayor oﬃces (executive branches) to follow. 
 
5. Recognize importance of written policies. Good asset management as a sustain-
able process (versus a push by one progressive person at local government) is not 
possible without explicit, preferably written policies. For example, to get rid of 
non-performing business rentals, asset managers need a mandate to privatize them, 
which should be established as a policy by the local council. The need for written 
policies brings up a whole host of challenges. First, there is no intrinsic culture at 
local governments to produce and implement written policies. Second, if such a 
policy is developed, what should be its legal status—should it be codiﬁed into a 
legally binding document (ordinance) or be a softer document? Third, in some cases 
it is not clear where to start—from policies or procedures. 
6. How much is “de-politization” of asset management feasible and desirable? Is it 
feasible to reign in the inﬂuence of politics on asset management decisions by 
introducing a local Ordinance on Asset Management? If so, countries in transition 
might be a good place to try, as local governments there are still less swamped by 
layers of historically established ways of running the business of government than 
most developed countries. 
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Notes
1 According to G. Peterson (2006).
2 According to O. Kaganova et al. (2001).
3 According to O. Kaganova, R. Nayyar-Stone, and G. Peterson (2000).
4 Very interesting examples of innocent but costly mistakes that can be caused by lack of 
professional expertise are provided by John Hentschel and Marilee Utter (2006) regarding 
the City of Baltimore (USA). 
5 Those ex-socialist countries that have been admitted into the European Union. 
6 For example, All the King’s Men by Robert Penn Warren.
7 Draws upon F. Conway, O. Kaganova, and J. McKellar (2006) who generalized the reform 
experiences of Australia, Canada, France, and New Zealand. 
8 This subject is discussed in the chapter from which the above reform framework is drawn. 
9 Readers will easily recognize that all anti-corruption and eﬃciency-oriented approaches 
listed below in items A–F are fully compatible with the framework of good asset manage-
ment suggested in Table 2. These approaches can be interpreted as speciﬁc justiﬁcations or 
technical solutions for the framework in Table 2. 
10 A lot of corruption, favoritism, or conﬂict of interest happens through allocating public 
property to various users under “preferential conditions,” which often implies free-of-charge 
or below-market prices. Disclosure of information on conditions is essential.
11 For example, comparison of prices obtained for municipal land sites sold through “direct 
sales” at estimated market prices and on auctions in one of Kyrgyzstan’s cities with a very 
active real estate market demonstrated that auction prices were, on average, at least 40 
percent higher that “appraised” prices for similar sites. 
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Finding the Money focuses on 
those areas of government 
most exposed to grand or 
petty corruption: budgeting, 
tax administration, public 
procurement, and management 
of government assets. The 
eight chapters collected 
in this volume are based 
on the assumption that 
corruption has systemic 
causes. By improving social 
accountability mechanisms and 
by increasing the institutional 
and human capacities of 
government, malfunctioning 
states and municipalities 
can be transformed. The 
anti-corruption techniques 
presented here go well beyond 
the introduction of political 
control mechanisms, expanding 
transparency, or revising the 
compact between the state and 
private service organizations 
to recommend the steps
needed for fiscal transparency 
and good governance. Public 
sector integrity also depends 
on governments’ capacity 
to introduce these measures, 
the incentives to comply set 
by intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, the use of audit 
and the shortest route of 
accountability, i.e., its direct 
influence by customers 
on service providers.
